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ABSTRACT
Economic p r i c e  t h e o r y  h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i z e d  w i t h  
r e l a t i v e  c o n s i s t e n c y  s i n c e  th e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 ' s .  C r i t i c s  
c o n te n d  t h a t  p r i c e  t h e o r y  n e e d s  an o r i e n t a t i o n  to w a rd  
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  p r i c i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  b u s i n e s s m a n .
Even w i t h  th e  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  N e o - c l a s s i c a l  p r i c e  
a n a l y s i s  made by P r o f e s s o r  Edward C h a m b e r l in  and M rs .  
J o a n  R o b in so n ,  th e  a t t a c k  upon p r i c e  t h e o r y  h a s  c o n ­
t i n u e d .
The p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  work h a s  b e e n  t o  a n a l y z e  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  oconomic t h e o r y  t o  b u s i n e s s  p r i c e  
p r a c t i c e s .  The p ro b le m  i s  one o f  f i n d i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  
e c o n o m i s t  i s  r i g h t  o r  wrong ,  o r  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  o n ly  
on e l e m e n t  o f  d i v e r g e n c e  b e tw e e n  econom ic  and b u s i n e s s  
c o n c e p t s .
The m ethod  o f  a p p ro a c h  h a s  b e e n  to  p r e s e n t  c u r ­
r e n t  p r i c e  t h e o r y  i n  a  b r i e f  s u r v e y  and t o  f o l l o w  t h i s  
w i t h  an a n a l y s i s  o f  c e r t a i n  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e s .  One 
h u n d r e d  b u s i n e s s  f i r m s  form th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  e m p i r i c a l  
d a t a  u s e d .  The sample  c o v e r e d  s u c h  f i e l d s  a s  t h e  p r i c e -  
m a k e r ,  f a c t o r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  p r i c e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  p r i c e  
p o l i c y  c o n c e p t s ,  and c o s t - p r i c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
v i i i
These o b s e r v a t i o n s  were  d e r i v e d  f rom  e m p i r i c a l
d a t a :
1 .  B u s i n e s s  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  th e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  t r a i n ­
i n g  o f  m o s t  b u s i n e s s  p r i c e - m a k e r s .  The p r i m a r y  f a c t o r s  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  p r i c i n g  a re  c o m p e t i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o s t  
a n a l y s i s ,  and a r e a s o n a b l e  r e t u r n .  T h ere  i s  a t e n d e n c y  
f o r  the  e n t r e p r e n e u r  t o  u s e  a p r i c e  w h ic h  w i l l  c o v e r  h i s  
" f u l l  c o s t . "  N i n e t y  p e r c e n t  o f  the  b u s i n e s s  f i r m s  
exam ined  were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p r i c i n g  t o  s u r v i v e  i n  th e  
l o n g  r u n .  C o m p e t i t i o n  i s  n o t  to o  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  manu­
f a c t u r e r ,  and o l i g o p o l y  i3  a p p a r e n t l y  common among manu­
f a c t u r i n g  f i r m 3 .
2 .  B u s in essm en  t h i n k  t h a t  s t a b l e  p r i c e s  a r e  d e s i r a b l e .  
Many o f  t h e  f i r m s  exam ined  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  would  h o l d  
t o  b a s i c  p r i c e s  and p r i c e  p o l i c y  even  i n  t im e s  o f  d e p r e s ­
s i o n .  The c o n c e p t  o f  a k i n k e d  demand c u r v e  was f a i r l y  
w e l l  Established by t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o  
p r o v i d e  a v e r y  r e a s o n a b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  r i g i d  p r i c e s .
3 .  P r i c e  l e a d e r s h i p  a p p a r e n t l y  i s  g e n e r a l l y  p r e v a l e n t  
i n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y ;  h o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
f i n d  any p a r t i c u l a r  f i r m  t h a t  w i l l  a d m i t  t o  b e i n g  a p r i c e  
l e a d e r .
4 .  B u s in e ssm e n  c o n s i d e r  t a x e s  t o  be on i m p o r t a n t  
f a c t o r  i n  p r i c e - m a k i n g ,  y e t  t h e y  a ro  v e r y  r e l u c t a n t  t o  
d i s c u s s  how t a x e s  i n f l u e n c e  t h e i r  p r i c e s .
ix
5 .  P r i c e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  g o n e r a l l y  p r a c t i c e d  by 
m a n u f a c t u r e r s ;  h o w e v e r ,  th e  a v e ra g e  b u s i n e s s m a n  d e n i e s  
t h a t  h i s  p r a c t i c e s  a re  t h o s e  which  he would te rm  as d i s ­
c r i m i n a t o r y .  B u s in essm en  c o n s i d e r  p r i c e  c o n c e s s i o n s  to  
be a p a r t  o f  r o u t i n e  b u s i n e s s  o p e r a t i o n s .
G. M a n u f a c t u r e r s  n o r m a l l y  e s t a b l i s h  a l e v e l  o f  
o u t p u t  below t h a t  l e v e l  w h ich  th e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  be 
c a p a c i t y  o u t p u t .  I h i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a re  
im p r e s s e d  by l o n g - r u n  w e l f a r e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and t h a t  
t h e y  compete  i n  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  m a r k e t s .
7 .  S i x t y  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  f i r m s  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  were 
a b le  t o  f i g u r e  o u t p u t  and r e v e n u e  to  maximize  p r o f i t s ;  
h o w e v e r ,  m os t  o f  them made l i t t l e  a t t e m p t  to  e q u a t e  
m a r g i n a l - r e v e n u e  and m a r g i n a l - c o s t  k n o w in g ly .  Largo 
f i r m s  can  e s t a b l i s h  o u t p u t  and r e v e n u e  t o  maximize  
p r o f i t s  much b e t t e r  t h a n  medium and s m a l l  f i r m s .
8 .  C o n v e n t i o n a l  m a r g i n a l  p r i c e  a n a l y s i s  i s  a p p l i ­
c a b l e  t o  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  and p r i c e  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  manu­
f a c t u r i n g  f i r m s .  Theory m u s t  bo r e g a r d e d  a3 o n l y  a 
g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  h o w ever ,  i n  t h a t  i t  can  bo a p p l i e d  
o n ly  i n  a b ro a d  and n o t  i n  a p r e c i s e  s e n s e .
9 .  Many b u s i n e s s  f i r m s  f i n d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  p r i c e  
and o u t p u t  more l i m i t e d  t h a n  C ham b e r l in  and Rob inson  
s u g g e s t .  Many p r o d u c e r s  a r e  unaware  o f  how many com pe t­
i t o r s  t h e y  a c t u a l l y  h a v e .  As a  r e s u l t  t h e y  p r a c t i c e  a 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  t y p e  o f  p r i c i n g  by  f o l l o w i n g  a p r i c e - l e a d e r .
x
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
The g u l f  t h a t  e x i s t s  b e tw e e n  econom ic  t h e o r y  
and t h e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  b u s in e s s m a n  h a s  b r o a d e n e d  i n  
t h e  l a s t  h a l f  c e n tu r y .^ -  There  a r i s e s  to d a y  a q u e s t i o n  
as  t o  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  economic  t h e o r y  as a  b a s i s  f o r  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  and c o n su m p t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  man i n  h i s  s o c i a l  g r o u p .  P r o b a b l y  nowhere  i n  t h e  
a r e a  o f  econom ic  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  th e  gap so wide as 
i t  i s  i n  t h a t  f i e l d  w h ic h  h a s  l o n g  been  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h e  h e a r t  o f  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  econom ic  a n a l y s i s ,  th e  f o r ­
m a t i o n  o f  p r i c e .  Much work h a s  b e en  done i n  many p h a s e s  
o f  economic  e n d e a v o r  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  w i t h  t h e  p r a c t i c a l ,  and y e t  p r i c e  a n a l y s i s  
h a s  b e e n  one f i e l d  t h a t  h a s  w i t n e s s e d  u n t i l  o n ly  
r e c e n t l y  a c o n d i t i o n  w h e r e i n  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  a t t e m p t  
t o  h a rm o n iz e  p r a c t i c e  v / i t h  h y p o t h e s i s . 2
^•P. \V. S. Andrews,  " I n d u s t r i a l  A n a l y s i s  i n  
E c o n o m ic s , "  Oxford  S t u d i e s  i n  th e  P r i c e  Mechanism,
( O x f o r d : The C la r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 1 ) ,  p .  139 .
2'.V. H. S .  S t e v e n s ,  " E f f e c t s  o f  C o s t  A n a l y s i s  
on P r i c e , "  The J o u r n a l  o f  M a r k e t i n g ,  V o l .  I l l ,  ( J u l y ,  
1 9 3 8 ) ,  p p .  6 2 - 7 1 .
1
2
Economic t h e o r y  worked f o r  y e a r s  on the  
a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  p u r e  c o m p e t i t i o n  and monopoly  were 
th e  o n ly  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h ic h  an i n d u s t r y  c o u ld  
o p e r a t e ;  as o f  a r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  d a t e  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  
y/a3 r e v i s e d  t o  i n c l u d e  i m p e r f e c t  and m o n o p o l i s t i c  
c o m p e t i t i o n .  These l a t t e r  a n a l y s e s  w i t h  t h e i r  m o d i ­
f i c a t i o n s  t o  f i l l  t h e  v o i d  b e tw ee n  p u r e  c o m p e t i t i o n  
and monopoly  have  g i v e n  academ ic  e c o n o m i s t s  m a t e r i a l s  
w h ich  t h e y  can  u s e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  c o u r s e s  i n  t h e  p r i n ­
c i p l e s  o f  e c o n o m ic s .  A s l o p i n g  demand c u rv e  and i t s  
i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  th e  a s s u m p t io n s  o f  e nough  c o m p e t i t i o n  
t o  a l l o w  p r i c e  change  w i t h o u t  u n d u ly  i n f l u e n c i n g  o t h e r  
p r o d u c e r s  i n  th e  f i e l d ,  and a f o r m u l a  whereby  the  f i r m  
c a n  m axim ize  p r o f i t s  o r  m in im iz e  l o s s e s ,  p r o v i d e s  m os t  
c o l l e g e  i n s t r u c t o r s  w i t h  a v e r s a t i l e  t h e o r y .  The 
t e n e t s  o f  t h i s  t h e o r y  th e y  t e a c h  w i t h  vehemence enough 
t o  c o n v in c e  m ost  u n i n i t i a t e d  l i s t e n e r s  t h a t  t h e i r  c o n ­
v e n t i o n a l  c o n c e p t  i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p t e d .
I n n o v a t i o n s  and r e s e a r c h  a r e  b e i n g  i n c r e a s e d  
by b o t h  t h e o r e t i c i a n s  and b u s in e s s m e n  t o d a y .  I t  i s  
e v i d e n t  t h a t  f e a t u r e s  have  a r i s e n  t o  c h a l l e n g e  th e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t i o n  t h e o r y .  The c o n ­
c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  the  p r e s e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  
p a t t e r n  h a s  l e d  to  p r i c e  l e a d e r s h i p  p a t t e r n s .  C o n d i t i o n s
w h o r e in  p r i c e  a c t i v i t i e s  a f f e c t  t h e  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  i n  
t h e  m a r k e t  i s  b e i n g  s t r e s s e d  by e c o n o m i s t s  and b u s i n e s s ­
men. There can be l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
m o s t  m a r k e t  s i t u a t i o n s  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  a s s u m p t io n  o f  
n e o - c l a s s i c a l  t h o u g h t  i n v o l v e s  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  a s e r i o u s  
n a t u r e .  E c o n o m is t s  t h e m s e l v e s  have  b e en  e n g a g i n g  i n  
a  h e a t e d  c o n t r o v e r s y  r e g a r d i n g  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  m ar ­
g i n a l  a n a l y s i s , 3 and f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  a t t e m p t s  have 
b e e n  made t o  r e f o r m u l a t e  the  d o c t r i n e  o f  i m p e r f e c t  
coinpe t i t i o n . 4
E m p h a s iz in g  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  i s  th e  
p r o p e r  u n i t  f rom  w h ic h  t o  s tu d y  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
p r i c e s ,  e c o n o m i s t s  n o n e t h e l e s s  have  o f t e n  been  l a x  i n  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  a n a l y t i c a l  p r i c e  t o o l s  even  
i n  t h i s  d e f i n a b l y  l i m i t e d  a r e a .  At t h e  same t im e  
t h e r e  h a s  been  a t e n d e n c y  to  p u s h  t h e o r e t i c a l  s p e c u ­
l a t i o n  on t h e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  th e  f i r m  to  assumed v a r i a ­
t i o n s  i n  c o s t  and demand c o n d i t i o n s  f a r  beyond t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t e s t i n g  t h r o u g h  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Most
^R. A. G o rdo n ,  " S h o r t - P e r i o d  P r i c e  D e t e r m i n a t i o n  
i n  Theory  and P r a c t i c e , ” The American Economic Review ,  
V o l .  XXXVIII, No. 3 ,  ( J u n o 7 '1 9 4 B ) ,  p p .  2 6 5 - 3 5 .
^H orace  G. W h i t e ,  J r . ,  "A Review o f  M o n o p o l i s t i c  
and I m p e r f e c t  C o m p e t i t i o n  T h e o r i e s , "  The American E co -  
nomio R e v ie w , V o l .  XXVI, ( 1 9 3 6 ) ,  p .  6377--------------------------
work d e a l i n g  w i t h  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  th e  p r i c e  
f i e l d  h a s  d e a l t  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  g e n e r a l  p r i c e  l e v e l  
a n a l y s i s  on th e  one h a n d ,  and w i t h  b r o a d  demand s t u d i e s  
on th e  o t h e r .  Case s t u d i e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d s  have 
beon  made and some b u s i n e s s  r e s e a r c h  g ro u p s  a re  e n t e r ­
i n g  i n t o  a s t u d y  o f  th e  p ro b le m s  t h a t  p l a g u e  t h e
C
e c o n o m i s t .  There  r e m a in s  a gap to d a y ,  how ever ,  
b e tw oen  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  th e  t h e o r i s t  and the  
c o n d i t i o n s  as t h e y  e x i s t  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p r i c e  d e t e r ­
m i n a t i o n .
I t .  was r e c o g n i z e d  a t  th e  t u r n  o f  th e  l a s t  c e n ­
t u r y  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  know ledge  i s  a r e q u i s i t e  t o  
s u c c e s s f u l  b u s i n e s s .  T h is  f a c t  u s h e r e d  i n t o  p o p u l a r ­
i t y  b u s i n e s s  e d u c a t i o n  t o  i n f o r m  t h e  b u s i n e s s m a n .
Time and m o t io n  s t u d i e s  were  v e r y  p o p u l a r  i n  t h i s  
p e r i o d ;  b u s i n e s s ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  and m a r k e t  r e s e a r c h  was 
i n t r o d u c e d ;  t h e  g ov e rn m e n t  be g an  c o n d u c t i n g  b u s i n e s s  
s u r v e y s ;  and many o t h e r  s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a r o s e  
t o  a l lo w  t h e  b u s in e s s m a n  to  se e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  the  
mass o f  demand, s u p p l y ,  and p r i c e  d a t a  a v a i l a b l e .
Trade a s s o c i a t i o n s  grew t o  a i d  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c e r
^The N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  M a n u f a c t u r e r s  and 
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Chamber o f  Commerce have  l e d  i n  t h i s  
w o rk .
i n  l e a r n i n g  a b o u t  c o s t s  o f  r i v a l  p r o d u c e r s  and th e  
e x t e n t  o f  m a r k e t  demand; he began  t o  u s e  t h i s  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  a3 a s o u r c e  f o r  m ak ing  more money. S a l e s  volume, 
p l a n t  c a p a c i t i e s  and u t i l i z a t i o n ,  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n v e n ­
t o r i e s ,  c o s t s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  and s i m i l a r  d a t a  were  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  th e  i n d u s t r y  and f o r  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  mem­
b e r s .  L a t e r  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  as n a t i o n a l  w e a l t h  and 
incom e,  co n su m p t io n  and s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  d a t a ,  p u r ­
c h a s i n g  power ,  w ages ,  employm ent ,  w h o l e s a l e  and r e t a i l  
p r i c e  i n d e x e s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  c a r  l o a d i n g s ,  
and many o t h e r  i n d i c e s  t h a t  c o u l d  be u t i l i z e d  by  t h e  
p r o g r e s s i v e  p r o d u c e r  were addod.
I h i s  change  c a u s e d  i n d u s t r y  to  move c l o s e r  t o
c o s t  a n a l y s i s  as a t o o l  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  p r i c e s .  Today
i t  i s  common p r a c t i c e  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  r e d u c e  p r i c e
v a r i a b i l i t y  and a l s o  to  e q u a t e  s u p p l y  to  t h e  demand
f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t .  W hether  r i g h t  o r  wrong,  c o s t  
. . ^
a n a l y s i s  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  f u n d a m e n t a l  to  t h e  p r i c e  and 
m a r k e t i n g  p r o b le m s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c e r .
Many e c o n o m i s t s  bemoan i n c r e a s i n g  p r i c e  
r i g i d i t i e s .  These r i g i d i t i e s  p r o b a b l y  g i v e  e v id e n c e  
o f  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  r o l e  p l a y e d  by c o s t  a n a l y s i s  i n  
p r i c e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  I t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  c o s t  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  p l a y  an e ven
more i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  p r i c e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  th a n  i t  
do es  t o d a y . 6
f u n d a m e n t a l  t o  t h e  p ro b lem  a t  hand  i s  th e  
a s s u m p t io n  g e n e r a l l y  made t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  
p r o d u c e s  o n l y  one p r o d u c t .  T h i s  a s s u m p t io n  i s  h i g h l y  
u n r e a l i s t i c ;  a c t u a l l y ,  m ost  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  f i r m s  a re  
m u l t i p l e - p r o d u c t  p r o d u c e r s .  I t  was r e c e n t l y  s t a t e d  
t h a t
There  i 3  an i n t e r e s t i n g  p a r a l l e l  be tw een  
t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  a s s u m p t io n s  p r i c e  t h e o r y  
a d h e r e d  t o  f o r  more t h a n  a c e n t u r y  and 
th e  a s s u m p t io n s  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  makes r e ­
g a r d i n g  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  among p r o d u c t s .
Today, by f a r  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  p r i c e  
t h e o r y  d e a l s  o n ly  w i t h  th e  two e x t r e m e  
c a s e 3 , th e  s i n g l e - p r o d u c t  f i r m  and the  
p u r e  c a s e  o f  j o i n t  c o s t s ,  jU3t  a s ,  f o r  
30 many y e a r s ,  i t  i g n o r e d  th e  r e a l  w o r ld  
e x i s t i n g  b e tw ee n  th e  e x t r e m e s  o f  p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t i o n  and p u r e  m o n o p o ly .7
PURPOSE AUD METIIOD 
The p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  work i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  th e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  the  c r i t i c i s m s  d i r e c t o d  a t  economic t h e o r y  
as i t  a p p l i e s  t o  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e .  B o th  b u s in e s s m e n  
and e c o n o m i s t s  a re  a d d in g  t o  t h e i r  knowledge  o f  p r i c e
6M. J .  J u c i u s ,  "Uniform  A c c o u n t in g  and p r i c i n g  
P o l i c i e s , "  J o u r n a l  o f  B u s i n e s s ,  V o l .  XVII,  ( J a n u a r y ,  
1 9 4 4 ) .  ~
7Gordon,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  273.
and o u t p u t  p o l i c i e s ;  h o w e v e r ,  some e c o n o m is t s  a re  
c o n v in c e d  t h a t  t h e o r y  i s  n o t  o r i e n t e d  p r o p e r l y  t o  
e x p l a i n  b u s i n e s s  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a n a ly z e  
th e  problem',  an a n a l y s i s  o f  c u r r e n t  p r i c e  t h e o r y  w i l l  
be n e c e s s a r y .  A l so ,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to p r e s e n t  e m p i r ­
i c a l  b u s i n e s s  d a t a  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  b u s i n e s s m a n ' s  p o s i ­
t i o n .  An a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i s s i m i l a r i t y  
b e tw ee n  econom ic  t h o o r y  and b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e  w i l l
Q
t h e n  be p o s s i b l e . 0
The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  t o  f o l l o w  d e a l s  w i t h  p r i c e  
and p r i c e  t h o o r y  f rom  an econom ic  s t a n d p o i n t .  The 
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p r i c e  i n  tho  economy i s  a n a l y z e d ,  f o l ­
lowed by on a n a l y s i s  o f  M a r s h a l l i a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  w h ich  
i n c l u d e s  p u r e  c o m p e t i t i o n  and p u r e  monopoly a n a l y s i s .
A p o s t - M a r s h a l l i a n  a n a l y s i s  i n t r o d u c e s  th e  t r e n d  
w h ich  b r o k e  w i t h  t h e  two e x t r e m e  p r i c i n g  c o n c e p t s  o f  
p u r e  c o m p e t i t i o n  and p u r e  m onopo ly .  S r a f f a  and h i s  
p r e d e c e s s o r s  and a d h e r e n t s ,  C ourno t  and E d gew or th ,  
w i t h  t h e i r  d u o p o ly  and o l i g o p o l y  t h e o r y  a re  i n t r o ­
du ced  h e r e  a lo n g  w i t h  P ig o u  and Shove .  T h is  l e a d s
®The e n t i r e  f i e l d  o f  p r i c e  t h e o r y  w i l l  be 
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  a n a ly z e  i n  a work o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ;  h e n c e ,  
o n l y  f a c t o r s  s e l e c t e d  by  t h e  w r i t e r  w i l l  be  u s e d  as  a 
b a s i s  f o r  c o m p a r i s o n  and a n a l y s i s .
t o  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  R o b i n s o n ’ s and C h a m b e r l i n ’ s work 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  Ihe  c r i t i c s  
o f  t h e  p o s t - M a r s h a l l i a n  S c h o o l  w i l l  be a n a l y z e d  v e ry  
b r i e f l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  th e  V /a l r a s i a n  S c h o o l  and T r i f f i n ,  
Some g e n e r a l  m a r k e t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  t o d a y ’s economy a re  
p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  an a n a l y s i s  o f  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  and a v e r ­
age c o s t  p r i c i n g .  T h is  i s  f o l l o w e d  by some c u r r e n t  
e m p i r i c a l  c o n c e p t s ,  p r i m a r i l y  b a s e d  upon th e  k i n k y  
demand c u rv e  as a n a l y z e d  by H a l l  and H i t c h ,
The n e x t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  work i s  t a k e n  c o m p l e t e l y  
f rom  t h e  r e t u r n s  o f  a q u e s t i o n n a i r e  and s e v e r a l  i n t e r ­
v i e w s .  The e m p i r i c a l  d a t a  i s  u s e d  t o  p o r t r a y  t h e  
m anner  i n  w h ic h  p r i c i n g  c o n c e p t s  a re  u s e d  by th e  manu­
f a c t u r i n g  c o n c e r n s  s u r v e y e d . ^  The p r i c e - m a k e r  i s  
s t u d i e d  i n  h i s  b u s i n e s s  e n v i r o n m e n t .  The a c c o u n t a n t ,  
e n g i n e e r ,  and t h e  e c o n o m is t  a r e  shown as t h e y  a f f e c t  
t h e  p r i c i n g  p i c t u r e .  F a c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p r i c e  d e t e r m i n a ­
t i o n  and p r i c e  p o l i c y  c o n c e p t s  a re  p r e s e n t e d  as i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  from t h e  e m p i r i c a l  d a t a .  S h o r t -  and l o n g - r u n  
p e r i o d  p r i c i n g  p o l i c i e s  a re  d i s c u s s e d .  T h i s  i s  f o l ­
lowed by  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t a x a t i o n  and i t s  im p a c t  upon
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  m eth o d  and 
i t s  r e s u l t s  i s  g i v e n  i n  C h a p te r  3 .
p r i c e  p o l i c y .  D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  p r i c i n g  i s  e xam in ed ,  
and p r i c i n g  on th e  b a s i s  o f  s t a n d a r d ,  a v e r a g e ,  and 
m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  i s  a n a l y z e d .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  a l s o  p r e s e n t s  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  th e  p r i c i n g  c o n c e p t s  o f  s m a l l ,  medium, 
and l a r g e  p r o d u c e r s ,  and some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  on t h e  
p r i c e - m a k e r s ' knowledge  o f  t h e  economic  c o n c e p t s  o f  
p r i c i n g .
The c o n c l u s i o n s  and o b s e r v a t i o n s  c o n s t i t u t e  
C h a p te r  4 .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t h e  h e a r t  o f  the  s t u d y  
showing where  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  o f  econom ic  t h o o r y  and 
b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e  t e n d  t o  c o i n c i d e  and where  they  
p o s s i b l y  do n o t  c o i n c i d e .
CRAFTER I I
PRICE: CURRENT STATUS ?nOM AN ECONOiaO S PnNDPOINT1
Economics a3 a s c i e n c e  i s  c o n c e r n e d  p r i m a r i l y  
w i th  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and u s e  o f  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s .  Hie 
u se  o f  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s  to  f i t  t h e  u n l i m i t e d  w a n t s  o f  
man c r e a t e s  a  s e t t i n g  i n  w h ich  v a l u e  and p r i c e  p l a y  a 
d o m in a n t  r o l e .  S in c e  th e  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  m atched  
a g a i n s t  th e  i n s a t i a b l e  w a n ts  o f  man, t h e s e  w a n t s  can  
be o n ly  p a r t i a l l y  f u l f i l l e d .  The p ro b le m  oC t h e  e co n o ­
m i s t  t h e n  i s  to  i n s u r e  th e  f u l l  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  a maximum o f  human s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  s i n c e  
p a r t i a l  o r  i n c o m p l e t e  u t i l i z a t i o n  l e a d s  to  an o v e r a l l  
l o s s  o f  human s a t i s f a c t i o n .  One w r i t e r  h a s  s t a t e d  t h a t
InrIhe m a t o r i a l  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o
g iv e  a somewhat l o s s  t h a n  c o m p le te  s u r v e y  o f  t h e o r e t i ­
c a l  economic  p r i c i n g .  I n t e n s i v e  s t u d i e s  a lo n g  t h i s  
l i n e  a r e  v e r y  n um erou s .  T e x t s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s p e c i a l ­
i s e d  p h a s e 3 o f  th e  m a t e r i a l  c o n t a i n e d  h e r e  g i v e  v a r i e d  
t r e a t m e n t s ,  and i t  i s  deemed u n w ise  t o  a t t e m p t  a com­
p l e t e  s u r v e y  o f  v a l u e  and p r i c e  i n  t h i s  work .  S o u rc e s  
3Uch as S t i g l e r ' s  Hie Theory of  P r i c e , P e t t e n g i l l ' s  
P r i c e  E c o n o m ic s , O x e n f e l d t ' s  I n d u s t r i a l  P r i c i n g  and 
1,1 a r k e 6 P r  ac'Fi’c o 3 , C h a m b e r l i n ' s  Thoory o f  Monopolist"  
CompetT F foh^ T r i f f i n ' s M o n o p o l i s t i c  C o m p e t i t i o n  and 
QeneraT~Equl l i b r i u m  Th e o ry  and many o t h e r s  w i l l  be 
l i s t e d " i n  f o o t n o t e s  and i n  d e t a i l  when c i t a t i o n s  a r e  
n e e d e d .
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economics i s  ’’The sc ien ce  th a t tr e a ts  phenomena from the 
standpoint o f  p r ic e j - - th e r e fo r e  m ostly , in du stry  and 
b u sin ess ." ^  The p r ic in g  mechanism in  the economic s o c i ­
e ty  i s  assumed to  provide the proper d is tr ib u t io n  and 
u t i l i z a t io n  needed to  g iv e  man an optimum l i f e .
THE IMPORTANCE OP PRICE IN THE ECONOMY
P rice in  a pecuniary economy stands dominant in
the minds o f the en trep ren eu r ia l gen ius which d ir e c t s
the system . The c a p i t a l i s t i c  fr e e  en terp r ise  economy
p la ces  much f a i t h  in  the p r ic in g  mechanism to guide i t s
market o p era tio n s. An example o f t h is  can be found when
Davenport very a p tly  sa y s :3
I t  i s ,  in  f a c t  the value problem --or more 
s p e c i f i c a l ly  and more accu ra te ly  fo r  presen t 
s o c i e t y ,— the problem of market p r ic e ,  th a t  
i s  the c e n tr a l and u n ify in g  problem o f  
presen t-day  econom ics. P r ic e , then, must 
attend  and ch a ra cter ize  a l l  th in gs th a t are 
economic; and a l l  th in gs so attended are so  
fa r  economic in  ch a ra cter . And more th in gs  
than those which accu ra te ly  are m ateria l 
must f a l l  w ith in  the scope o f p r ic e . Price  
extends i t s  sway to  the utmost l im it s  of 
whatever i s  property , ta n g ib le  or in ta n g ib le ,  
--w hether m a ter ia l or im m aterial. Property  
co v ers— and th erefore  p r ic e  co v ers—d eb ts ,
o
H. J . Davenport, The Economics o f E n terp rise , 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 19JLS), p . 25 .
^Davenport, op. o l t . ,  pp. 25 -26 .
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good w i l l ,  f r a n c h is e s ,—everyth ing  th a t i s  
bought or so ld . P rice in c lu d es a lso  many non­
property facts--hum an s e r v ic e s , such as the 
goods fo r  which payment i s  made to  the actor , 
preacher, teach er, or s in g e r . And, by the 
way, a l l  e f fo r t s  or p ro cesses  are econom ically  
productive fo r  which a p r ic e  i s  so paid or 
which, d ir e c t ly  or in d ir e c t ly ,  enhance the 
p r ic e .
With th is  statem ent to in d ica te  the importance o f p r ice  
in  our s o c ie ty , i t  i s  proper at th is  p o in t to  examine 
b r ie f ly  the b a sic  fu n ctio n s o f p r ice  in  the economic 
p ro cess .
The a llo c a tio n  o f resou rces to the most pro­
ductive employment i s  one fu n c tio n  o f p r ic e ;  i t  h e lp s  
to  determ ine what goods w i l l  be produced, by whom they  
w i l l  be produced, and in  what q uan tity  they w i l l  be 
produced. High p r ic e s  as compared w ith  c o s t  are p r o f it  
crea tin g  and they induce en try  in to  the productive  
f i e l d  so as to  in crea se  f a c i l i t i e s  and output. Low 
p r ic e s  r e la t iv e  to c o s t  have a d iscouraging  e f f e c t  upon 
b u sin ess endeavor. These assumptions are e s ta b lish e d  
in  form al economic theory . M od ifica tion s are n ecessary  
in so fa r  as p e r fe c t  a llo c a t io n  o f  resou rces through the 
p r ic in g  mechanisms i s  concerned. Other market in f lu ­
ences are known to  a f fe c t  resource a l lo c a t io n  along  
w ith  p r ic e , and mention o f h igh  p r ice  and low p r ice  
r e la t iv e  to c o s t  a lso  moves in to  the realm of
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e l a s t i c i t y  th eory . This l a s t  concept can d e f in i t e ly  
modify resource a llo c a t io n  through the volume o f  s a le s  
which w i l l  accompany h igher or lower p r ic e s . There i s  
l i t t l e  in form ation  a v a ila b le  to  ex p la in  which p rice  
changes a c tu a lly  ex ert the g r e a te s t  in flu en ce  on a l lo c a ­
t io n  o f re so u rces . T rad ition a l theory tends to stand  
u n a ltered  in  t h is  case s in ce  i t  i s  g en era lly  conceded 
th a t p r ic e s  do have an important e f f e c t  upon the d ir e c ­
t io n  o f production .
A second fu n ctio n  o f  p r ice  in  a fr e e  en terp r ise  
economy i s  th a t o f d is tr ib u t in g  income in  the system .
Thi3 d is tr ib u t io n  among the fa c to r s  of production i s  
very complex and must o f  n e c e s s ity  consider p ro d u ctiv ity  
o f the variou s fa c to r s ,  r e la t iv e  s c a r c ity  and u t i l i t y  
o f the fa c to r s  to both buyers and s e l l e r s ,  and the 
e f f e c t  o f  low p r ic e s  upon both producers and consumers. 
Most buyers and many s e l l e r s  in d ic a te  th a t low p r ic e s  
are to be p referred  to  h igh  p r ic e s .  The absolu te e f f e c t  
o f  low p r ic e s  upon income d is tr ib u t io n , however, can 
hardly be a scer ta in ed . Again, the co n d itio n  whereby 
p r ice  d is tr ib u te s  income i s  fu r th er  com plicated when 
the l e v e l  o f  p r ic e s  in  gen eral i s  low as compared w ith  
the case when the p r ice  o f  one p a r tic u la r  product i s  low . 
Changing p r ic e s  w i l l  w ithout doubt crea te  a change in  the
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d is tr ib u t io n  o f income among the fa c to r s  o f  production , 
but exact measurement o f  these f lu c tu a t io n s  i s  hard to  
d e f in e .
P rices a lso  ex er t a d e f in i t e  in flu en ce  on t o t a l  
n a tio n a l output. As in  the case o f d is tr ib u t io n  o f in ­
come, the p rec ise  e f f e c t  i3  very d i f f i c u l t  to determ ine. 
Assuming a given  l e v e l  o f n a tio n a l income, lower p r ic e s  
would cause more goods to be purchased than h igh  p r ic e s .  
But low p r ic e s  th a t would cause producers to lo se  money 
would a lso  c u r ta il  investm ent. This would tend to lower 
n a tio n a l output i f  we assume p r ice  i s  low enough to make 
b u sin ess u n p ro fita b le .
I f  p r ic e s  are low and they s t i l l  allow p r o f ita b le  
o p era tio n s, s a le s  could p o ss ib ly  expand to  the p o in t o f  
req u ir in g  new investm ent for  an expansion in  ou tp ut. In 
the l i g h t  of th is  p a r ticu la r  s i tu a t io n , i t  would appear 
th a t the low est r e la t iv e  p r ice  c o n s is te n t  w ith  the main­
tenance o f  investm ent in c e n t iv e s  would be the b e s t  p r ice  
to  con trib u te toward n a tio n a l output. P rice v a r ia tio n s  
very d e f in i t e ly  have an e f f e c t  upon the amount o f  s a le s  
and thereby upon production . Lower p r io e s  tend to  
in crease  s a le s  and reduce sa v in g s . I t  would be very  
d i f f i c u l t  to determine the e f f e c t  o f  any p a r t ic u la r  
p rice  change upon t o t a l  n a tio n a l output; however, i t  i s
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d e f in i t e ly  known th a t p r ic e s  do in flu en ce  output and in  
th is  manner serve an important fu n ctio n  in  the c a p ita l­
i s t i c  system .
The in flu en ce  o f  p r ice  extends beyond that o f  
determ ining the type o f output, the personal income 
d is tr ib u t io n  and the t o ta l  n a tio n a l output. Public  
p o lic y  d ea lin g  w ith  economic a c t i v i t i e s  i s  focused  to  
a la rg e  degree upon p r ic e s  and p r ic in g  p r a c t ic e s .  
Governmental a g en c ies , excep t on very rare o cca s io n s , 
do not reg u la te  such a c t i v i t i e s  as s a le s  prom otion, p er­
sonnel s e le c t io n ,  resea rch , te c h n ica l improvements, 
q u a lity  c o n tr o l, and the l i k e .  In stea d , p o lic y  i s  p r i ­
m arily  centered  on p r ic e s  w ith  seeming assumption th a t  
" If b u sin ess organ ization  or p r a c t ic e  i s  bad, the i l l  
e f f e c t s  are seen  in  p r ic e s ." 4 An in te r e s t in g  fa c to r  to  
note at th is  p o in t i s  th a t w hile the government and 
econom ists emphasize p r ic e s  as the major elem ent in  the 
economy, O xenfeldt says th a t businessm en are l ik e ly  to  
con sid er other asp ects o f b u sin ess op eration  ju s t  as 
im portant.
4Edwin Nourse, P rice  Making in  a Democracy, 
(Y/ashington: Brookings I n s t i tu t io n ,  1^44J, p . 9 .
5 Alfred R. O xenfeld t, In d u str ia l P rlo lng  and 
Market P r a c tic e s , (New York: P r e n tic e -r ia ll , i n c . ,
im T /p p . '  61-65.
MARSHALLIAN EQUILIBRIUM
Without any great quarrel current p r ic e  theory  
can be given  a date w ith  Alfred M arshall's ascension  to  
the head o f the Cambridge School o f Economics. A lfred  
M arshall was probably the g r e a te s t  econom ist that England 
had in  the p eriod  fo llo w in g  M ill . Hia g r e a te s t  work was 
to  take E n glish  c la s s i c a l  economics and in te r p r e t  and 
modify i t  so as to reg a in  3orao resp ec t fo r  i t  in  the 
economic w orld . He brought together the c la s s ic a l  c o s t  
concepts and the Austrian u t i l i t y  a n a ly s is  and showed 
how each was important in  value and p rice  a n a ly s is .  He 
showed how both supply and demand were important and 
were m utually determ inant. He gave h is  gen eral ru le  of 
p r ic e , which i s  s t i l l  looked upon by many as a v a lid  
exp lan ation  o f p rice  today.
A lfred M arshall covered many phases and f i e l d s  
o f econom ics, but the one o f  immediate concern here i s  
h is  eq u ilib rium  concept; h is  p r ic in g  a n a ly s is  w i l l  be 
analyzed as b r ie f ly  as p o ss ib le  in  the fo llo w in g  
m a te r ia l.
M arsh all's in d u s tr ia l  a n a ly s is  d is t in g u ish ed  
two c la s s e s  o f in d u stry , com p etitive and m o n o p o listic .
The b a s ic  d is t in c t io n  along t h is  l in e  was whether or 
not a b u sin ess  could produce a product w ith  the same
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te c h n ic a l s p e c if ic a t io n s  as the product o f  any p a r ticu ­
la r  firm  and whether or not i t  could  o f fe r  i t  fo r  sa le  
to  th a t f ir m 's  custom ers. The example o f a monopoly as 
g iven  by M arshall was th a t o f a p u b lic  u t i l i t y  w ith  
s ta tu to ry  p r iv i l e g e s .  Such a monopoly e x i s t s  when tech ­
n ic a l ,  l e g a l ,  or some other co n d itio n  makes i t  im possib le  
fo r  other b u sin esses  to  o f fe r  the same type o f commodity 
or se rv ic e  to  a custom er. A b u sin ess  o f th is  nature w i l l  
have a determ inant demand curve o f  i t s  own, and the 
m onopolist w i l l  be expected  to  have one m otive and th a t  
w i l l  be to ob ta in  a maximum n et p r o f i t .  When demand i s  
h ig h , p r ice  i s  h igh; and i f  c o s t  i s  h igh , then p r ice  i s  
h ig h . There w i l l  be no n ecessary  connection  between the 
p r ic e  which the m onopolist w i l l  e s ta b lis h  and the
average c o s t  o f  the output which he w i l l  s e l l  at that
p r ic e , according to M arshallian monopoly theory .
M arshall used as a l in e  o f  d is t in c t io n  between 
purely  com p etitive and m o n o p o lis t ic a lly  co n tro lle d  
in d u s tr ie s  the p r in c ip le  o f en try  in to  the in d u stry . As 
long as en try  was p o s s ib le ,  then the market would tend  
to  be co m p etitiv e . In such com p etitive in d u s tr ie s , he 
thought the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f en try  o f other producers would
in su re th a t long-run  p r ic e  would be equal to  the normal
average c o s t  o f p rod uction . M arshall would have each
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in du stry  ch aracterized  by homogeneous p roducts, a law 
o f one p r ic e , and each s e l l e r  provid ing so sm all a part  
o f the t o ta l  supply th a t he could be presumed to  meet a 
p e r fe c t ly  e l a s t i c  demand.
M arshall’s theory o f eq u ilib rium  d e a lt  b r ie f ly  
w ith  a normal demand and supply co n d itio n  wherein the 
demand p r ice  and the supply p r ice  were eq u a l. Assuming 
th a t the fo r c e s  o f demand and supply had fr e e  p lay  in  a 
market ch aracter ized  by fr ee  com p etition , there would be 
only one p r ice  in  that market at one and the same tim e. 
Even though the producers in  the industry  had knowledge 
o f what other producers in  the industry  were doing, i t  
was supposed th at th is  knowledge in  i t s e l f  would prevent 
each from paying more or tak ing a lower p r ice  than 
other producers. The demand p r ice  fo r  each commodity 
was governed by circum stances which v aried  according to  
the character o f  the problem, but in  every case the 
more o f a product o ffe red  fo r  sa le  by the in d u stry , the 
lower the p r ice  would become, or the demand p rice  fo r  
any given  commodity would tend to  d im inish  w ith  every  
in crease  in  the amount o ffe r e d . The normal supply p r ice  
he regarded as the expense o f  production  in c lu d in g  gross  
earnings o f management o f a ’'r e p r e se n ta t iv e ’' firm . The 
p r ice  was one which would ju s t  s u f f ic e  to  keep the
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aggregate amount o f  production o f the industry balanced  
w ith some firm s in crea sin g  th e ir  output and others  
decreasing  th e ir s  w ith  the aggregate production remain­
ing unchan'ged.
Equilibrium  occurred when the demand p r ice  was 
equal to the supply p r ice  w ith the amount produced having  
no tendency e ith e r  to  be in creased  or decreased , accord­
ing to  M arshall. With demand and supply in  eq u ilib rium , 
the amount o f  the commodity being produced in  a p a r ticu ­
la r  u n it  o f  time was c a l le d  the eq u ilib rium  amount and 
the p r ice  at which th is  q u an tity  was so ld  was c a lle d  the 
eq u ilib rium  p r ic e . Such an equ ilibrium  M arshall assumed 
to  be s t a b le .  I f  d isp la ced  a l i t t l e  from th i3  p r ic e ,  
the market would tend to return  as a pendulum tends to  
swing about i t s  low est p o in t ,
The m ateria l to  fo llo w  d ea lin g  w ith  pure compe­
t i t i o n  and pure monopoly, w i l l  be presented  prim arily  to  
show the M arshallian technique o f  approach to these two 
su b je c ts . While the m a ter ia l w i l l  not be purely  as that 
presen ted  by A lfred M arshall, i t  w i l l  e n t a i l  b a s ic a l ly  
the M arshallian tr a d it io n  and w i l l  be used as an ampli­
f i c a t io n  o f what M arshallian economics had been in te r ­
p reted  to show.
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Pure C om petition, Pure com petition  i s  an ex p la ­
n a tion  o f  p r ice  from an eq u ilib rium  stan d p o in t. Pure 
com petition  i s  somewhat more sim ple and not n early  so 
in c lu s iv e  as p e r fe c t  com p etition . P erfect com petition  
would in vo lve  t im e less  and c o s t le s s  m o b ility  o f  a l l  
fa c to r s  o f  production , equal a ccess  to the market on the 
p art o f both buyers and s e l l e r s ,  in stan taneous and over­
a l l  p r ice  change, an immediate and a constant equating  
o f  demand and supply, f u l l  knowledge o f the market on 
the part o f  both buyers and s e l l e r s ,  no c o llu s io n  nor 
cooperation  in  the market p lace so a3 to  in flu en ce  
p r ic e , and se v era l s im ila r  l im it in g  assum ptions. Pure 
com p etition  on the other hand can be taken to  assume 
on ly  th a t the number o f s e l l e r s  i s  so large  th a t none 
has s ig n if ic a n c e  in  the market, th a t goods are id e n t ic a l  
in  a g iven  market, and that there i s  a la rg e  number of  
im p artia l buyers in  the market. With these assum ptions, 
pure com p etition  attem pts to determ ine what p r ice  w i l l  
be in  a s t a t i c  market fo r  an in d iv id u a l producer who has 
no co n tro l over the p r e v a ilin g  or market p r ic e  and whose 
produce i s  homogeneous w ith  a l l  o th ers in  the market 
p la c e . Each buyer and each s e l l e r  takes the p r ice  as he 
f in d s  i t  and r e a l iz e s  th a t he must e s ta b lis h  h is  p o l ic i e s  
a cco rd in g ly . The co n d itio n s  a lso  in d ica te  th a t fo r  the
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in d iv id u a l producer, p e r fe c t ly  e l a s t i c  demand and supply 
curves are always p resen t. Most textbooks in d ica te  th is  
s itu a t io n  w ith  a graph which g iv e s  a p e r fe c t ly  e l a s t i c  
firm  demand curve tangent to a l,U" shape average co s t  
curve which has the m arginal c o s t  curve r is in g  and p a ss­
ing through both the average revenue curve ( th is  i3  a lso  
the m arginal revenue curve when the average revenue i s  
p e r fe c t ly  e l a s t i c )  and the average t o t a l  c o s t  curve at 
th e ir  p o in t o f in te r s e c t io n . This i s  the long run eq u i­
librium  adjustm ent.
The two co n d itio n s in  which m arginal co s t  equals  
average revenue and average c o s t  equals m arginal revenue 
s a t i s f i e s  two co n d itio n s in  the assum ptions o f pure com­
p e t i t io n .  In the f i r s t  in s ta n c e , MC 3 AR in d ic a te s  that  
consumer e x p lo ita t io n  i s  absent and that the optimum 
com bination o f  a l l  the fa c to r s  o f  production  i s  being  
exerc ised .®  In the second in sta n c e , AC e MR in d ic a te s  
th a t the c o s t  o f each fa c to r  o f  production i s  ju s t  
covered by the m arginal co n tr ib u tio n  o f th a t fa c to r  and 
th a t the o v e r a ll  volume o f the fa c to r s  o f production * 
employed i s  the maximum; there i s  no e x p lo ita t io n  o f
6J . M. C a sse ls , "Excess Capacity and M onopolistic  
C om petition," Q uarterly Journal o f Economics, Volume 51, 
(1 9 3 6 ). ------------- -------------------------------------
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labor or othor fa c to r s .  Any d ivergence between m arginal 
c o s t  and p r ice  when em phasising e i th e r  the buying or 
s e l l in g  sid e  g iv e s  automatic proof th a t com petition  i s  
not p u r e .7
I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t in  some cases the demand 
curve w i l l  l i e  above the low est p o in t on the average 
coat curve and that production w i l l  be s e t  a t the p o in t  
where m arginal c o s t  equals p r ic e . This i s  a short run 
co n d itio n , however, and en try  in to  the f i e l d  w i l l  soon 
e ith e r  b id  up the c o s t  o f  the fa c to r s  o f production or 
reduce the in d iv id u a l demand in  such manner as to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  the s itu a t io n  where MC = AR = AC. The op posite  
s itu a t io n  in  which the demand curve w i l l  l i e  below the 
lo w est p o in t on the average c o s t  curve w i l l  in d ica te  
one o f two c o n d it io n s . The in d iv id u a l producer e ith e r  
w i l l  operate only in  the sh ort run u n t i l  he can equate 
h is  average c o s t  to the average revenue, or in  the long  
run he w i l l  become bankrupt and w i l l  be forced  out o f  
the market.
The firm  in  i t s  p r ice  and co st r e la t io n s h ip  must 
not n e c e s s a r ily  make a p r o f i t  in  e x c e ss  o f f u l l  c o s t ,
7a. P. Lerner, "The Concept o f  Monopoly and the 
Measurement o f Monopoly Power,” Review o f  Economic 
S tu d ies , Volume 1 , (1 9 3 4 ).
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nor must i t  n e c e s s a r ily  break even to induce i t  to  con­
tin u e op eration s fo r  the sh ort p er io d . So long as the 
p rice  remains above average v a r ia b le  c o s t s ,  i t  can con­
tin u e op eration s and s t i l l  make some elem ents o f i t s  
f ix e d  c o s t .  T h eo r e tic a lly , i t  i s  p o ss ib le  that the firm  
w i l l  continue op eration s u n t i l  p r ice  i s  equal to average 
v a r ia b le  c o s t s .  I f  the p r ice  should go below average 
v a r ia b le  c o s t s ,  then o f n e c e s s ity  the firm  should cease  
op era tion s; however, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t very short 
period  op eration s would continue when va ria b le  c o s ts  
were not being covered . Whatever the case might be, the 
output w i l l  always be s e t  in  these cases at the p o in t  
where m arginal c o s ts  fo r  the in d iv id u a l firm  in te r s e c t s  
the p r ice  l in e ;  th is  m arginal c o s t  curve in  e f f e c t  i s  
the supply curve fo r  the firm .
Each firm  must c a lc u la te  the e x ten t to which i t  
can allow  p r ic e  to drop below i t s  f u l l  c o s t  before c lo s ­
in g  production . This la r g e ly  h in ges on the q uestion  o f  
which c o s ts  are considered  to be f ix e d  in  the period  
under co n sid era tio n . This again i s  la r g e ly  a te c h n ica l  
m atter which depends upon raw m a ter ia l and labor c o s ts  
as compared w ith  equipment c o s ts  and upon the short 
p eriod  as c a lc u la te d  by a firm . The longer the short
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period  con sid ered , the few er o f i t s  c o s ts  w i l l  be con­
sid ered  as f ix e d .
Long run op eration s fo r  the firm  must o f n eces­
s i t y  cover the average o f a l l  c o s ts  incurred in  produc­
t io n .  Hie firm  i s  able in  the lon g  period  to vary i t s  
output by varying the ra te  o f op eration s in  i t s  e x is t in g  
p la n t and a lso  by varying the s iz e  o f p la n t f a c i l i t i e s .
In the short run .th e firm  must ad ju st i t s  ra te  o f  output 
to  the e x is t in g  or to  the expected  le v e l  o f  market p r ic e .  
In the l ig h t  o f  the v a r ia t io n s  mentioned above, however, 
the firm  can be presumed to  adapt i t s  long p eriod  average 
and m arginal c o s ts  to  the expected  long p eriod  le v e l  o f  
market p r ice  and, in  doing so , to  choose the com bination  
o f p la n t s iz e  and ra te  o f  use which i s  b e lie v e d  to  afford  
the g r e a te s t  long run n et r e tu r n .8
C haracterizing the p eriod  or time concept along  
the l in e s  above, M arshall introduced h is  gen eral r u le  of  
p r ic e  which has been accepted by many th e o r is t s  as a 
model fo r  v a l id i t y  in  p r ice  g e n e r a liz a t io n s . M arshall 
sta te d  th a t 11. • . , as a gen era l r u le , the sh orter  the 
period  which we are co n sid er in g , the g rea ter  must be the
8Joe S. Bain, Price Theory, (New York: Henry
H olt and Company, 1953), p . 13$.
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share o f our a tte n tio n  which i s  g iv en  to  the in flu en ce  
o f demand on va lu e; and the longer the p er io d , the more 
important w i l l  bo the in flu en ce  o f c o s t  o f  production  
on v a lu e .”9
In e s ta b lis h in g  industry  p r ice  and output ranges 
under pure com p etition  i t  i s  n ecessary  to  aggregate the 
t o t a l  o f the output o f a l l  o f  the in d iv id u a l firm s. The 
in du stry  demand when compared w ith  th is  t o t a l  of a l l  
u n it  m arginal c o s t  fu n ctio n s should e s ta b lis h  a market 
p r ic e .  The industry  demand w i l l  n ot be p e r fe c t ly  e l a s ­
t i c .  The slop e o f the curve w i l l  depend upon the amounts 
o f the product which buyers as a whole are prepared to  
take at each market p r ic e .  For short-run  industry  supply  
then , we fin d  th a t the curve i s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  the sum of  
the sh ort-run  m arginal c o s t  curves o f  a l l  f irm s. The 
p r ice  which w i l l  be s e t  as market p r ice  w i l l  be one in  
which ”the aggregate amount buyers are w il l in g  to take 
ju s t  equals the aggregate amount s e l l e r s  are w il l in g  to  
su p p ly .”10 •
9 A lfred M arshall, P r in c ip le s  o f Economics, (8th  
E d itio n , New York: The Macmillan Company, 192UJ, p . 349.
10Bain, op. c l t . ,  p . 142.
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The p r ice  e s ta b lish e d  here must be an eq u ilib riu m  
p rice  to  f u l f i l l  the co n d itio n s o f pure com p etition .
This co n d itio n  w i l l  be found to be true where the sh o rt-  
run industry  supply curve in te r s e c t s  the industry  demand 
curve i f  the aggregate amounts th a t s e l l e r s  are w ill in g  
to  produce equals e x a c tly  the amount buyers are w il l in g  
to  take and i f  each s e l l e r  i s  in  h i3  in d iv id u a l short 
period  eq u ilib rium  wherein margin co3t equals market 
p r ic e . These co n d itio n s w i l l  tend to  m aintain p r ice  
because p r ice  w i l l  not be departed from so long as the 
co n d itio n s  o f demand and supply remain unchanged and the 
l a t t e r  co n d itio n  au tom atica lly  e s ta b lis h e s  an equ ilibrium  
p r ic e .
Industry p r ice  under pure com petition  in  the 
lon g  run w i l l  be tempered by v a r ia b le s  introduced when 
en try  or e x i t  o f firm s occurs in  response to  p r o f it s  or 
lo s s e s  fo r  the in d u stry . I f  we assume th a t under pure 
com petition  a l l  o f the firm s w i l l  ad just th e ir  average 
c o s ts  to  a c e r ta in  minimum which w i l l  be common to  a l l ,  
then we can a sc er ta in  the e f f e c t  which entry and e x i t  
w i l l  have upon the supply fo r  the industry  in  the long  
run. I f  p r ice  i s  above t h is  minimum average c o s t  of  
a l l  f ir m s, the e x c ess  p r o f i t s  a v a ila b le  in  the f i e l d  
w i l l  lea d  to  en try , thereby in crea sin g  the supply
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tending to  lower p r ice  to the c o s t  lin e*  I f  p r ic e , on 
the other hand, i s  below th is  average c o s t  for  a l l  firm s, 
the e x i t  o f  firm s w i l l  reduce the supply, tending to  
push the p r ice  back up to average c o s ts  o f  production . 
When th is  i s  tru e, i t  i s  ev id en t th a t in  the long run 
u n r e str ic te d  entry and e x i t  o f  new firm s w i l l  cause the 
firm s in  the industry  and the sc a le  o f op eration s in  the 
industry  to  produce an o v e r a ll output at which p r ice  
equals the minimum average c o s ts  o f production o f a l l  
f irm s. This i s  an assumed p r e r e q u is ite  when we con sid er  
the assumptions of pure com p etition .
Monopoly. Pure monopoly i s  a r e la t iv e ly  rare  
co n d itio n  in  our economy today. I t  i s  a s itu a t io n  
which i s  ch a ra cter ized  by one s e l l e r  and many buyers; 
the buyers in d iv id u a lly  have no In fluence over p r ic e .
The s e l l e r  under monopoly i s  assumed to  have co n tro l  
over p r ic e ;  however, th is  s e l l e r  w i l l  f in d  th a t h is  a b il­
i t y  to  d isp ose o f h is  commodity at any p a r t ic u la r  p rice  
i s  l im ite d . I t  i s  an in e v ita b le  consequence th a t the 
q u an tity  which can be so ld  at a p rice  under monopoly 
w i l l  be lim ite d  w hile the s e l l e r  in  pure com p etition , 
even though he i s  unable to  a f f e c t  the market p r ic e ,  can 
s e l l  as much as he d e s ir e s  at the market p r ic e .
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An a n a ly s is  o f monopoly p r ice  req u ires th at a 
d is t in c t io n  be made between market p r ice  and normal 
p r ice  as 3een from a pure com petition  standpoint on one 
hand and a monopoly v iew point on the o th er . Of impor­
tance here i s  the fa c t  th a t no sharp d is t in c t io n  i s  to  
be made between market p r ice  and normal p r ice  le v e ls  
from the stand p oin t o f monopoly. Market p r ice  and the 
sh ort run normal l e v e l  are many tim es id e n t ic a l .  The 
output i3  adjusted  con tinu ou sly  in  order to match cur­
ren t and a n tic ip a te d  s a le s .  Cost elem ents are taken 
in to  co n sid era tio n  in  s e t t in g  p r ic e s .  I f  a monopoly 
company i s  the only su p p lie r  in  some market a t the 
moment, new d isc o v e r ie s  and in v en tio n s or even i t s  own 
p r ic e s  may be preparing r iv a l  sources o f supp ly . A 
firm  has a com plete and p e r fe c t  lon g  run monopoly when 
i t  i s  the only s e l l e r  o f a s p e c i f ic  good in  the p resen t, 
when i t  c o n tr o ls  a l l  r iv a l  supply in  the market, and 
when there i s  no obvious th rea t to the continuance o f  
the monopoly co n d itio n  as i t  e x i s t s .
Monopoly p r ice  i s  that p r ice  which y ie ld s  the 
la r g e s t  n et re tu rn . The s e t t in g  o f  such a p r ice  may 
in vo lve  many d if f e r e n t  th in g s: the adoption o f the
p r ic e  o f a su spected  com p etitor , the a p p lica tio n  o f  a 
standard mark-up, the c a r e fu l c a lc u la t io n  of c o s t  and
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s a le s  schedules and many other fa c to r s . Whatever the 
ca se , the producer p la ces  a p r ic e  of h is  own choosing  
upon the product and in  doing so he sim ultaneously  
determ ines h is  volume o f output. The m onopolist must 
o f  n e c e s s ity  equate m arginal revenue and m arginal c o s t  
as did the producer under pure com p etition . The demand 
fo r  the m onopolist product v a r ie s  from that under pure 
com p etition , however, in  th a t the m onopolist i s  faced  
w ith  the t o ta l  demand curve s in ce  he co n tro ls  the  
e n t ir e  supply o f an economic good.
In equating marginal c o s t  and marginal revenue, 
the m onopolist i s  normally faced  w ith  a n eg a tiv e ly  
in c lin e d  demand sch ed u le . This schedule i s  in  con­
t r a s t  to the pure com petition  s itu a t io n  in  which the 
same market p r ice  i s  rece iv ed  whether one u n it or an 
e n t ir e  output i s  s o ld . The m onopolist in  not being  
faced  w ith  an i n f i n i t e l y  e l a s t i c  demand must concern  
h im se lf w ith  m arginal revenue adjustments that are ob­
ta ined  when the p r ice  i s  lowered and thereby a la r g er  
q u an tity  i s  s o ld . The m on op o list's  s lo p in g  demand 
curve i s  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  the actual p r ice  and output 
l e v e ls  and a lso  fo r  r e a c tio n s  o f p r ice  and output to 
demand and c o s t  changes. In complete monopoly the  
s a le s  schedule fo r  the monopoly commodity w i l l  be
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determined s o le ly  by the fo rce s  c o n tr o llin g  the e l a s t i c ­
i t y  of demand fo r  the product. This l a s t  s itu a t io n  
e x i s t s  s in ce  buyers can ob ta in  the product from only one 
firm , the monopoly firm .
The m onopolist in  s e t t in g  a p rice  i s  faced  w ith  
p o ss ib ly  three d if fe r e n t  c o s t  or p rice  p e r io d s . These 
are the sh ort run p r ic in g  p er io d , or the period in  which 
both v a r ia b le  and f ix e d  c o s ts  are p resen t. The second  
i s  a market p r ic in g  period  in  which a l l  c o s ts  are f ix e d  
and none are v a r ia b le , A th ird  i s  the long run a d ju st­
ment th a t might fa ce  the m onop olist.
Short run p r ic in g  fo r  the m onopolist i s  a case  
in  which he attem pts to  maximize p r o f i t s  w hile co n sid ­
er in g  four d is t in c t  c o s t  r e la t io n s h ip s :  m arginal c o s t s ,
average v a r ia b le  c o s t s ,  average f ix e d  c o s t s ,  and average 
t o ta l  c o s t s .  He w i l l  equate m arginal c o s ts  and m arginal 
revenue so as to  e s ta b l is h  a q u an tity  output and a p r ice  
based upon th is  q u an tity  l e v e l .  S ince the m arginal 
revenue curve w i l l  be in c lin e d  more than the average 
revenue curve, the m arginal c o s t  curve w i l l  in te r s e c t  
the m arginal revenue curve at a p o in t sh ort o f  the in te r ­
se c t io n  o f  the average revenue and the average t o t a l  co s t  
curves and a lso  at a p o in t sh ort o f  th a t in  which the 
m arginal c o s t  equates average revenue as found in  pure
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com p etition . The s itu a t io n  in  which output i s  esta b ­
lis h e d  at a p o in t where m arginal co s t  equals m arginal 
revenue w i l l  g iv e  the maximum n et re tu rn .
The m onopolist i s  faced  w ith  approxim ately the 
same operating co n d itio n s in so fa r  as covering average 
t o ta l  c o s ts  and average v a r ia b le  c o s ts  as the com petitor  
when com petition  i s  pure. In the long run, the monopo­
l i s t  must cover a l l  o f h is  c o s t s .  In the sh ort run, he 
w i l l  continue to operate w hile  he can cover h is  average 
v a r ia b le  c o s ts  and some elem ent o f h is  f ix e d  c o s t s .  He 
might p o ss ib ly  operate in  the very sh ort run so long as 
he i s  not coverin g  v a r ia b le  c o s ts  but th is  s itu a t io n  
c a l l s  fo r  a d ra in in g  o f money from the pockets o f the 
owners. I t  i s  a temporary s itu a t io n  in  which there i s  
abundant hope th a t market co n d itio n s w i l l  soon improve.
There are a lte r n a t iv e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  open to the  
m onopolist in  e s ta b lis h in g  a sh ort period  p r ice  but 
there a lte r n a t iv e s  g en era lly  are not adopted .11- The 
m onopolist does not charge the h ig h e st  p o s s ib le  p r ice  
s in ce  th e o r e t ic a l ly  he would s e l l  but one u n it  and in  
doing so he would cover on ly  a very sm all p art o f h is
^ S tep h en  Enke, Interm ediate Economic Theory, 
(New York: P re n tice -H a ll, in c . ,  1950), p . 301 .
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overhead; h ie  lo s s e s  would be enormous. He does not pro­
duce and s e l l  the output in  which h is  average t o t a l  c o s ts  
are low est; t h is  output exceeds the p o in t where m arginal 
c o s t  i s  equal to  m arginal revenue and i t  i s  at such an 
extended l e v e l  that h is  m arginal revenue m ight even be 
n eg a tiv e , tending to add more to h is  c o s ts  than to h is  
r e c e ip t s .  The m onopolist does not seek to  produce and 
s e l l  an output th a t y ie ld s  the g r e a te s t  u n it  p r o f i t .  He 
i s  seek ing t o t a l  p r o f i t  and not u n it  p r o f i t .  Marginal 
revenue w i l l  exceed m arginal c o s t  a t the output in  which 
u n it  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be at a maximum. S t i l l  another p o in t  
o f  in te r e s t  when d ea lin g  w ith  the m onopolist i s  th a t  
there i s  no in d iv id u a l supply sch ed u le . No one curve i s  
a v a ila b le  from which can be read the q u a n tit ie s  th a t  
w i l l  be supposedly su p p lied . The reason here i s  th a t a 
m onopolist u n lik e  a purely  com p etitive  su p p lier  does not 
a d ju st h is  m arginal c o s t  to  p r ic e . This p o in t has i t s  
c o n tr o v e r s ia l asp ects when s o c ia l  w elfare i s  concerned, 
a m atter which needs no d isc u ss io n  at th is  p o in t.
Market p eriod  p r ic in g  fo r  the m onopolist i s  a 
very unusual case in  which m arginal c o s t  and average 
v a r ia b le  c o s ts  are assumed to be zero and average f ix e d  
c o s ts  and average t o t a l  c o s ts  h eld  an id e n t ic a l  r e la ­
t io n sh ip  to  ou tp ut. This i s  a s i tu a t io n  in  which the
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m onopolist w i l l  determine p rice  w ithout re feren ce  to  
c o s t .  The s e l l e r  has misjudged h is  sa le s  schedule fo r  
an a r t ic le  which cannot be stored  and he f in d s  h im se lf  
w ith  an accumulation o f goods on hand which cannot be 
so ld  at the p r ice  which would be e s ta b lish e d  on a mar­
g in a l cost-m argin al revenue b a s is .  S ince the s e l l e r  
can recover h is  investm ent only by s e l l in g  the goods, 
he w i l l  fin d  i t  most p r o f ita b le  to  ignore c o s ts  and s e t  
the p r ice  at a l e v e l  which w i l l  maximize t o ta l  revenue 
before the goods s p o i l .  The q u estion  a r ise s  w ith  the 
m onopolist in  th is  case as to whether or not g rea ter  
p r o f i t s  w i l l  be r e a liz e d  i f  he w ithholds part o f the 
supply and allow s i t  to  go to w aste . A p rice  i s  d e lib ­
e r a te ly  chosen which renders m arginal revenue equal 
zero . Marginal c o s t  i s  a lso  zero s in ce  there are no 
v a r ia b le  co st3  in  t h is  unusual market p er io d . The p r ice  
i s  lowered to  the l e v e l  at which m arginal revenue i s  
zero s in ce  each a d d itio n a l u n it  so ld  up to th is  p o in t  
w i l l  add to  t o t a l  revenue. The remaining u n it s ,  i f  any 
are a v a ila b le , which cannot be so ld  at th is  p rice  w i l l  
be allowed to  s p o i l .  I f  the surp lus i s  d isposed  o f  the 
firm  w i l l  rea d ju st p r ice  so th at m arginal revenue and 
m arginal c o s t  are again eq u al.
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Monopoly In the market period  does not in v a r ia ­
b ly  requ ire th a t some o f the a v a ila b le  supply be thrown 
away or allowed to  s p o i l .  I f  the t o ta l  supply brought 
to the market fo r  sa le  were l e s s  than the q u an tity  
needed to  bring m arginal revenue to  zero , a l l  produced 
u n its  would be so ld  and the output sa le  p o in t m ight not 
equate m arginal revenue and m arginal c o s t .  I t  i s  ev id en t 
that i f  the supply i s  too g rea t to be so ld  at the optimum 
p r ic e , then the m onopolist has in c o r r e c t ly  estim ated  to  
h is  own l o s s .
Long run monopoly p r ic e  adjustm ents req u ire  that  
the co n d itio n  o f monopoly remain com plete. In t h is  ca se , 
long run p r ice  and output adjustm ents w i l l  be noth ing  
more than readjustm ents by the firm  to bring about equal­
i t y  o f lon g  run m arginal c o s t  and m arginal r e v e n u e . ^  
Monopoly firm s tend to  operate in  the sh ort run; however, 
they must make long run adjustm ents from the standpoint 
o f p r ice  and output l e v e l s .  G enerally  they are in te r ­
e s te d  in  sh ort run m arginal c o s ts  w ith  the e x is t in g  p la n t .  
In the long run, however, the firm  w i l l  seek  to  equate 
the long run m arginal c o s t  w ith  m arginal revenue by
12John P. Due, Interm ediate Economic A n a ly sis , 
(Chicago: Richard D. irw in , I n c . ,  I s S I ) ,  pp. 257-58 .
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ad ju stin g  p lan t s i z e .  When the long run m arginal ad ju st­
ments are com plete, m arginal revenue w i l l  equal both long  
run m arginal co st3  and sh ort run m arginal c o s ts  w ith  the 
p la n t at i t 3  p a r ticu la r  output l e v e l .  I f  m arginal 
revenue and long run m arginal c o s ts  are not eq u a l, the 
p lan t adjustm ents have not been completed in  such a man­
ner as to  maximize p r o f i t s .  F a ilu re to  equate sh ort run 
m arginal c o s ts  and marginal revenue in d ic a te s  fa i lu r e  to 
operate at the most p r o f ita b le  le v e l  o f  output w ith  the 
e x is t in g  p lan t ca p a c ity . Once a l l  long run adjustments 
have taken p la ce , no fu rth er  adjustments w i l l  be made by 
the m onopolist s in ce  continued complete monopoly i s  
assumed in  which no new firm s en ter  the in d u stry .
Monopoly in  i t s e l f  i s  no guarantee o f p r o f i t s  
in  ex c ess  o f those under com p etition . I f  demand is  
inadequate, the complete absence o f com petition  i s  o f  
l i t t l e  b e n e f it  to the s e l l e r .  While the m onopolist i s  
favored  w ith the complete market demand, he might have 
some d i f f i c u l t y  in  a scer ta in in g  the exact e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
h is  s a le s  sch ed u le . A m onopolist might have s u f f ic ie n t  
p o te n t ia l  s a le s  to  earn on ly a normal re tu rn , or he 
might have such a lim ite d  s a le s  volume th a t he might not 
be in  a p o s it io n  to  earn th is  normal amount. He would 
ev en tu a lly  have to  liq u id a te  h is  b u s in e ss .
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The sc a le  o f  operations o f  a m on op o list's  p lan t  
w i l l  a lso  a f fe c t  an im portant co n sid era tio n  h ere . The 
m onopolist i s  not an a ll-w is e  businessm an, and he cannot 
always begin  production  at a cap acity  le v e l  to f i t  h is  
actu a l demand; he must make adjustm ents o f output in  
which he can be reasonably sure o f  a sse ss in g  u n it  c o s t s .  
He w i l l  a lso  know roughly fo r  what he can s e l l  a l i t t l e  
more w ith  an in crea se  in  p la n t output and how much he 
needs to f l e x  h is  p r ice  downward to  in crease  h is  s a le s .  
Through a s e r ie s  o f adjustments he should be able to  
g et m arginal c o s t  equal to m arginal revenue. I f  through 
ignorance the m onopolist sto p s h is  experim ents to  
achieve maximum n et retu rn s and i s  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  ju st  
making a p r o f it , ,  then he w i l l  be lower or h igher at any 
given  time than h is  optimum sc a le  o f o p era tio n s. I f  
the sc a le  i s  lower than the optimum sc a le  to achieve  
maximum n et re tu rn s , both the m onopolist and the general 
p u b lic  lo s e ;  the m onopolist i s  not making the la r g e s t  
n et return  and the p u b lic  i s  not g e t t in g  as many goods 
and i s  paying a r e la t iv e ly  h igh  p r ice  fo r  those i t  g e t s .  
A p rice  too low and sc a le  o f  op eration s too h igh  allow s  
the p u b lic  to b e n e f it  at the expense o f the m onop olist.
In summary, monopoly p r ice  w i l l  norm ally r e s u lt  
in  a h igher p r ice  and a sm aller volume of output than
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would occur under purely  com p etitive  c o n d it io n s . Both 
monopoly p r ice  and purely  com p etitive  p r ice  must face  
the same b a sic  requirem ents fo r  continued p la n t opera­
t io n s  in  the long run and the sh ort run. Both monopoly 
and pure com petition  attempt to  ad ju st p r ice  and output 
to  that p o in t in  which marginal c o s t  equals m arginal 
revenue. The m onopolist can alm ost always earn a p r o f it  
in  ex cess  o f th at under com petition  by r e s t r ic t in g  ou t­
put and r a is in g  p r ic e . The h igher p r o f it s  and the d i f ­
feren ce  between monopoly p rice  and a purely  com p etitive  
p r ice  depend p rim arily  upon the e l a s t i c i t y  o f demand.
In g en era l, the more in e la s t ic  the demand, the grea ter  
w i l l  be the ex cess  o f monopoly p r ice  over a purely com­
p e t i t iv e  p r ic e .  I f  the demand i s  extrem ely e l a s t i c ,  the 
m onopolist would not be able to  r a is e  p r ic e s  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t ly .
Pure com petition  and pure monopoly are the ex ­
tremes upon which pricem akers might conceivab ly  f in d  
them selves basing th e ir  current p r ic e s .  Both o f these  
ca ses  are r e la t iv e ly  sim ple, and from the academic 
standpoint they are e a s i ly  understood. Shading between 
pure com petition  and pure monopoly are the many s i tu a ­
t io n s  from m on op olistic  com petition  in to  o lig o p o ly  and
38
duopoly. The p a r t ia l  monopoly and lim ite d  com petition  
concepts are very broad and have many r a m if ic a t io n s .
Pure com petition  and monopoly have become the 
standards by which are judged many varying and com pli­
cated  cases o f buying and s e l l in g .  Pure com petition  
i3  the extreme s itu a t io n  which can be used to analyze  
very few market s i t u a t io n s ,  and as such, i t s  p r in c ip le s  
are somewhat lim ite d  or u s e le s s  as a b a s is  fo r  a n a ly s is  
of m anufactured-goods markets today. Pure monopoly, on 
the other hand, i s  ch a ra cter ized  in  most ca ses  by tech ­
n o lo g ic a l requirem ents which are such that the number 
of firm s must o f n e c e s s ity  be lim ite d  to a minimum i f  
c o s ts  are to be reasonably low . This s itu a t io n  i s  
recogn ized  as a monopoly and in  many cases i t  i s  regu­
la te d  and p ro tected  by government.
POST MARSHALLIAN ANALYSIS 
Im perfect com petition  and m on op olistic  com peti­
t io n  have become a part o f  economic study s in ce  the 
1930*s .  Most d isc u ss io n s  o f p r ice  theory d e a lt  w ith  
only two extreme ca ses  o f monopoly and p e r fe c t  or pure 
com petition  p r io r  to  the 1930 's .  In a period  o f some 
th ir ty  to  fo r ty  years the economy o f  the U nited S ta tes  
underwent a r e la t iv e ly  r a d ic a l change. The system  of
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p riva te  en terp r ise  remained dominant; however, the s iz e  
of firm s increased  w hile the number o f firm s in  the same 
f i e ld s  tended to d ecrease . Improved tra n sp o rta tio n  and 
communications f a c i l i t i e s  tended to  extend the market 
area in  which each o f  the la rg er  firm s operated . Mass 
production techniques were made ap p licab le  in  many cases  
and in crea sin g  returns could  be enjoyed as the sc a le  o f  
op eration s tended to  expand and grow. While the s iz e  
of firm s tended to in crease  along w ith  an in crea se  in  
market areas and at the same time a decrease occurred  
in  the number o f com p etitors, there i s  no su b s ta n tia l  
evidence o f a d ec lin e  in  com p etition . The character o f  
com petition  has apparently changed w ith in  in du stry  w ith  
decreased  numbers o f s e l l e r s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  where a few 
powerful firm s are dominant; however, the in te n s ity  o f  
in tern ec in e  com petition  in  many cases has tended to  
in crease  w ith  fewer s e l l e r s  in  the market.
Changed co n d itio n s created  a problem wherein i t  
was found th a t monopoly and pure com petition  conoepts 
could  not ex p la in  p r ic e  theory f u l l y .  The u sua l market 
s itu a t io n  became one o f im perfect com p etition . Imper­
f e c t  com petition  c o n s is t s  o f  a case in  which there i s  
more than one s e l l e r  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  product but each  
firm  e x e r c is e s  some co n tro l over p r ic e ;  com petition  i s
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not p e r fe c t  but n e ith er  does pure monopoly e x i s t .  Some­
where between the two extrem es o f monopoly and pure com­
p e t i t io n ,  there l i e s  the area of im perfect com p etition . 
This i s  the p r ice  s itu a t io n  that e x i s t s  in  most indus­
t r i e s .
A lfred M arshall d e a lt  alm ost com pletely  w ith  
in d u s tr ia l a n a ly s is . He made very l i t t l e  re feren ce  to  
firm  a n a ly s is  and used only h is  " rep resen ta tiv e  firm" 
as an attempt to get to  an equ ilibrium  o f the firm  
ra th er  than u sin g  h is  industry  eq u ilib rium  o f a p a r t ia l  
n atu re . The handling o f pure com petition  and pure 
monopoly theory w ith  some o f  the h ero ic  assumptions 
which had to  be used l e f t  many w r ite r s  w ith  a f e e l in g  
o f g u i l t  or incom pleteness when d ea lin g  w ith  p rice  
th eo ry . The d isturbance in  the minds o f the econom ists 
la s te d  fo r  se v e r a l years a fte r  M arsh all's P r in c ip le s  
was p u b lish ed .
S r a ffa . P iero  S r a ffa ’s "The Laws o f Returns 
Under Com petitive C onditions,"  in  the Economic Journal 
in  1926 can be c i t e d  a3 the f i r s t  attempt to  so lv e  th is  
m ental d istu rb an ce . S ra ffa  in  h is  a r t ic le  r e a liz e d  
th a t the area of in crea s in g  retu rn s fo r  a firm  had 
been l e f t  more or l e s s  unanalyzed. The o r ig in a l laws 
o f  re tu rn s-d id  not d escrib e in  s u f f ic ie n t  manner the
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connection  between co3t and q u a n tity  o f production . The 
th in k ing  behind such words as d is tr ib u t io n , production , 
exchange v a lu e , and the law o f  non-proportional retu rn s  
c a lle d  fo r th  the id ea  o f a law o f  supply to be used w ith  
the law of demand upon which to  base a theory o f  v a lu e . 
In m odifying the two laws fo r  what was considered  more 
e f f e c t iv e  u se , d im in ish ing retu rn s had to be changed 
from the ''land" Idea to any fa c to r -o f-p r o d u c tio n  case  
in  which the fa c to r  was a v a ila b le  only in  a con stant or 
l im ite d  amount. In creasin g  retu rn s had to  be changed 
more r a d ic a l ly  because o f th e ir  e a r l ie r  r o le  o f impor­
tance in  the d iv is io n  o f la b o r . More emphasis was 
needed in  the ex tern a l d iv is io n s  as opposed to the 
in te r n a l d iv is io n s ,  thu s, whether an industry  would be 
c la s s i f i e d  as one o f in crea sin g  or d ecreasing  returns  
would depend upon i t s  r e la t iv e  s i z e .  Most sm all in d i­
v id u a l firm s would tend to  be in crea s in g  return  firm s, 
w hile  the whole industry  could be c la s s i f i e d  as one o f  
d ecreasing  re tu rn s .
S ra ffa  p o in ted  out th a t  the supply o f an in d i­
v id u a l firm  could be considered  sep a ra te ly  from the 
demand o f the in du stry  fo r  purposes o f a n a ly s is . I f  
changes in  the eq u ilib rium  p ic tu r e  o f  the in d iv id u a l  
firm  were r e f le c te d  in  eq u ilib riu m  changes fo r  the
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in d u stry , however, then the is o la te d  a n a ly s is  of 
s in g le  commodity com petition  would tend to  be in v a lid .  
P a rticu la r  equ ilibrium  co n d itio n s  would be upset in  
such a c a s e . Small v a r ia tio n s  in  q u a n tit ie s  produced 
would not c a l l  fo r th  ex ter n a l economies according to  
S ra ffa  and th erefore v a r ia b le  c o s ts  would tend to  be 
co n sta n t. He analyzed fu rth er  that in  r e a l i t y  a3 
opposed to  previous theory the in term ed iate p o in ts  at 
which an in d iv id u a l firm  might stand between monopoly 
and pure com petition  were not n e c e s sa r ily  c lo se  to  
one or the o th er . He c ite d  product d if f e r e n t ia t io n ,  
consumer p re feren ce , and marketing c o s ts  as fa c to r s  
in  com p etitive v a lu e . "Every firm  has two c la s s e s  o f  
m arginal custom ers: those who are at the margin only
from i t s  own standpoint and f i x  a l im it  fo r  the ex cess  
o f i t s  p r ic e s  over the p r ic e s  g en era lly  r u lin g , and 
those who are at the margin from the standpoint o f  
the gen era l market and f i x  a l im it  fo r  the general 
in crease  in  p rice  o f the product.
S ra ffa  i s  c i te d  by most w r iter s  as having made 
the f i r s t  break w ith  M arshallian a n a ly s is  by s ta t in g
13piero S ra ffa , "The Laws o f Returns Under Com­
p e t i t i v e  C onditions,"  Economic Journal, 1926, p . 547.
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t h a t  s o m e th in g  b e t t e r  was n e e d e d ; ^  he e v en  w en t  so  f a r  
as t o  s t a t e  a t  one t ime t h a t  M a r s h a l l ’ s t h e o r y  s h o u l d  
be a b an d o n ed .  E a r l i e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  b r i d g e  t h e  gap  
b e tw ee n  p u r e  c o m p e t i t i o n  and monopoly  h ad  b e e n  made by 
C o u r n o t ,  E d g ew o r th ,  and o t h e r s . ^ * 6 These a u t h o r s  were
■*-4Joan Robinson d ir e c t ly  supports S ra ffa  as 
opposed to the d im in ish ing returns approach o f M arshall. 
M arshall’s view s were too gen era lized  and always assumed 
f u l l  employment o f resou rces; i f  th is  were tru e , any in ­
crease in  the use o f one or more fa c to r s  in  one or more 
concerns would have to r e s u l t  in  a d ec lin e  in  the use o f  
the fa c to r s  in  one or more concerns. A ctu a lly , increased  
demand can c a l l  fo r th  in creased  production through in ­
creased use o f one or more o f  i t s  fa c to r s  w ithout mate­
r i a l l y  a f fe c t in g  other firm s because f u l l  U3e o f resou rces  
i s  seldom being made. The tendency to r i s in g  supply  
p r ice  depends upon a markedly unaverage s e le c t io n  o f pro­
d uctive fa c to r s ,  a low e l a s t i c i t y  o f s u b s t itu t io n , degree 
o f s p e c ia l iz a t io n , and the degree to which fa c to r  supply 
i s  f ix e d .  Again, Robinson g e ts  c lo s e  to the ob servation s  
of S ra ffa  when she says that "where f a l l in g  supply p r ice  
occurs, i t  w i l l  work more stro n g ly  the la r g er  i s  the 
in du stry; f o r ,  the b igger  the in d u stry , the g rea ter  the 
e f f e c t  o f  a given  p rop ortionate in crease  in  i t s  output 
in  a lte r in g  the su p p lie s  o f fa c to r s  favourably to  i t s  
own requirem ents."  Taken from Joan R obinson’s "Rising  
Supply P r ic e ,"  Economica, 1941, as found in  K. E. Bould- 
ing and G. J . S t lg le r * s  Readings in  P rice Theory, V ol.
VI, (Chicago: Richard D. Irw in, Inc#, 1952), Cnap. 11,
•*-5p, W. S. Andrews, " In d u str ia l A nalysis in  
Economics." Oxford S tu d ies in  the Price Mechanism,
( Oxford: Clarendon P ress, 1951), p . 139.
l®Duopoly and o lig o p o ly  b r ie f s  are taken from 
E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory o f M onopolistic Competi­
t io n , (Cambridge, MassTl Harvard U n iv ers ity  P ress,
19'4'8) , Chapter I I I ,  and Robert T r if f in ,  M onopolistic  
Com petition and General E quilibrium  Theory, (Cambridge, 
M ass.: "Harvard U n iv ers ity  p ress , l9 4 0 j , and George J. 
S t ig le r  and Kenneth E. Boulding, Readings in  Price  
Theory, V ol. VI, (Chicago: Richard 0 . Irw in, I n c . .
1932),' Chap. 11.
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in te r e s te d  p rim arily  in  d u o p o lis t ic  and o l ig o p o l i s t i c  
p r ic in g  per se and were not c r i t i c i z in g  M arshall; they 
even went so fa r  in  most cases as to  l im it  th e ir  anal­
y se s  w ith  about the 3ame assumptions th a t M arshall 
su re ly  would have made.
Duopoly and O ligop o ly . When the number of 
s e l l e r s  i s  sm all and the co n tro l over p r ice  i s  co n sid ­
e r a b le , we have a co n d itio n  of p a r t ia l  monopoly. The 
co n tro l over p r ice  on the p art o f in d iv id u a l s e l l e r s  i s  
u su a lly  a r e lu c ta n t  co n tro l because the s e l l e r  i s  a fra id  
o f r e t a l ia t io n  from h is  few com p etitors. This s itu a t io n  
would be more or l e s s  ty p ic a l o f duopoly, w ith  two 
s e l l e r s ,  or o lig o p o ly , w ith  se v era l s e l l e r s .  When a 
firm  makes a product th a t d i f f e r s  s l i g h t ly  from that 
made by other firm s and when there are a r e la t iv e ly  
la rg e  number o f s e l l e r s  in  the market we have a s itu a ­
t io n  which approximates m on op o listic  com p etition . Each 
firm  serv in g  the market w i l l  f i l l  the same gen era l need 
o f the consuming p u b lic ; however, the degree o f compe­
t i t i o n  between the firm s i s  le ssen ed  somewhat because 
of product, d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .
Duopoly and o lig o p o ly  e x i s t  when a s in g le  com­
m odity i s  being produced by two firm s or by on ly  a few  
f ir m s . The r iv a l  firm s o f fe r  id e n t ic a l  products or they
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o f fe r  goods v/hich are d if fe r e n t ia te d  in  some degree from 
one another; however, the goods serve the same need o f  
the consumer. The s e l l e r s  a c t iv e ly  compete i f  there i s  
no c o l lu s io n  nor agreement in  the group. The r e a c tio n  
of a l l  producers must be considered  by each s e l l e r  in  
planning h is  production  and p r ice  p o l i c i e s .  Each o f the 
com petitors can a f f e c t  p r ic e s  and s a le s  in  the o lig o p ­
o l i s t i c  market.
P rofessor Edward Chamberlin ably surveyed duop­
oly  and o lig o p o ly  theory to 3erve h is  purpose in  attem pt­
ing to  f in d  a so lu t io n  to va lue and p r ice  in  the middle 
ground between com p etition  and m o n o p o l y . H e  worked in  
an area in  which the number o f s e l l e r s  was r e la t iv e ly  
sm all; two s e l l e r s  gave duopoly and sev era l gave a 
co n d itio n  o f o lig o p o ly  and in  every case the number was 
30 l im ite d  th a t the presence o f  any one o f the s e l l e r s  
was always known through h is  in flu en ce  on p r ic e .  Such 
an emphasis upon numbers allow ed him to  l e t  pure compe­
t i t i o n  be assumed oth erw ise: a standardized  product and
com plete knowledge o f the market on the port o f  both  
buyers and s e l l e r s .
17Chamberlln, op. c i t . ,  Chapter I I I .
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Chamberlin a lso  has complete independence of  
the 3 e lle r 3  in  order to  avoid th e ir  combining to form 
a monopoly. This independence, o f n e c e s s ity ,  has to  
be c lo s e ly  d efin ed  s in ce  w ith  only a few s e l l e r s  in  the 
market each has to  con sid er the p o lic y  o f the others in  
s e t t in g  h is  own p o l i c i e s .  To d efin e  t h is ,  Chamberlin 
sa id , ‘'There can be no a c tu a l, or t a c i t ,  agreement— that 
i s  a l l ." ^ 8 Further co n sid era tio n s  along th is  l in e  are 
introduced, .from the v iew point o f duopoly s in ce  the 
e s s e n t ia l  p r in c ip le s  th a t w i l l  g iv e  a so lu t io n  to value  
and p r ice  w ith  a few s e l l e r s  (whether only two or sev ­
e r a l more up to  the p o in t where the in d iv id u a l s e l le r s  
no lon ger  in flu en ce  p r ic e )  i s  to be stu d ied . Chamberlin 
then co n d itio n s h is  duopoly concept w ith  the d ir e c t  
e f f e c t  one s e l l e r  w i l l  have upon p r ic e  actin g  indepen­
d en tly  as though he has no e f f e c t  upon h is  r iv a ls ;  then 
fo llo w s the in d ir e c t  e f f e c t  one s e l l e r  w i l l  have upon 
h is  n et return  by co n sid er in g  any p o lic y  adopted in  the 
l ig h t  o f what the com petitor w i l l  do; and f in a l ly  he 
s tu d ie s  the duopoly s itu a t io n  w ith  regard to  what a 
s e l l e r  w i l l  do i f  h is  r iv a ls  p o l ic i e s  remain f ix e d .
*8I b id . ,  p . 31 .
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These co n d itio n s are considered  w hile studying the id eas  
of Cournot and Edgeworth.
Cournot and Edgeworth were both seek ing  an 
answer to  the q u estio n  o f equ ilibrium  p r ice  and maximum 
n et return  under co n d itio n s  o f duopoly and o lig o p o ly , 
working from a con d ition  o f  duopoly to  one approaching 
com p etition . They both  worked w ith  id e n t ic a l  products 
on the part o f r iv a l  producers and both showed th a t as 
the number o f com petitors approached the purely  compet­
i t i v e  number th a t the p r ic e  had a tendency to  be lower 
and nearer the com p etitive  p r ic e .  The two men d iffe r e d  
somewhat, however, as to the co n d itio n s  under which the 
r iv a ls  operated , and they a lso  h e ld  com pletely  d if fe r e n t  
concepts as to the nature o f p r ic e  when a con d ition  o f  
m on op olistic  com petition  p r e v a ile d . Cournot worked on 
the assumption that one producer acted independently  
o f a r iv a l  and assumed the r i v a l ' s  supply to  be con­
s t a n t .  He sa id  that p r ic e  was determ inate fo r  any num­
ber o f s e l l e r s  that m ight be in  the market. Edgeworth, 
on the other hand, assumed th a t the r iv a ls  acted in de­
pendently o f one another, each assuming h is  r i v a l ' s  
p r ic e  to be co n sta n t. He a lso  m aintained th a t the p r ice  
was indeterm inate and would tend to o s c i l l a t e  between a 
monopoly p r ice  and one s l i g h t ly  above the com p etitive
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p r ic e . Edgeworth d iffe r e d  s l i g h t ly  from Cournot, too , 
when he sa id  that the d u o p o list  would gain  by r a is in g  
h is  p r ice  when h is  r iv a l  was s e l l in g  a l l  o f  h is  supply, 
thereby g iv in g  the former a monopoly in  h is  lim ite d  
market. Cournot would have the p r ice  s t e a d ily  lower as 
the number o f com petitors came in to  the market. Edge- 
worth h eld  th a t the r iv a l  producers merged the market 
fo r  a p r ice  drop but th a t they acted independently fo r  
a p r ice  in c r e a se . Both o f the. w r iters  used s lop in g  
s tr a ig h t  l in e  demand curves and both fig u red  th at the 
producers adjusted  the p rice  and th at com p etitive  b id ­
ding had nothing to  do w ith  i t ,  the buyer merely tak ing  
the consequences o f p r ice  change should i t  be upward a3 
Edgeworth p red ic ted .
Cournot conceived  a s itu a t io n  in  which two com­
p e t ito r s  had m ineral springs and each com pletely  d is r e ­
garded changes in  the output and p r ice  o f  h is  r i v a l .
To s im p lify  the m atter as much as p o s s ib le ,  Cournot used  
zero c o s t  curves and a s tr a ig h t  l in e  demand curve and 
assumed th a t when the t o t a l  output o f the r iv a ls  was 
placed  on the market th a t the commodity would become a 
fr ee  good. I f  one producer had monopoly co n tro l o f  the 
market, he would s e t  a p r ice  th a t would g iv e  him the 
maximum n et return  and would crea te  a demand equal to
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the to ta l  o f  h is  ou tp u t. A lone com petitor w ith  an equal 
c a p a b ility  o f output cr ea tes  a problem. The r iv a l  i s  
aware, by the assum ptions above, that the p r ice  v / i l l  go 
to zero i f  he in troduces h is  ca p a c ity  to the market.
The r e s u lt  i s  that the second producer p la c e s  h a lf  o f h is  
output in to  the market, which would maximise h is  re tu rn , 
and the market p r ice  tends to drop.
The o r ig in a l producer w i l l  soon see that he can 
in crease h is  p r o f it  by cu ttin g  h is  output and at the 
same time the r iv a l  producer w i l l  add to the market 
supply in  order to  gain  the maximum n et re tu rn . This 
la t t e r  move undercuts the o r ig in a l producer, and he 
cu ts h is  output to  the most p r o f ita b le  l e v e l .  At the 
same time h is  r iv a l  f in d s  i t  p r o f ita b le  to add to the 
supply, and th is  procedure con tinu es u n t i l  both of the 
r iv a l  producers are sharing the market eq u a lly  between 
them. Cournot h e ld  th a t the p r ice  was p e r fe c t ly  d e te r ­
minate and th a t as the number o f s e l l e r s  in creased  from 
one to in f in i t y  th a t the p r ice  became grad u ally  lower 
and approached the purely  com p etitive  p r ic e . Price can • 
always be determined fo r  any co n d itio n  o f m on op olistic  
com p etition  i f  a s tr a ig h t  l in e  demand curve i s  p r e se n t.
Edgeworth attempted to  show th a t p r ice  would be 
indeterm inate where each producer assumed h is  r i v a l ' s
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p rice  to  be co n sta n t.^ 9 I f  only one com petitor had com­
p le te  co n tro l o f the supply, he would s e t  a monopoly 
p r ic e , hov/ever, w ith  a r iv a l  producer in  the market they  
both cannot do t h is  and 3 t i l l  g e t  a l l  the goods so ld .
The obvious move i3  fo r  one o f  the s e l l e r s  to lower the 
p rice  s l ig h t ly  (assuming h is  com petitor to  hold  h is  p r ice  
con stan t) in  which case the lower p r ice  w i l l  g e t  r id  o f  
a l l  o f the f i r s t  s e l l e r s  goods. Loss o f s a le s  lead s the  
com petitor to cu t h is  p r ice  to that o f  h is  com petitor  
and p o ss ib ly  s l i g h t ly  lower in  order to s e l l  a l l  o f h is  
product. This continuous u ndercutting  lead3 to the 
in e v ita b le  low p r ic e  forged  by cu tth ro a t com p etition , 
and the p r ice  now becomes a com p etitive  one and both  
s e l l e r s  are able to r id  them selves o f a l l  the goods they  
have, y e t  n e ith e r  i s  w e ll o f f .
Edgeworth m aintains that at a p o in t s l ig h t ly  
above the com p etitive  p r ice  one o f the s e l l e r s  w i l l  w ise -  
up and r e a l iz e  th a t w ith  h is  r i v a l ' s  supply lim ite d  and 
a l l  being so ld , he i s  l e f t  w ith  a monopoly co n d itio n  p re­
v a i l in g  in  the area in  which he e x i s t s .  This causes the 
p r ic e  to bounce back up to  the monopoly p r ic e . With the 
com petitor making b ig  p r o f i t s ,  n a tu ra lly  the r iv a l  i s
19I b id . ,  Chapter I I I .
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going to r a iso  h is  p r ic e , and the markets w i l l  uncon­
sc io u s ly  be merged and p r ice  w i l l  s ta r t  down again  
through the cu tth ro a t com petition  ro u te . Edgeworth 
showed that a merging o f the markets le d  to a p r ice  
f a l l  whereas when the s e l l e r s  were able to separate the 
markets th a t each would rece iv e  a monopoly p r ic e . Edge- 
worth came to the con clu sion  th a t p r ice  was indeterm i­
nate under co n d itio n s  o f  m on op o listic  com petition', and 
i t  would o s c i l l a t e  and v ib ra te  ir r e g u la r ly  fo r  an in d e f­
in i t e  len g th  o f tim e. Chamberlin c r i t i c i z e s  Edgeworth 
by saying th a t p r ice  o s c i l l a t e s  not because s e l le r s  
o s c i l la t e  b u t, ra th er , because Edgeworth o s c i l la t e s  
between duopoly and monopoly.
Chamberlin, a f te r  rev iew in g  the concepts p re­
sented  above, makes h is  own con clusion  d i f f e r  from th a t  
o f both o f th ese  w r ite r s . Chamberlin holds that s e l l e r s  
w i l l  hold  to  the monopoly p r ice  as long as p o ss ib le  and 
th a t the break toward com p etitive  p r ice  comes when the 
number o f  s e l l e r s  becomes so la rg e  that the in d iv id u a l  
s e l l e r ' s  in flu en c e  on p r ice  i s  in s ig n i f ic a n t .  When t h is  
p o in t i s  reached, then the p r ic e  drops abruptly to the 
com p etitive  p r ic e . There w i l l  be no gradual d escen t as 
Cournot p red ic te d , but a sharp dip  from the monopoly 
p r ice  to the com p etitive  p r ic e  occurs.
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Reviewing duopoly and o lig o p o ly  theory more 
f u l ly ,  we can develop s im ila r  though somewhat more specu­
la t iv e  and p o ss ib ly  more p r a c t ic a l  a sp ects o f  th is  same 
a n a ly s is . I f  the s e l l e r s  r e a l iz e  the d e s tr u c tiv e  im p li­
ca tio n s  o f cu tth ro a t p r ic in g , each w i l l  h e s ita te  to  
in i t i a t e  a p r ice  red u ctio n . The problem of secu rin g  the 
la r g e s t  p o ss ib le  p r o f it  w ithout a p r ic e  war i s  paramount 
in  th is  case; p r ice  to maximize p r o f i t s  fo r  both i s  
probably the answer. In th is  ca se , each r iv a l  w i l l  
attempt to hold  an e s ta b lish e d  p r ic e . There i s  a general 
tendency fo r  p r ice  under duopoly to be sta b le  and to  
approach the p r ice  th a t would be charged by a m on op olist. 
Hie case o f monopoly i s  very s im ila r  to  the s i tu a t io n  in  
duopoly wherein the m onopolist i s  attem pting to maximize 
h is  p r o f i t  over the long run and the p r ic e s  charged w i l l  
be r e la t iv e ly  low i f  th is  seems the b e s t  from the stand­
p o in t o f  maximizing long run p r o f i t s .  Although each of  
the com petitors in  duopoly i s  w il l in g  to  charge a maxi­
m izing p r ic e  in  regard to p r o f i t s ,  both o f the d u o p o lis ts  
cannot do so w ithout an agreement. An agreement would 
allow  the d u o p o lis ts  to  have a p r ice  very c lo se  to  th a t  
o f a monopoly p r ic e .  The duopoly p r ice  can only approach 
monopoly p r ic e , however, s in ce  p r ice  co n tro l and output 
co n tro l i s  n o t ab so lu te on the p art o f  e ith e r  o f  the
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d u o p o lis t ic  s e l l e r s .  The m onopolist has a com plete 
survey o f h is  market and he can reg u la te  the output 
fo r  the e n t ir e  in d u stry . Probably p r ice  under duopoly 
w i l l  tend somewhat lower than th a t under monopoly 
because the d u o p o lis t  w i l l  fea r  lo s s  o f s a le s  to  h is  
com petitor i f  h is  p r ic e  i s  in creased  in  an e f f o r t  to  
maximize h is  p r o f i t .
The trend o f thought presen ted  in  the immediate 
preceding pages has been based on th a t form ulated by 
in d iv id u a ls  who preceded S ra ffa  and, in  the case o f  
Chamberlin, one who fo llow ed  S ra ffa  but who p red icated  
h is  id eas upon the a n a ly s is  which he made of both  
Cournot and Edgeworth. Two men who were w r itin g  about 
the same time as S r a ffa , and who can be considered  as 
adherents o f th is  a stu te  in d iv id u a l are A. C. Pigou and
G. P. Shove. These two men wrote in  the realm of  
m o n o p o listic , d u o p o lis t ic ,  and o l ig o p o l i s t i c  markets 
and in  doing 30 gave credence to  S r a ffa 's  id eas d ea lin g  
w ith  the middle ground between pure com petition  and 
monopoly. Pigou wrote much along the l in e s  o f  w elfare  
economics and gen era l econom ics; in  the p rocess he d is ­
cussed the gains from m onopolization and the impact of 
demand a n a ly s is  upon the producer,20 pigou sa id  th a t
20The m a ter ia l d ea lin g  w ith  Pigou and Shove w i l l  
be taken from P igou 's Economics and W elfare, (Macmillan
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Edgeworth was r ig h t  when he in d ica ted  that the q uan tity  
o f resou rces devoted to  production i s  indeterm inant in  
m on op olistic  com p etition . Ihe quantity  o f each d u o p o list  
depends on h is  judgment o f the p o lic y  he exp ects the 
other to  fo llo w . The range o f the indeterm inantness l i e s  
somewhere between noth ing and some a scerta in a b le  q u a n tity . 
I t  i s  l ik e ly  to be l e s s  than the q uan tity  which should  
have been o ffe red  by the two jo in t ly  under sim ple compe­
t i t i o n .  Pigou a lso  thought th a t p rice  warfare would be 
engaged in  by the d u o p o lis t  by s e l l in g  at a lo s s  to in ­
f l i c t  in ju ry  on a r i v a l .  Thi3 con d ition  e x i s t s  when the 
s a le s  p r ice  o f any amount o f  a good i s  below the 3hort 
period  supply p r ice  o f  that q u a n tity . The quan tity  o f  
investm ent would no longer be determ inable; i t  would 
l ik e ly  exceed the amount which would have been in v ested  
in  sim ple monopoly.
Pigou thought normal supply p r ic e  to be that which 
would Just s u f f ic e  to  bring fo r th  a regu lar flow  o f quan­
t i t y  when no monopoly co n d itio n  e x is t e d . A f a l l in g  aver­
age c o s t  to  the firm  would lea d  to a f a l l in g  supply p r ice
and C o., L td ., 1929 ), pp. 251-289, 787-810, and the 
"Im perfections o f the Market," Economic Journal, (March, 
1933), pp. 113-124, and Shove's a r t ic le  "R epresentative  
Firm and In creasin g  Returns," Economic Journal, (March, 
1930), pp. 914-916.
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fo r  the commodity. He says that i f  a p r ice  i s  f ix e d  
between monopoly and com p etitive  p r ic e , the output w i l l  
probably be g rea ter  than monopoly output. I f  monopoly 
output i s  decreased  when a com p etitive p r ice  e x i s t s ,  
then fo r  a c e r ta in  range o f  p r ic e s  h igher than th is  i t  
would a lso  be reduced. Those co n d itio n s  are ra re , how­
ev e r . In sim ple monopoly, actu a l output i s  le s s  than 
id e a l output in  in d u str ie s  su b jec t to  d ecreasing  supply  
p r ic e , equal to  id e a l output in  in d u str ie s  o f con stant  
supply p r ic e , and g rea ter  than id e a l output in  in d u s tr ie s  
o f In creasin g  supply p r ic e . Some in d u str ie s  w ith tempo­
r a r i ly  low p r ic e s  may f in d  that they lead  to  new demands. 
The supply p r ice  o f an industry  can f a l l ,  remain s t a ­
tio n a ry , or r i s e  as the output in c r e a se s . In doing so  
i t  i s  obeying the laws o f d ecrea sin g , co n sta n t, and in ­
cr ea s in g  supply p r ic e .
Pigou assumes that in  one-firm  in d u str ie s  an 
eq u ilib riu m  firm  w i l l  not e x i s t  i f  average co st  i s  
g rea ter  than supply p r ice  and the industry  i s  s e l l in g  
at the supply p r ic e . He a lso  exp lained  th a t no eq u i­
librium  w i l l  e x i s t  i f  m arginal c o s t  i s  g rea ter  than  
supply p r ice  and the in d u stry  i s  s e l l in g  at supply p r ic e .  
In both o f these ca ses  a tendency to  co n tra ct production  
w i l l  be p r e se n t. E quilibrium  does not n e c e s s a r ily
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fo rb id  average c o s t  to be l e s s  than supply p r ic e . Where 
average c o s t  i s  equal to  the supply p r ic e , m arginal 
c o s ts  l e s s  than supply p r ic e , and the in du stry  i s  s e l l ­
in g  at the supply p r ic e , there i s  no tendency fo r  output 
to  expand s in ce  any expansion would n e c e s sa r ily  in vo lve  
a lo s s .  Hence, eq u ilib rium  would not be com patible w ith  
such an arrangement.
Pigou sa id  th at in  a one firm  in d u stry , the 
supply p r ice  o f any g iven  amount o f output i s  equal to  
the average co s t  or the m arginal c o s t s ,  according to  
which i s  g rea ter . The in du stry  i3  f r e e  to  conform to  
d ecreasin g , co n sta n t, or in crea sin g  c o s t s .  I f  i t  con­
forms to  d ecreasing  supply p r ic e , the supply curve i s  
co in c id en t w ith the average c o s t  curve; i f  i t  conforms 
to  in crea sin g  supply p r ic e , i t  c o in c id e s  w ith  the curve 
o f m arginal c o s t;  i f  i t  conforms w ith  both , i t  co in c id e s  
w ith  both cu rves. I f  i t  conforms w ith  in crea sin g  supply  
p rice  w ith  some le v e ls  o f  output and w ith  d ecreasin g  
supply p r ic e  w ith  o th ers , the supply curve l i e s  along  
the curve of average c o s ts  where th is  i s  h igher and 
along th e curve o f m arginal c o s ts  where i t  i s  the h igher  
o f  the two.
Shove in  1930 was w r itin g  about d if fe r e n t ia te d  
products which would be found in  o l ig o p o l i s t i c  in d u s tr ie s
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l ik e  the automobile in d u stry . He sa id  that in  cases  
s im ila r  to  the automobile industry  average or m arginal 
c o s t  might be lowered i f  a firm  in creased  i t s  output and 
l e f t  th a t o f i t s  r iv a ls  in ta c t  thus in crea sin g  aggregate 
outp ut. These c o s t3  might be r a ise d  (or l e f t  con stan t)  
i f  the firm  in creased  i t s  output by Invading the market 
o f i t s  com petitors (aggregate output remaining the sam e). 
Enlargement o f e x is t in g  firm s or in te r n a l economies might 
cause in crea sin g  retu rn s or d im in ish ing supply p r ic e .  
Shove in  w r itin g  o f  the r e p r ese n ta tiv e  firm  and in c r e a s ­
ing retu rn s was adding f u e l  to  the f i r e  which had been 
prepared by S ra ffa  in  condemning M arshallian equ ilibrium  
econom ics. Shove’s approach to o l ig o p o l i s t  markets was 
one which was very u se fu l in  the economy o f  h is  day and 
th a t o f  today.
Many American in d u s tr ie s  are ty p if ie d  by an 
o l ig o p o l i s t i c  m arket. Such a market e x i s t s  when there  
are more than two and y e t  r e la t iv e ly  few s e l l e r s  o f a 
s im ila r  product. These s e l l e r s  are so sm all in  number 
th a t no one o f them w i l l  act independently o f the o thers  
in  e s ta b lis h in g  h is  output and p r ic e  p o l i c i e s .  Only 
when the s e l l e r  i s  w il l in g  to accept the f u l l  r is k s  of 
r e t a l ia t io n  from h is  r iv a l  s e l l e r s  w i l l  he act indepen­
d e n tly . Each s e l l e r  can in flu en ce  the market p r ice
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under o lig o p o ly  by changing the p r ice  a t which he s e l l s  
h is  commodity. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  p r e d ic t , however, 
e x a c tly  how each com petitor w i l l  r ea c t to  a p r ice  change 
under o lig o p o ly . The o l ig o p o l i s t  i s  aware th a t a p r ice  
redu ction  w i l l  probably lead  to  a forced  red u ction  among 
h is  r iv a ls  in  order to  avoid the lo s s  o f custom ers. The 
degree o f r e ta l ia t io n  w ith  even a sm all decrease in  p r ice  
i s  the q u estio n  that im m ediately a r is e s .
The in creasin g  or decreasing  o f  p r ice  in  an 
attempt to  maximize p r o f i t  under o lig o p o ly  i s  a slow  
p ro cess . A ll com petitors h e s ita te  to a c t . Price i s  
very l ik e l y  to be h ig h ly  in f le x ib le  because o f th is  r e ­
lu ctance to  begin p r ice  changes. While market p r ic e  
might not maximize p r o f i t s  fo r  any one o f  the competing 
f irm s, i t  i s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  that the p r e v a ilin g  o l i ­
g o p o lis t ic  p r ice  might be a compromise which b est f i t s  
the immediate circum stances o f  the market. Price in f l e x ­
i b i l i t y  I s  a common c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f o lig o p o ly , duopoly, 
and monopoly. The m onopolist has the a b i l i t y  to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  and keep a p r ice  so as n ot to  s p o i l  or ru in  h is  
market; the d u o p o list and o l ig o p o l i s t  are a fra id  to  act 
to  break p r ic e , and they tend to  hold to an e s ta b lish e d ,  
s ta b le  p r ic e .
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Prico i s  determ ined in  an o l ig o p o l i s t i c  industry  
through the fo r c e s  o f demand fo r  the product and the 
supply o f the product that a r e la t iv e ly  few s e l l e r s  are 
w il l in g  to bring in to  the market at the variou s p o ss ib le  
p r ic e s .  P rice d i f f e r e n t ia ls  can occur between the pro­
ducts of d if f e r e n t  s e l l e r s  w ith a premium being paid fo r  
those o f superior q u a lity  or those in  which the q u a lity  
i s  thought to be su p er io r . The s t a b i l i t y  th a t charac­
t e r iz e s  the o l ig o p o l i s t i c  market, however, w i l l  tend to  
hold  even on e s ta b lish e d  p r ice  d i f f e r e n t ia l s  when d i f ­
fe r e n t  m anufacturers o f fe r  products that are d if fe r e n ­
t ia t e d .
O lig o p o lis t ic  p r ice  determ ination  i s  l ik e ly  to  
be com plicated  because o f  the e f f e c t  upon the other  
com petitors which a change in  output or in  p r ice  by one 
s e l l e r  might have. The s e l l e r s  under o lig o p o ly  have a 
sloping- demand curve and the demand fo r  each in d iv id u a l  
su p p lier  or s e l l e r  rep resen ts  on ly  a p ortion  o f the 
demand curve fo r  the product o f the in du stry  as a w hole. 
Because the demand curve fo r  each s e l l e r  i s  only a p art  
o f the t o ta l  industry  demand curve, the q u a n tity  or p r ice  
change which one firm  i n i t ia t e s  w i l l  be f e l t  im m ediately  
by a l l  o th e rs . Where the lo s s  o f  s a le s  to  a p r ic e c u tt in g  
com petitor may be con seq u en tia l because o f  the few
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com petitors in  the in d u stry , we f in d  that s ta b le  p r ic e s  
and in f le x ib le  p r ic e s  w i l l  probably be the long-run  
r e s u l t .
O lig o p o lis t ic  markets in  many ca ses are a sso ­
c ia te d  w ith  kinked demand c u r v e s ,21 This ex p la in s the 
r e la t iv e ly  s ta b le  and in f le x ib le  p r ic e s ,  Ihe kinked  
curve in d ic a te s  that there i s  an abrupt change in  e la s ­
t i c i t y  at a p a r t ic u la r  p r ic e . The kinked demand curve 
a lso  w i l l  g ive a corresponding m arginal revenue curve 
which i s  d iscon tin u ou s or which has a break. I f  a 
com petitor in  the o l ig o p o l i s t i c  market attem pts to  in ­
crease s a le s  by reducing p r ic e ,  h is  com petitors w i l l  
probably meet the red u ction  and perhaps undercut in  an 
e f f o r t  to  gain back any expected  lo s s  o f  s a le s .  I f  
t h is  i s  the c a se , the firm  in i t ia t in g  the p rice  cu t  
would probably in crea se  i t s  s a le s  very m oderately a fte r  
the p r ice  red u ction . Hence, the demand fo r  the p a r t ic ­
u la r  s e l l e r  who would f i r s t  cu t p r ice  tends to be in -  
o la s t lc  a t a p o in t below the e s ta b lish e d  p r ic e . I f  the 
com petitor hopes to in crea se  h is  p r o f i t s  and gain  through 
an in e la s t ic  demand curve, he w i l l  be faced  w ith  the fa c t
^ R . L. H all and C. J . H itch , "Price Theory and 




th a t h is  com petitors might not fo llo w , s in ce  by d e f in i ­
t io n  the o l ig o p o l i s t  has a product which i s  the same or 
very s im ila r  to  th a t of h is  com p etitors. Since compet­
i t o r s  w i l l  l ik e ly  not fo llo w  s u it  by in crea sin g  p r ice  
u n le ss  the in i t ia t o r  i s  the p r ice  lead er or u n le ss  
general p r ice  and c o s t  l e v e l  i s  in cr ea s in g , we f in d  that 
the s a le s  o f the in i t ia t o r  w ill^ d e c lin e  ra p id ly  a fte r  
h is  in c r e a se . This rapid  decrease in  s a le s  w ith  an in ­
crease in  p r ice  tends to g iv e  an e l a s t i c  demand above 
the e s ta b lish e d  p r ic e .
The kinked demand curve which g iv e 3 a co r re s­
ponding d iscon tinu ou s m arginal revenue curve lea d s to  
a f u l l  gap in  the m arginal revenue-m arginal c o s t  r e la ­
t io n s h ip . With a d iscon tin u ou s m arginal revenue at a 
given  l e v e l  o f output i t  i s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  that  
m arginal co s t  can r i s e  or f a l l  appreciably and th is  
w i l l  not a f f e c t  the output o f the firm  sin ce  m arginal 
c o s t  w i l l  be equal to  the d iscon tinu ou s m arginal revenue 
at a l l  tim es.
Many o l ig o p o l i s t s  in  a g iven  industry  might be 
d is s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the s ta b le  and p r e v a ilin g  market p r ice  
because th e ir  p a r t ic u la r  m arginal co s t  and m arginal 
revenue are not eq u a l. Very l i t t l e  i s  done to  in i t i a t e  
a change in  output and p r ic e , however, s in ce  the p r ice
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might p o ss ib ly  be the b est  compromise in  view o f the 
c o n f l ic t in g  market in te r e s t s  o f the se v e r a l s e l l e r s .  
D is s a t is fa c t io n  w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  p r ice  tends to crea te  
p r ice  c o l lu s io n  or agreement. When one p a r tic u la r  firm  
i s  dominant in  an o l ig o p o l i s t i c  market, i t  o ften  assumes 
the r o le  o f a p r ice  lea d er , and in  doing so , i t  might 
attempt to  s a t i s f y  the sm aller s e l l e r s  as w e ll as i t s e l f  
when s e t t in g  p r ic e s .
P rice in  an o l ig o p o l i s t i c  in du stry  i s  l ik e l y  to  
be one which s a t i s f i e s  no p a r t ic u la r  producer. The 
demand fo r  the product i s  a b a s ic  p r ice  fa c to r  in  that 
the few o l ig o p o l i s t s  in  the market s e t  a p r ice  which 
w i l l  tend to g e t  the b e st  p r o f i t  m axim ization fo r  the 
group ra th er than fo r  any p a r t ic u la r  in d iv id u a l. Pro­
duction  c o s ts  w i l l  d i f f e r ,  and i f  each o f  the s e l l e r s  
could a c t on h is  own he would e s ta b lis h  a d if fe r e n t  
p r ice  more than l i k e l y .  The fe a r  o f  fu r th er  p r ic e c u t-  
tin g  cau ses each s e l l e r  to avoid antagon izing h is  fe llo w  
com petitors and he tends to s t ic k  w ith  the e s ta b lish e d  
p r ic e . The compromise does not n e c e s s a r ily  mean c o l lu ­
s io n  or agreement; i t  i s  a s itu a t io n  which comes about 
when the s e l l e r s  are afra id  o f  the consequences o f  moving 
from a p r e v a ilin g  p r ic e .
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Monopoly, duopoly, and o lig o p o ly  a l l  have a 
s o c ia l  aspect which g e ts  a tte n tio n  in  p o lic y  making from 
a p o l i t i c a l  sta n d p o in t. When demand d e c lin e s  in  p eriods  
o f slow and low economic a c t iv i t y ,  the firm s which have 
monopoly or p a r t ia l  monopoly are l ik e l y  to f l e x  output 
rath er than f l e x  p r ic e . These in d u str ie s  tend to have 
a s ta b le  p r ice  throughout varying p eriod s o f economic 
a c t iv i t y ;  however, the employment and output f lu c tu a t io n s  
vary w idely  w ith  the b u sin ess  c y c le .  This variance i s  
in  d ir e c t  co n tra st  to  the s i tu a t io n  wherein the large  
number o f  s e l l e r s  are in  the m arket. P rice changes are 
made when com p etition  i s  among numerous s e l l e r s  and the 
v a r ia t io n s  in  output and employment tend to be much 
sm aller than th ose  in  the ca ses  o f monopoly, duopoly, and 
o lig o p o ly .
M onopolistic  C om petition . M onopolistic com peti­
t io n  i s  a type o f  im perfect com petition  which has gained  
much a tte n tio n  in  the l a s t  two d ecades. I t  has e a s i ly  
d efin ed  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  and the one outstanding charac­
t e r i s t i c  i s  th a t o f  product d if f e r e n t ia t io n .  As d i s t in ­
guished from monopoly, duopoly, and o lig o p o ly , monopo­
l i s t i c  com petition  has a r e la t iv e ly  large number o f  
s e l l e r s  whose products are s l ig h t ly  d if fe r e n t  from o th ers  
in  the market although a l l  o f  the products tend to serve
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the same general need from the consuming p u b lic 's  stand­
p o in t . Product d if f e r e n t ia t io n  as such i s  achieved in  
many w ays. V aria tion s in  the s p e c if ic a t io n s  o f  a prod­
u c t , or the use o f d if fe r e n t  in g red ien ts  or raw m a ter ia ls  
in  preparing the product, or the use o f varying types o f  
s e l l in g  e f f o r t s ,  a d v e r t is in g , g o o d w ill, courteous and 
e f f i c i e n t  s e r v ic e , brands and trade-marks a l l  tend to  
lend  to  product d if f e r e n t ia t io n  as i t  i3  exp la in ed  in  a 
m o n o p o lis t ic a lly  com p etitive  market.
I f  a firm  i s  able to  d if f e r e n t ia te  i t s  product, 
i t  can a tta in  a lim ite d  degree o f  monopoly. This d i f ­
f e r e n t ia t io n  w i l l  allow the firm  to  achieve h igher p r ic e s  
than would norm ally be ob ta ined , and i t  can a lso  have a 
h igh er p rice  w ithout lo s s  o f volume i f  the su p e r io r ity  
o f i t s  product can be e s ta b lish e d  and r e ta in e d . The 
d if f e r e n t ia t io n  o f an in d iv id u a l firm  product i s  very  
d e s ir a b le  when the market p lace co n ta in s a la rg e  number 
o f  s e l l e r s .  Product d if f e r e n t ia t io n  reduces the hazards 
o f  lo s s  o f s a le s  through p r ic e c u tt in g  by com petitors in  
th is  same l i g h t .
Ohe m on op o listic  com petitor has a demand curve 
which s lo p es  downward and to the r ig h t  as in  ca ses w ith  
monopoly and p a r t ia l  monopoly mentioned h e r e to fo r e . The 
power to  co n tro l p r ic e , however, i s  lim ite d  in  th at
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s im ila r  products are o ffe red  by com petitors and in crea ses  
in  p r ice  w i l l  tend to d rive some customers to  com p etitors. 
Lowering and in crea sin g  p r ic e s  can be done w ith in  a sm all 
range w ithout undue fea r  o f  r e t a l ia t io n  when a product i s  
f u l l y  d if f e r e n t ia te d .
The demand curve fo r  the firm  under m on op olistic  
com petition  tends to  be q u ite  e l a s t i c  because o f the ease  
o f s u b s t itu t io n  between the products o f  the s e l l e r s  in  
the market p la c e . The firm s under m on op o listic  com peti­
t io n  attempt to  s e t  p r ic e  and output at a p o in t in  which 
m arginal c o s t  and m arginal revenue are eq u a l. The a b i l ­
i t y  to  do th is  h inges on the fa c t  th a t each s e l l e r  shares  
a r e la t iv e ly  sm all part o f  the in du stry  demand, the dan­
ger o f  r e t a l ia t io n  i s  s l i g h t  when p r ice  changes are m inor. 
The in te r r e la t io n s h ip  between p r ic e s  o f  the various  
s e l l e r s ,  however, i s  assured by the fa c t  th a t the products 
can be su b s titu te d  fo r  one another. \Vhilo d if f e r e n t ia t io n  
o f product a llow s each firm  to e s ta b lis h  output and p r ic e  
at the p o in t where m arginal c o s t  and m arginal revenue are 
equated, i t  does not g iv e  them com plete independence in  
any ca se .
A d vertisin g  and s e l l in g  a c t i v i t i e s  are very impor­
ta n t in  the case o f m on op o listic  com p etition . The s i t u a ­
t io n  i s  very d if fe r e n t  from th at under pure com petition
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or under monopoly when the s e l l e r  e ith e r  ha3 no co n tro l  
over p r ice  and h is  product i s  id e n t ic a l  w ith  a l l  o th ers , 
or in the l a t t e r  case when he can con tro l p r ice  and 
output s in ce  he has the e n t ir e  demand fo r  the. product.
I f  the product o f  a s e l l e r  i s  d if fe r e n t ia te d  and can be 
f u l ly  id e n t i f ie d  by the buyer, the lo s s  o f s a le s  through 
a p r ic e  in crease i s  l im ite d . A lso, th is  r e co g n itio n  by 
buyers o f  a p a r t ic u la r  s e l l e r  w i l l  a llow  him to g a in  a 
share o f  the market w ith  a p r ice  drop. The lo y a lty  o f  
customers i s  developed through a d v er tis in g  and s e l l in g  
techn iques; th is  m aintains customers and w i l l  e lim in a te ,  
to  a lim ite d  degree, the tr a n s fe r  o f  patronage to com­
p e t ito r s  when p r ic e s  are changed.
The a d v er tis in g  and s e l l in g  which i s  in i t ia t e d  
to introduce and m aintain a market on the p art o f  a 
m on op olistic  com petitor a lso  in crea ses  c o s t s .  The 
firm 's  average c o s t  curves and m arginal c o s ts  tend to  
s h i f t  upward. The a d v er tis in g  and s a le s  expense at the 
same tim e tends to  Increase the demand; the s h i f t  a lso  
moves the m arginal revenue curve outward. The s e l l in g  
program, i f  i t  i s  s u c c e s s fu l ,  w i l l  allow  the firm  to  
s e l l  more and p o ss ib ly  at a h igher p r ice  than could be 
a tta in ed  o th erw ise . A la r g er  p r o f i t  i s  p o ss ib le  i f  the 
firm  i s  able to  reckon and accu ra te ly  determine s e l l in g
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and a d v er tis in g  c o s ts  in  the l ig h t  o f increased  demand. 
S e l l in g  o u tla y s are l ik e  a l l  c o s t s ,  however, in  that  
they are su b jec t to  the p r in c ip le  o f  d im inishing  
re tu rn s.
M onopolistic com petition  as seen by Chamberlin 
gave sev era l s ta g es  o f eq u ilib r iu m . One was equ ilibrium  
o f the firm , another was equ ilibrium  o f the industry  
w ith  a c lo sed  group, and another c o n s is te d  o f a group 
in  which there was freedom o f en tr y . The s itu a t io n  
wherein there would be firm  eq u ilib rium  was found w ith  
output r e la te d  to  c o s ts  and revenue so that marginal 
revenue was equal to  m arginal c o s t s .  This was Chamber­
l i n ^  n ecessary  co n d itio n  fo r  the equ ilibrium  of the 
in d iv id u a l f irm . For eq u ilib rium  w ith in  the in d u stry , 
the m atter o f  freedom o f en try  was so lved  when Chamber­
l i n  assumed th a t a d d itio n a l firm s might en ter  the 
in d u stry  so long as p r o f i t s  were above those n ecessary  
to  a t tr a c t  u n sp ec ia liz ed  c a p ita l  and u n sp ec ia liz ed  b u s i­
n ess a b i l i t y  in to  the f i e l d .  Die m atter o f  e x i t  was 
taken care o f when actu a l lo s s e s  would drive firm s out 
o f the In dustry . A s t a b i l i t y  would be reached in  the 
f i e l d  when t o t a l  c o s ts  were equal to to ta l  revenue fo r  
a l l  the firm s i.i the group. The m atter o f c lo sed  en try , 
but w ith  freedom o f e x i t ,  was handled by P rofessor
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Chamberlin when he allowed firm s to e x i t  the industry  
when p r o f it s  were in s u f f ic ie n t  to m aintain b u sin ess  
p r o f i t s .  The m atter of a c lo sed  entry  meant th at the 
group would acquire eq u ilib rium  when the firm s in  the 
group made at le a s t  enough money to cover th e ir  c o s ts ,  
v/hich meant that th e ir  revenue could exceed or be equal 
to  th e ir  c o s t s .22
Chamberlin probably g iv e s  the be3t th e o r e t ic a l  
exp lan ation  o f p r ice  now a v a ila b le  in  Chapter 5 o f The 
Theory of M onopolistic C om petition. In th is  chapter he 
s ta te s  h is  equ ilibrium  a n a ly s is . His work here d ea lin g  
w ith  large and sm all group a n a ly s is  i s  probably the most 
co n stru ctiv e  p resen t theory .
In d iv id u a l firm  eq u ilib rium  i s  introduced by 
Chamberlin p r io r  to h is  exp lan ation s of firm  a c tio n  in  
e ith e r  large or sm all groups. He s ta te s  in  gen era l (page 
80) th a t the manufacturer w i l l  not n e c e s s a r ily  take the 
lo w est c o s t  product nor th a t one which has the g r e a te s t  
demand. Furthermore, he p o in ts  out th a t the fiirni*s 
output bears no r e la t io n s h ip  to  the p o in t o f most 
e f f i c i e n t  production . Com petitive p ressu res tend to  
reduce e x tra  p r o f i t  because the com petitors can push
22T r if f in ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 20-23 .
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p r ices  down, in crease  in d iv id u a l firm  c o s ts ,  or create  
re c e ss io n  in  the demand fo r  the in d iv id u a l com p etitor’s 
product.
Chamberlin introduced h is  la rg e  and sm all group 
a n a ly s is  based upon some rather h ero ic  assum ptions. He 
assumed that the c o s t  curve fo r  a l l  firm s would be in var­
ia b le  throughout the in du stry  tending to l im it  h is  prob­
lems to  those of demand and com petition  in the market. 
Secondly, he assumed th a t there was an absolute s im ila r ­
i t y  between the firm s in  a group and th is  e s ta b lish e d  in  
any s in g le  firm  the image o f every one of them under a l l  
circum stances regarding outputs and en try . This im plies  
a l l  markets to  be of equal s iz e  and both co s t  and demand 
curves fo r  a l l  o f the competing products to be uniform . 
These assumptions p lace Chamberlin in  a p o s it io n  very 
c lo se  to  the assumptions o f M arshall’ s " rep resen tative  
firm ."
The la rg e  group i s  ono in  which a firm  fin d s  i t ­
s e l f  w ith so many com petitors th a t i t  cannot appreciably  
in flu en ce  the p r ic e s  o f other firm s by i t s  a c tio n s . 
Chamberlin had equ ilibrium  fo r  t h is  group e s ta b lish e d  when 
the in d iv id u a l firm  had m arginal c o s t  and m arginal revenue 
equal; and group s t a b i l i t y  occurred when average t o t a l  
c o s ts  and average revenue were equal for  a l l  firm s.
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Chamberlin based h i3  sm all group a n a ly s is  upon 
h i 3 b a sic  assumptions that each firm  would attempt to  
maximize p r o f it  and that firm  s a le s  and co s t  curves were 
in v a r ia b le  w ith re sp ec t to  tim e. Chamberlin's treatm ent 
here d e a lt  w ith the case where a firm  operated w ith in  a 
group 3mall enough th a t i t  could have some e f f e c t  upon 
other firm s through i t s  p r ice  and output p o l i c i e s .  
Chamberlin considered  two cases w ith  the sm all group, 
one in  which a m onopoly-like so lu t io n  was reached  
wherein the l e v e l  o f output would be the same as that 
i f  a l l  firm s were u n ited  under a s in g le  p r o f it - s e e k in g  
en trepreneur. The second case was one in  which Cham­
b e r lin  analyzed a co n d ition  wherein the s e l l e r s  would 
con sid er the re a c tio n s  o f th e ir  own moves upon th e ir  
r i v a l s '  co n d itio n . In one case h ere in , he e s ta b lish e d  
a co n d itio n  wherein r iv a ls  would m aintain p r ic e s  and have 
th e ir  sa le s  drop as a r e s u l t  o f some firm 's  p r ice  c u t .  
This would lea d  to  an o l ig o p o l i s t i c  p r ic e -c u tt in g  scheme 
wherein a l l  p r ic e s  would f a l l  to the p o in t o f  tangency 
between in d iv id u a l f irm 's  demand curves and the c o s t  
curve; these curves he assumed to be the same for  the 
whole group. Chamberlin foresaw the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
o s c i l la t in g  p r ic e s  s im ila r  to those d escribed  by Edge- 
worth in ca ses  where some firm s would be able to r a is e
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p r ice  because a com petitor was at the p o in t o f  maximum 
output.
The next s itu a t io n  p ictu red  by Chamberlin was one 
in  which the supply o f a product o ffered  by r iv a l  firm s 
would be held  co n sta n t. This s itu a t io n  would in vo lve a 
change in  p rice  when one s e l l e r  moved, a f fe c t in g  h is  
r i v a l ' s  s i tu a t io n . Chamberlin assumed th a t in th is  case 
adjustments would take p lace to  end in a determ inate 
p o s it io n  somewhere between the monopoly so lu tio n  and the 
tangency so lu t io n s  described  e a r l ie r .
I f  one were to imagine the sm all group a n a ly sis  
strip p ed  of i t s  r ig id  co s t  and demand assum ptions, he 
might p ic tu re  a somewhat more r e a l i s t i c  p rice  id ea .
T r if f in  p o in ts  out that s e l l e r s  o ften  engage in  cu t-th ro a t  
com petition  in the hope of d riv in g  r iv a ls  from the market 
e n t ir e ly ,  that they many tim es fea r  b usiness r e t a l ia t io n ,  
and sometimes b u sin ess  e th ic s  are in v o lv ed . A ll o f these  
th ings lead  the s e l l e r s  to a p o lic y  of in e r t ia  or one o f  
" liv e  and l e t  l i v e ." 23 B uild ing fu r th er  on th is  id ea , i t  
i s  p o ss ib le  to  imagine th a t Chamberlin's sm all group anal­
y s i s  would probably f i t  many large group firm s th a t might 
f in d  them selves competing in  a lo c a l  area on a sm all group 
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P late A on the preced ing page shows the p r ic e -  
p r o f i t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in  the three general ca ses  o f pure 
com p etition , m on op o listic  com p etition , and monopoly.
In order to b e t te r  summarize fo r  m onop olistic  com peti­
t io n , which i s  under co n sid era tio n  h ere , both "large  
group" and "sm all group" analyses are p resen ted .24
WALRASIAN SCHOOL AND TRIFFIN 
N ineteenth  century Europe w itnessed  the r is e  of  
a group of deductive econom ists who b e liev ed  that through  
the use o f a lgeb ra ic  form ulas and other m athem atical 
n o ta tio n s  they could measure the s a t is f a c t io n  y ie ld  of 
economic goods, ttiis  m athem atical school included such  
men as Antoine Cournot (1801-1877), once a p ro fesso r  of 
mathematics at Lyons; Hermann Gosson (1810-1858), who 
was a c tu a lly  the f i r s t  o f the group; W illiam  Stanley  
Jevons (1835-1882), an econom ist and a s t a t i s t i c ia n ;
Leon Walra3 (1834-1910); and V ilfred o  Pareto (1848-1923). 
The la t t e r  two in d iv id u a ls  were en gin eers before e n te r ­
ing the f i e l d  o f  econom ics. Most o f  these econom ists 
had a good background in  m athem atics, and from th is  back­
ground i t  can be assumed that they would tend to use
24For a system atic  a p p ra isa l, ev a lu a tio n  and 
c r it ic is m  o f m on op olistic  com petition  th e o r ie s  see  
T r lf f in ,  op. c i t . ,  Chapter I I .
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deductive reasoning and would a lso  use a lgeb ra ic  f o r ­
mulas to  support th e ir  th e o r ie s . This school attempted  
to  show that a l l  exchanges have th e ir  r e la t io n sh ip  
between goods exchanged and in  turn th is  g iv e s  a r e la ­
tio n sh ip  to  the m athem atical law o f fu n c tio n .
The m athem atical sch o o l, w hile u sin g  a lgeb ra ic  
equations to rep resen t a b stra ct q u a n t it ie s ,  used very- 
few numbers in  th e ir  eq u a tio n s. Biey assumed p e r fe c t  
com petition  and th a t the law o f supply and demand would 
work to g ive only one p r ice  fo r  a g iven  good in  any 
p a r tic u la r  market. A lfred M arshall, sometimes p laced  
in  t h is  group, worked on a long-run , short-run  theory  
o f p r ic e s  saying th a t in  the long run the p r ice  tended  
to  the m arginal c o s t  which i s  the c o s t  o f the most 
expensive ad d ition  to the product obtained  when u t i l i z ­
ing in e f f i c i e n t  fa c to r s  o f  production or working other  
fa c to r s  more in te n s iv e ly  and at a g rea ter  c o s t .  Per­
manent p r o f i t s  which could  not be reso lv ed  in to  wages, 
in t e r e s t ,  or ren t could  not be f i t t e d  in to  M arsh all’s 
system . W alras, along w ith  the other n e o c la s s i s i s t s  
emphasized th a t abnormal p r o f i t s  would tend to  d isap ­
pear in  the lon g  run. M arshall in s is t e d  in  analyzing  
th e ir  presence in  the sh ort run and then he c l a s s i f i e d  
them as a form of r e n t , c a l le d  " q u a s i-r e n t ," which was 
p r ice  determ ined but not p r ice  determ ining.
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The m athem atical school showed the in flu en ce  o f  
hedonism in  th a t they thought th at at the p r ice  e s ta b ­
lis h e d  in  the market p lace  maximum s a t is f a c t io n  was 
given  to  a maximum number o f buyers and s e l l e r s .  The 
f in a l  o b je c tiv e  o f  the sch oo l was th a t they were to  
ex p la in  an economic regime and not n e c e s s a r ily  to  ju s ­
t i f y  i t .  Through the approach o f  these econom ists, the 
m athem atical p r in c ip le s  and assumptions o f a u t i l i t y  
concept were p re tty  w e ll e s ta b lis h e d . The id eas e s ta b ­
lis h e d  by the sch o o l, though a b i t  unorthodox and neg­
le c t e d ,  were hardly new.
D esp ite the lack  o f fresh n ess in  th e ir  id e a s , the 
m athem atical econom ists e s ta b lish e d  v a l id i t y  fo r  tru th s  
th a t had n o t been com pletely  accepted p rev io u s ly . They 
emphasized the unhampered op eration  o f supply and demand, 
dim inish ing u t i l i t y ,  and maximum u t i l i t y  at the p o in t of  
s a t ie t y .  A lfred  M arshall was s k i l le d  in  the use o f  
mathematics and one o f  the c h ie f  p o in ts  o f d ivergence  
between M arshall and the other m athem aticians was the 
emphasis on u t i l i t y .  M arshall could be numbered te ch ­
n ic a l ly  in  the m athem atical schoo l 3ince he a lso  used  
a lgeb ra ic  formulas but he was c a r e fu l in  h is  use o f  
mathematics when he wrote:
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The m o s t  u s e f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m a t h e m a t i c s  t o  
econom ics  a r e  t h o s e  w h ic h  a r e  s h o r t  and s im p le  
and w h ich  employ few sy m bo ls ;  and which  aim a t  
t h r o w i n g  a b r i g h t  l i g h t  on some s m a l l  p a r t  o f  
t h e  g r e a t  econom ic  movement r a t h e r  th a n  a t  p r e ­
s e n t i n g  i t s  e n d l e s s  c o m p l e x i t i e s . 25
Leon Walras was the f i r s t  to  e s ta b lis h  firm ly  the 
m athem atical method in  economics w ith  h is  book in  1874 
e n t i t le d  Elements d 1economic P o lit iq u e  Pure. Like Stan­
le y  Jevons, he was in flu en ced  by the p leasure -  pain  
philosophy o f hedonism. W alras1 fa th er  was an econom ist 
who proposed the term "rarete" la t e r  used e x te n s iv e ly  by 
h is  son . The term which i s  su b jec tiv e  in i t s  im plica­
t io n s  " s tr e sse s  the concept that value i s  commensurate 
w ith  the measure o f the le a s t  im portant s a t is fa c t io n  
y ie ld e d  by any u n it  of su p p ly ." 26 A ctually , "rarete" i s  
the same as m arginal u t i l i t y  or the f in a l  degree of 
u t i l i t y ,  the la t t e r  being the term used by Jevons.
M arshall and Jevons represented  demand and 
supply of a s in g le  commodity; Walras v is io n ed  an eq u i­
lib rium  th at included a l l  commodities and a l l  productive  
f a c t o r s .27 To Walras, the demand for  c o ffe e  i s  a ffe c ted
25Prank N eff, Economic D o ctr in es , (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, I n c .,  i9 6 0 ) , p . 347.
26I b id . ,  p . 352.
27Edmund W hittaker, A H istory  o f  Economic Id eas, 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, I9 6 0 ), p . 460.
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not only by i t s  p r ic e , but a lso  by the p r ic e  o f  the cream 
and sugar which are added to the c o f fe e ;  or, the demand 
fo r  c o ffe e  may be reduced not by a s h if t in g  o f p r ice  but 
by a s h i f t in g  o f consumer d e s ir e s  to cocoa . Walras was 
the f i r s t  econom ist to face  w ith  complete frankness the 
fa c t  th a t in  a g iven  market goods are being bought and 
so ld  con tin u ou sly , that every p rice  depends upon every  
other p r ic e , and th at the p r ice  fo r  any g iven  a r t ic le  
cannot be exp la ined  u n t i l  the p rice  o f everyth ing  e ls e  
has been exp la in ed .
H. W. S p ieg e l says th a t the modern reader i s  
struck by the s im ila r ity  between Walras and M arshall.^®
On much economic theory they agree, and when th e ir  w r it ­
in gs do sep ara te , i t  i s  a d iffer e n ce  o f in te r e s t s  that 
separate them—not tech n iqu e. This d iffer e n ce  in  in te r ­
e s t s  i s  shown by W alras' look in g  fo r  gen era l p r in c ip le s  
which u n d er lie  the workings o f an exchange economy w hile  
M arshall sought an a n a ly tic a l instrum ent capable o f  
e a s ie r  a p p lica tio n  to  p a r t ic u la r  problems o f h is to r y  or 
ex p er ien ce . S p ie g e l fu r th er  p o in ts  out the in flu en ce  
th a t Cournot had on both, showing that the two system s
^®H. W. S p ie g e l, The Development o f Economic 
Thought, (New York: John W iley and Sons, I n c . ,  1952),
pp. 581-83 .
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have tended to  grow back together as the years  p ass .  
Walras sa id  that he owed "the economic d e f in i t io n s  which 
are the b a s is  o f  my system to my fa th e r ,  and to Cournot 
the mathematical language which i s  most apt for  formu­
la t in g  th is  system ."29
Though Walras i s  now known as one of the g re a t­
e s t  o f  a l l  the con trib u tors to pure a n a ly s is ,  he was 
a ls o  a p ass ion ate  s o c ia l  reformer. Along t h i s  l i n e ,
T .  W. Hutchinson s a y s :*59
Though he was a thorough-going d i s c ip le  o f  
n e ith e r ,  there are obvious tra ces  o f  some 
o f  the lea d in g  ideas o f  both Comto and S t .
Simon in  W alras’s w r it in g s  on the p r in c i ­
p le s  of p o l ic y .  But J. S. M i l l ’s h igh ly  
unreconciled  combination of s o c i a l i s t i c  
a sp ir a t io n s  and in d iv id u a l i s t i c  maxims 
seems to  have been at l e a s t  an equ ally  im­
portant in f lu e n c e .  Walras was c e r ta in ly ,  
in  the o lder  sense o f  the term, a ’s o c i a l ­
i s t ’ , that i s  one who b e l ie v e d  in  the 
la r g e - s c a le  r a t io n a l  reform of s o c ie ty ,  
rath er  than in  the beneficence o f  i t s  
’n a tu r a l’ , t r a d i t io n a l ,  and spontaneous 
harmonies,
W alras’ grea t con tr ib u tion  was in  showing that  
the problem o f  the mutual determ ination o f  the p r ic e s  
o f  any number o f  commodities at a s in g le  time can be
29T. W. Hutchinson, A Review o f  Economic Doc­
t r in e s ,  (Oxford: The Clarendon P ress , 1353), p . 200.
30I b id . ,  pp. 200-201.
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regarded as a determinate problem. He showed that the 
problem of p r ic es  at a given time i s  determined by prov­
ing that there can be e s ta b l is h e d ,  on the b a s is  o f  data  
which economists o rd in a r ily  employ f o r  th e ir  p r ice  d i s ­
c u ss io n s , a number of equations which i s  ju s t  equal to 
the number o f  the p r ic e s  to be a scerta in ed , prom the 
mathematical p o in t  of view , whenever there i s  s e t  up a 
number of simultaneous equations equal to the number of 
unknowns, there i s  a determinate problem. Determinate  
equilibrium  thus r e s u l t s  s in ce  i t  g iv e s  determinate  
supply and demand fu n ction s  and a number o f  equations  
equal to  the unknowns. This view has been c r i t i c i z e d  
because i t  abandons the ca u sa l-g e n e t ic  problem.
Walras attempted to apply h i s  general e q u i l ib ­
rium a n a ly s is  to the problem of the p r ic in g  o f  fa c to r s  
in  h i s  theory o f  production . The problem of production  
f e l l  in to  two p a rts  fo r  Walras, "one r e la t in g  to the 
p r ic in g  of fa c to r s  o f  production , which are only used  
in  combination w ith  one another; the other r e la t in g  to  
the r o le  of time in  production -  the theory o f  c a p i t a l . "31 
The id ea  o f  a general equ ilibrium  in  which a l l  va lu es in
51S p ie g e l ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 586
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an economic system mutually determine one another had 
been expressed by both Turgot and Cournot.
Though Marshall la t e r  wrote more comprehensively  
of the importance o f  u t i l i t y ,  Jevons expressed the id ea  
f i r s t  in  h i s  Theory o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy. Jevons could  
not accept the p ro p o sit io n  that labor or c o s t  o f  produc­
t io n  determined exchange v a lu e . Instead  he s ta te d ,  
"Value in  exchange is* defined  by term inal u t i l i t y . " 3  ̂
This marked an innovation  in  economic thought for  Jevons 
and h i s  fo l lo w e r s .
Jevons, w ith others o f  the mathematical sch oo l,  
showed the in flu en ce  o f  hedonism. In t h i s  aspect, Mar­
s h a l l  broke sharply with the mathematical sch oo l, for  
w hile  he took over th e ir  methods and many o f  th e ir  con­
c lu s io n s ,  he discarded the p sy c h o lo g ica l ideas which lay  
behind them. "He ^.Marshall} never admitted such concep­
t io n s  as p leasu re  and pain in to  the prominent p o s i t io n  
in  economic thought assigned to  them by Jevons. Not 
p leasu res  as p sy ch o lo g ica l r e a c t io n s  but fa c tu a l  demands 
were what mattered to M arshall."33
3^Whittaker, op. c i t . ,  p . 453.
33Ib id .
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Also in flu en c in g  Jevons was h i s  tra in in g  as a 
s t a t i s t i c i a n .  He b e liev ed  th at the u ltim ate  laws o f  
economics were o f  so general a nature that they should  
be compared to  the p h y s ica l s c ie n c e s .  Economics had to 
be as mathematical in character as the p h ysica l s c ie n c e s .  
Jevons wrote the fo llo w in g :  "To me i t  seems th at  our
sc ien ce  must be mathematical, simply because i t  d ea ls  
with q u a n t i t ie s .  Where ever the th in gs  treated  are 
capable o f  being greater  or l e s s ,  there the laws and 
r e la t io n s  must be mathematical in  n atu re . Economists 
can not a l t e r  th e ir  nature by denying them the name."34
The d iffe r e n c e  between a s t a t i c  and a s o c ia l  
economy was pointed  up w ith  great c l a r i t y  by the mathe­
m atica l econom ists. Cournot and Gossen were the r e a l  
p ioneers o f  the sch oo l, and they worked without b e n e f i t  
o f  th e o r ie s  prepared by e a r l i e r  econom ists. The others  
who fo llow ed  these two worked independently o f  each  
other but they were aware o f  the th e o r ie s  and methods 
of the p ion eers .
I t  was Cournot who made the f i r s t  important use 
of mathematics in  economic procedure by p resen tin g
34Eric R o ll ,  A H istory of Economic Thought, (New 
York: P re n t ice -H a ll ,  I n c . ,  1942), p . 41?.
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deductions in  c o n c ise ,  accurate form from m ater ia ls  o f  
s l i g h t  v a r ia t io n .  He demonstrated m athem atically the 
r e la t io n s h ip  between supply, demand, and p r ic e .
G03sen declared  that su ccess iv e  portions o f  a 
good p o ssess  a dim inishing measure of u t i l i t y  or de­
creasing  power in  s a t i s f y in g  a want. The measure o f  the 
u t i l i t y  of the l a s t  portion  o f  the good in  the s e r ie s  i s  
that of the marginal u n i t .
The emphasis o f  S tanley Jevons was on wants and 
th e ir  s a t i s f a c t io n ;  hence, consumption i s  of groat im­
portance in  h is  approach. He pointed  out that u t i l i t y  
i s  not an inherent q u a lity  in  a good but that i t  i s  
r e la t iv e  to wants and too much o f  i t  brings d i s u t i l i t y .
He and Gossen arrived at the same conclusion  that in  
consumption, the tendency i3  to eq u a lize  the f i n a l ,  or 
marginal u t i l i t i e s .
Leon Walras constructed  a more complete system  
of mathematical an a lysis  o f  economic data than Jevons. 
Assuming p e r fe c t  com petition , Walras worked out a mathe­
m atica l theory o f  exchange, and he thought that the 
exchanging persons re a c t  so as to  g e t  the g r e a te s t  pos­
s ib le  s a t i s f a c t io n  out of th e ir  d e s ir e s ,  the exchange 
values being prop ortional to  th e ir  ' 'rarete .'’ Pareto, 
whose th eor ies  g re a t ly  resemble those o f  Walras, accepted
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the c l a s s i c a l  doctr ine  and la t e r  developed the theory of  
marginal u t i l i t y .
Robert T r i f f in . A b r i l l i a n t  econom ist, contempo­
rary w ith  Chamberlin, Robert T r i f f in  has fo llow ed  c lo s e ly  
in  the l in e  of the mathematical econom ists. He has been 
instrum ental in p resen tin g  a good c r i t i c i s m  and a n a ly s is  
of both Chamberlin and Robinson. He further ha3 presented  
in  h is  book, M onopolistic  Competition and General E q u ilib ­
rium Theory (1940), a noteworthy mathematical approach to
1 C
add to  the Walrasian S chool’s a n a ly s is .
T r i f f in ' s  primary c r i t ic i s m s  o f  m onopolistic  com­
p e t i t io n  th e o r ie s  are as fo l lo w s:
1) In m onopolistic  com petition  the same 3a les  
curve i s  in terp reted  as represen tin g  iden­
t i c a l l y  both the exp ecta tion s  o f  the s e l l e r  
and the happenings of the market.*56 The 
whole a n a ly s is  i3  conducted as i f  the sub­
j e c t iv e  s a le s  curve embodied the actual
35I t  i s  beyond the scope and exten sion  o f  a work 
of t h i s  nature to thoroughly analyze a t h e o r e t ic a l  
stru cture  such as that presented  by T r i f f in .  His c r i t ­
ic ism s and ev a lu a tio n  o f  m onopolistic  com petition theory, 
h is  b a s ic  assumptions fo r  h i s  th e o r e t ic a l  a n a ly s is ,  and 
h is  primary con c lu s ion s  w i l l  be considered on ly .
35T r i f f in ,  op. c l t . ,  p . 63.
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r e a c t io n s  o f  the market. Such i s  not always 
true because the entrepreneur i s  uncerta in  
about many fa c to r s  which a f f e c t  h is  in d iv i ­
dual curve, therefore he i s  not able to  
adjust i t  to  the general s a le s  curve as 
assumed.
2) M onopolistic com petition  con fines  i t s  d i s ­
cu ss ion  to com petitive  in te r r e la t io n s h ip s  
between in d iv id u a l firm s in  a group or 
in du stry , not consider ing  in te r r e la t io n s h ip s  
between the grou p s.3?
3) Although m onopolistic  com petition  denounced 
the concept of product id e n t i ty  fo r  competi­
t io n  a n a ly s is ,  i t  kept the concept o f  firm s  
and product grouping. In the opinion of  
T r i f f in ,  the interdependence of firm s i s  
much more gen era l than w ith in  a c e r ta in  
group o f  su b s t itu ta b le  goods only;
In kind the com petition  between two 
d if f e r e n t ia t e d  brands o f  cars i s  the 
same as the com petition  between cars  
and, fo r  in s ta n c e ,  t a i lo r in g .  Indeed, 
the com petition  may be keener between 
Ford and Rogers-Peet than between Ford 
and R olls-R oyce. The th e o r e t ic a l
37I b id . ,  p . 67 .
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problem i s  the com petition  between  
g ood s .38 A ll  that may be involved  i s  
a question  o f  d egree: every firm  com­
p etes  with a l l  the other firm s in the 
economy, but w ith  d i f f e r e n t  degrees of 
c lo s e n e s s .39 When the study of compe­
t i t i o n  i s  freed  from the narrowing 
assumptions of pure com petition , only  
two terms remain e s s e n t i a l  fo r  the 
a n a ly s is :  the in d iv id u a l firm  on the
one hand; the whole c o l l e c t i v i t y  of  
com petitors on the o th e r .40
T r i f f in  moved away from the p rev io u s ly  presented  
concepts o f  groups and commodities; and to f a c i l i t a t e  
h is  own a n a ly s is ,  he presented  d e f in i t io n s  to e s t a b l i s h  
these u n i t s . 4 *̂ The firm he defined  as an economic u n it  
acting independently so as to maximize i t s  n e t  revenue 
as ca lcu la ted  in  monetary u n i t s ;  commodities or fa c to r s  
are id e n t i f i e d  w ith in  each firm  as u n it s  o f  goods which
38Ib ld . , p. 88.
59 Ib id .
40Ib id . , p. 89.
^ B r i e f l y  d efin ed , T r l f f in ' s  new terminology can 
be explained  roughly as: Pure Monopsony i s  monopoly on
the buyer's  s id e ;  product d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  induces e i th e r  
heterogeneous com petition  (on the s e l l e r ' s  s id e ) ,  or 
heteropsony '(on the b uyer's  s id e ) ;  these l a t t e r  in  turn 
may be c ir c u la r  or a to m is t ic ,  depending upon the presence  
or non-presence of o l i g o p o l i s t i c  f a c t o r s .  I f  the pro­
ducts are homogeneous (p e r fe c t ly  s u b s t i t u ta b le ) ,  a condi­
t io n  of homogeneous com petition  (on the s e l l e r ' s  s id e )  or 
homeopsony (on the b u y er*3 s id e )  e x i s t s .  These a lso  may 
be c l a s s i f i e d  in to  c ir c u la r  or a to m istic  depending upon 
the ex is te n c e  o f  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  factors".
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in d iv id u a l entrepreneurs must d i f f e r e n t i a t e .42
In exp la in in g  h is  theory, T r i f f in  used a concept 
o f  e x ter n a l interdependence. He introduced such ideas  
a3 interdependence of s e l l i n g ,  interdependence o f  buying, 
interdependence and the problem of  en try , and in te rd e ­
pendence between buyers and s e l l e r s .  T r i f f in  showed how 
co n d it io n s  o f  pure o l ig o p o ly  or pure com petition  could  
e x i s t .  He in d ica ted  g ra p h ica lly  and mathem atically that  
there could be d i f f e r e n t  kinds of com petition  between 
firm s at d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of p r ic e s .  The number of  
com petitors in  the market he assumed would depend upon 
the l e v e l  o f  p r ic e s  s in c e  each s e l l e r  has a price  below  
which he w i l l  re fu se  to  s e l l ,  dependent upon h is  co s t  
co n d it io n s .
D iscuss ing  the interdependence between buyers 
and s e l l e r s ,  a case re ferred  to as b i l a t e r a l  monopoly, 
T r if f in  sa id :  "When a commodity i s  so ld ,  s e l l e r s  and
buyers are linked  in  an immediate way s in ce  the p r ice  
re ce iv ed  by the f i r s t  i s  d isbursed  by the l a t t e r ." 4^
He thought that wherever both s id e s  o f  the market, con­
sc io u s  o f  th e ir  in f lu e n c e  on p r ic e s ,  d ir e c t  th e ir  p o l ic y
42T r i f f in ,  op. c l t . ,  p . 94
45I b ld . ,  p . 124.
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to in flu en ce  p r ice  in  th e ir  favor, i t  i s  a case o f  o l i ­
g o p o l i s t i c  indeterm inacy. This problem cannot be theo­
r e t i c a l l y  analysed; hence, the p a r t ic u la r  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  
o f  each case must be observed.
Before p resen tin g  T r i f f i n ' 3 con c lu s io n s , a note
on com petition  and the shape o f  the c o s t  curve i s  deemed
worthy of p r esen ta t io n . Under con d ition s  of monopoly or
m onopolistic  com petition , the fo llo w in g  i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic
o f  the thinking o f  T r i f f in :
I f  the output equating marginal revenue and mar­
g in a l  c o s t  i s  to correspond to the maximization, 
and not to  the m inim ization, o f  p r o f i t ,  the mar­
g in a l  c o s t  curve must cut the marginal revenue 
curve from below. In other words, expansion of  
output w i l l  increase p r o f i t  as long as I t  in ­
creases  t o t a l  revenue more than i t  in crea ses  
t o t a l  c o s t . ’  . . .  The assumption o f  monopoly or 
m onop olistic  com petition i s  compatible w ith  
e i th e r  in cr ea s in g , constant, or even decreasing  
marginal c o s t . 45
Under pure com petition , apart from the con d ition  
mentioned above: "equilibrium  . . .  Is  . . .  incom patible
w ith  decreasing  marginal costs"  and "the average co s t  
curve can only be tangent to the h o r iz o n ta l average 
revenue curve [[sales curvejj from above."46
44Ib id . ,  p . 148.
45I b id «, p . 149.
46Ib id .
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I l l u s t r a t iv e  of h i3  th inking and general opinion  
of the th e o r e t ic a l  a n a ly s is  of com petition i s  h is  "Con 
elusion" to M onopolistic Competition and General E q u ilib ­
rium Iheory. Because o f  the summary nature and e x c e l lo n t  
wording and p resen ta t io n , i t  i s  deemed worthwhile to con­
clude the d iscu ss io n  o f  the mathematical th e o r is t s  with a 
l i t e r a l  t r a n s c r ip t io n :47
Born and reared in  a Marshallian environment, monop­
o l i s t i c  com petition has been, unto th is  day, encumbered 
by the f e t t e r s  o f  p a r t ic u la r  equilibrium  methodology.
Ihe grouping o f  firm s in to  in d u s tr ie s ,  and the d iscu ss io n  
o f  value theory w ith in  the ’.vails  of one i s o la te d  industry  
are p e r fe c t ly  v a l id  and adequate procedures under purely  
com petitive  assumptions. They are, however, antiquated  
and e n t ir e ly  out o f  place in so far as m onopolistic  com­
p e t i t io n  i s  concerned. Product d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  robs the 
concept of industry o f  both i t s  d e f in i te n e s s  and i t s  
s e r v i c e a b i l i t y .  Outside of the l im it in g  cases o f  pure 
monopoly and pure com petition , the s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
between any two products, the com petitiveness  between 
two firm s v a r ie s  only in  degree. The grouping of firms  
in to  in d u s tr ie s  cannot be based on any c le a r c u t  c r i t e r io n ,  
nor can i t  be of any help  in a general statem ent of value 
theory.
With the in du stry , a lso  goes overboard the treatment 
of p r o f i t s  in terms o f  c lo sed  and fr e e  entry (o r ,  in the 
old  Paretian  term inology, monopoly and free  co m p etit io n ) .  
Whether or not the crea tion  o f  new firm3 can a f f e c t  the 
demand curves and p r o f i t  op p ortu n itie s  o f the firm s in  
b usiness  i s  a fa c tu a l  m atter, to be ascerta ined  in  each 
in d iv id u a l case . Between the l im it in g  cases of Paretian  
monopoly (complete p r o tec t io n  of p r o f i t s ) ,  and fr e e  com­
p e t i t io n  ( l e v e l l i n g  down of p r o f i t s  to  a com petitive  
l e v e l ) ,  there e x i s t  a l l  k inds o f  concrete s i t u a t io n s ,  
ir red u c ib le  to any standard pattern  or simple assumption.
47I b id . ,  pp. 188-89
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The s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  betv/een any two products, the 
v u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f  any firm  to inctirsions from new r i v a l s ,  
are problems outside the reach o f  th e o r e t ic a l  deduction .
I t  i s  only w ith in  the framework provided by f a c tu a l ,  
d e sc r ip t iv e  answers to these q u e stio n s , that pure theory  
can d isp lay  i t s  u s e fu ln e s s .  The attempts of each in d i ­
v id u a l at maximizing h i s  income (o f  each firm at maxi­
mizing i t s  p r o f i t s )  take place w ithin  the range provided 
by th is  i n s t i t u t io n a l  environment. 7/hen a l l  elements of  
o lig o p o ly  can be excluded, the range i3 e a s i ly  narrowed 
down to determinate equilibrium  p o in ts .  V/hen o lig o p o ­
l i s t i c  in f lu e n c es  are at p lay , the so lu t io n  becomes 
dependent of a larger  number of circum stancos, outsido  
the compass o f  t r a d it io n a l  pure theory.
C la s s ic a l  a n a ly s is  was able to reach a high degree 
of s im p l ic i ty  and d e f in i t e n e s s ,  owing to the U3e of a 
number of very d r a s t ic  and l im ite d  assumptions: id e n t i ty
of each firm w ith  an in d iv id u a l owner, purely  com petitive  
markets, p e r f e c t ly  fr e e  en try . As these assumptions are 
re laxed  one a f te r  another, the theory gains in  g e n e r a l i ty ,  
lo s e s  in d e f in i t e n e s s .  M onopolistic  com petition  i s  
la r g er  but vaguer than pure com petition; the con sid era tion  
of o l i g o p o l i s t i c  types of behavior, o f separation  between 
co n tro l and ownership, open a d d it io n a l degrees of freedom, 
The present stage of pure theory appears undoubtedly very  
form al, lack in g  in  concrete content and p r a c t ic a l  s i g n i f ­
ican ce . As compared w ith  the s o c ia l  philosophy of  
Smithian economics, the e t h ic a l  n e u tr a l i ty  and barrenness  
of our con clu sions may w e ll  be ap p a llin g .
Disencumbered, however, o f a l l  the l im ita t io n s  and 
taboos im plied in  the c l a s s i c a l  assumptions, the way i s  
now open fo r  the b u ild in g  up of a d i f f e r e n t  type of eco­
nomics. Instead  of drawing i t s  substance from arb itrary  
assumptions, chosen fo r  th e ir  s im p l ic i ty  and unduly ex ­
tended to the whole f i e l d  o f  economic a c t i v i t y ,  our 
theory may turn to more p ed estr ia n , but more f r u i t f u l  
methods. I t  w i l l  recogn ize the r ich n ess  and v a r ie ty  of  
a l l  concrete ca ses ,  and tack le  each problem with due 
re sp e c t  for  i t s  in d iv id u a l a sp e c ts .  More advantage w i l l  
be taken o f  a l l  r e lev a n t  inform ation, and l e s s  r e l ia n c e  
w i l l  be p laced  on a mere r e so r t  to the passkey o f  general  
th e o r e t ic a l  assumptions.
We are r ig h t ly  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith the d is to r te d  p ic ­
ture o f  economic l i f e  which c l a s s i c a l  theory has be­
queathed u s .  Subconsciously , however, we keep hoping 
fo r  some other grand formula that would unravel as simply  
and e le g a n t ly  the i n f i n i t e  com plexity of our modern world.
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For economics to progress , i t  must g ive  up i t s  you th fu l  
q uest  fo r  a p h ilo so p h er’s ston e .
SOME GENERAL MARKET SITUATIONS IN THE ECONOMY
The g e n e r a l iz a t io n s  made p rev iou sly  d ea lin g  with  
pure com petition , pure monopoly, and other p r ice  analyses  
can be compared with counterparts in  e x i s t in g  p r ice  s i t ­
u a tio n s  in  American markets. Some firm s f in d  themselves  
in  a p o s i t io n  which very nearly  approaches pure or p er­
f e c t  com petition; fo r  example, i f  a good i s  so ld  on a 
stock  exchange or a commodity market the p r ic e s  which are 
announced p e r io d ic a l ly  show the s e l l e r  the u n it  p r ic e  he 
can expect to  r e c e iv e .  In some cases he i s  able to d i s ­
pose o f  h is  t o t a l  output at the e x i s t in g  p r ice;  however, 
in  some cases  the quoted p rice  w i l l  be one in  which he 
w i l l  meet some com petition in  that he w i l l  have to com­
p ete  w ith  other s e l l e r s  in  order to d ispose of h is  output. 
I t  i s  the s t r iv in g  fo r  orders among d i f f e r e n t  producers 
which fu rn ish es  com petition  in  many n e a r -p er fec t  competi­
t i v e  m arkets. These markets In which commodities and 
s e c u r i t i e s  are so ld  approach pure or p e r fe c t  com petition .
Many market s i tu a t io n s  in  the United S ta te s  f in d  
firm s or groups of firms f ix in g  p r ic e s .  There i s  no 
system o f  automatic re g u la t io n  of supply and demand in  
these  ca se s  as i s  the case in  a s e c u r ity  exchange or a
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commodity market. Entry fo r  one or more firms in  an 
industry of th is  nature poses a problem in  that ad ju st­
ments must be made to  the market in  which p r ic e s  are 
f ix e d .  Trade a s so c ia t io n s  sometimes attempt to e lim inate  
or l im i t  com petition; to accomplish t h i s  they can draw 
a t te n t io n  to the reduction  o f  the p r ic e  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  
f irm 's  product or to c e r ta in  standards of q u a l i ty ,  
d esign , or s t y le  which might be e s ta b l is h e d .  Monopolis­
t i c  com petition theory ex p la in s  s i tu a t io n s  such as th e se .
The methods o f  p r ic e  f ix in g  adopted by some 
a sso c ia t io n s  i s  to s e t  th e ir  p r ic e s  fo r  a market or 
season p er iod . The a b i l i t y  .to do th is  i s  one which w i l l  
allow a l im it a t io n  o f  com petition  and i t  i s  a s i tu a t io n  
which w i l l  r e s u l t  when an o l i g o p o l i s t i c  or s im ila r  s i t ­
uation  i s  found. In many cases where the standards of  
q u a l i ty  or the standards o f  grade are used in  p rice  
f ix in g ,  the s e l l i n g  p r ice  i s  composed o f  some kind of  
average c o s t  o f  the various agreeing members p lus a 
markup or agreed percentage of the p r o f i t .  This i s  part  
of a l i v e  and l e t  l i v e  s i t u a t io n .
Textbooks in  many cases  g en er a liz e  about inform al 
systems in  which producers get  together  and e s t a b l i s h  
p r ic e s  through c o n su lta t io n .  The once famous "Gary d in ­
ners" in  which a strong firm was able to c o n su lt  with
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i t s  c l o s e s t  com petitors about p r ic e  changes i s  often
48a sso c ia ted  w ith  heavy or broad industry  p r ic in g .  When 
sev era l firra3 are able to co n tro l most of the output of  
the in du stry , there i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  that the conference  
technique might be very b e n e f ic ia l  fo r  these producers. 
Very l i t t l e  has been w r itten  or found about industry  
p r ic in g  o f  t h is  n atu re . I t  i s  known, however, th a t  even 
in  the absence of the production le a d e r s '  conferences,  
there i s ,  in  many c a s e s ,  a c lo s e  con tact between the 
salesmen and the s a le s  agents o f  the f irm s.
The p o l ic y  of any one firm in  an industry in  which 
sev era l large  firm s might be dominant i s  quickly  known to  
the others and i t  may In fluence th e ir  d e c is io n s  about 
p r ice  changes. The re lu ctan ce  of manufacturers to  under­
cut th e ir  com petitors' p r ice  i s  g e n era lly  known and they 
many times tend to hold a p r ic e .  Some co n sid era tio n  must 
be g iven , however, to the f a c t  th at  introductory o f fe r s  
and large  orders are given s p e c ia l  p r ic e s ;  i t  i s  not a 
c lo s e ly  held  s e c r e t  that d iscr im in a t io n  might be prac­
t ic e d  by large firm s in  some c a s e s .  S e l f  in t e r e s t  and 
se c r e t  agreements can lead  to  in d iv id u a l con tract  p r o f i t s
48R. E. Glos and H. A. Baker, Introduction  to  
B u sin ess , (C in c in n ati:  South-Western Publishing Co..
Inc'., "1951), p . 733.
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as w e l l  as group action  and one industry p r ic e .  Govern­
ment reg u la tio n  o f  tru s ts  and monopoly elem ents in  the  
economy have l im ite d  t h i s  a c t iv i t y  to  a c e r ta in  ex te n t .  
Once e s ta b l is h e d ,  however, there i s  no p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  
court action  against a firm  for  breaking an agreement o f  
th is  nature . This tends to hold the informal agreement 
p ro p o s it io n  to a l im ite d  u se . I f  the economic world in  
which the Industry i s  operating suddenly f a l l s ,  the 
weaker firms are l i k e l y  to  push out and attempt to keep 
output up by reducing p r ic e .
I t  I s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  that a many-firm industry  
w i l l  g e t  togeth er  in  an informal agreement in  cases  in  
which there i s  no leader  to bind the members togeth er .  
This agreement can be the r e s u l t  o f a natural urge to 
survive when i t  i s  recognized  that com petition  between 
•firms o f  almost equal productive and p r ice  s ta tu s  might 
be d e s tr u c t iv e .  Price changes would be p o ss ib le  with  
the beginning o f  a new production season w ith  p r ic e s  
e s ta b l ish e d  upon some m utually-agreed ba3i3  in  these  
l a t t e r  c a s e s .  Economic theory c h a ra c ter iz es  th is  area 
in  large  group a n a ly s is .
Price  lead ersh ip  i s  another s i tu a t io n  found In 
American markets. I t  has long been recognized  that some 
large  firm s are able to  co n tr o l  current and p o te n t ia l
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market output to the ex ten t that they are able to lead  
In e s ta b l is h in g  p r ic e .  The p r ice  movements on the part  
of the3e firm s are watched very c lo s e ly  by the other  
firm s in  the industry  that do not have output co n tro l  
to any s ig n i f i c a n t  e x te n t .  The p r ice  leadersh ip  can be 
found in  many in d u s tr ie s  and the methods used by the 
firm s in  e s ta b l is h in g  p r ic e s  are those which are b asic  
to  a study o f  t h i s  n ature . The estab lishm ent o f  a p r ice  
demands wide knowledge and a thorough examination of  
records on the part o f  the p r ice  s e t t in g  firm . The 
firm s which s e t  p r ice  must o f  n e c e s s i t y  have a greater  
o v e r a l l  in t e r e s t  in  the p r ice  and i t s  estab lishm ent  
through i t s  own production and demand records than would 
firm s content to adopt the e x i s t in g  p r ice  or s e t  price  
on the b a s is  o f one long e s ta b l is h e d .
A s i t u a t io n  which i s  the re c ip ro c a l  o f that of  
p r ic e  leadersh ip  i s  that o f  p r ice  fo l lo w in g . The p r ice  
fo l lo w e r s  in  an industry  are normally too sm all to con­
t r o l  p r ice  w ith th e ir  own output or to a f f e c t  output and 
p r ic e  to  any grea t  ex ten t  when they combine w ith  some o f  
th e ir  own sm aller members. The sm all fo llo w er  u su a lly  
accepts the p r ic e  of the p r ice  le a d e r , or i f  he has a 
d if f e r e n t ia t e d  product, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  that ho w i l l  s e t  
h is  own p r ice  e i th e r  a l i t t l e  above or a l i t t l e  below
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that o f  the p r ice  le a d e r .  As a genera l ru le  these small 
firm s w i l l  try  to  s e t  th e ir  p r ic e  a l i t t l e  above the 
le a d e r 's  p r ice  in  order to ga in  a l i t t l e  ad d it io n a l p ro f­
i t  w hile depending on the lo y a l t y  of the customers that  
they have. I f  they are unable to do t h i3 ,  they are l i k e l y  
to lower the p r ice  s l i g h t l y  below the le a d e r 's  p r ice  hop­
ing to gain s a le s  th a t  they can p o ss ib ly  take away from 
the p r ice  le a d e r .  I f  the p r ice  i s  3et very much below  
the le a d e r 's  p r ic e ,  the small firm w i l l  be lo s in g  p r o f i t s  
th at i t  might make o th erw ise . Whatever the case , the 
p r ic e s  s e t  by the sm all producers, i f  they d i f f e r  at a l l  
from those s e t  by the p r ice  le a d e r ,  w i l l  d i f f e r  but very  
s l i g h t l y .
Many in d u s tr ie s  in  the U. s. are faced  w ith  an 
e s ta b l is h e d  p rice  which the p u b lic  has been le d  to b e l ie v e  
i s  a r ig h t  or f a i r  p r ic e .  This conventional or long-run  
p rice  i s  one which i s  a very popular p r ic e  to the con­
sumer. The manufacturer i s  compelled to s e l l  h is  product 
at a p a r t ic u la r  p r ic e  and he must decide upon the p r o f i t  
l e v e l s  which the w holesa ler  and the r e t a i l e r  w i l l  gain  in  
order to come out at the popular market p r ic e .  I f  c o s ts  
f lu c tu a t e ,  the producer must e i th e r  adjust q u a lity  or 
s a c r i f i c e  in  some manner so as to  keep the p r ice  at the 
same l e v e l .  The a b i l i t y  to adjust co st  to meet p r ice  in
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th is  s i t u a t io n  can lead  to s tr in g e n c ie s  not f e l t  by many 
producers. The a t te n t io n  which consumers pay to products 
in  many cases  such as th is  are not d irec ted  to p r ice  at  
a l l .  The consumer w i l l  be led  by com petition  based upon 
s t y l e ,  upon q u a l i ty ,  or upon some unusual or outstanding  
f e a tu r e ,  which gives  greater  u t i l i t y  than could be gained  
by using the product of a com petitor. A dvertising and 
s e l l i n g  c o s t s  are important and tend to be expanded under • 
these co n d it io n s  in  order to gain  sa le s  at a given p r ic e .
MARGINAL COST AND AVERAGE COST PRICING 
Textbook a n a ly s is  normally s t a te s  that the pro­
ducer w i l l  attempt to equate marginal c o s t s  and marginal 
revenue so as to e s ta b l i s h  h is  output at the b e s t  p o in t  
from a p r o f i t  stand p oin t. This e f f o r t  holds true for  
pure com petition  when the marginal co s t  i s  brought up to  
the p r ice  l in e ;  s in ce  the demand i s  p e r fe c t ly  e l a s t i c ,  
i t  a lso  c o n s t i t u te s  the marginal revenue fo r  the firm . 
Under monopoly, duopoly, o l ig o p o ly ,  and m onopolistic  
com petition  the marginal cost-m arginal revenue formula  
works ju s t  as w e l l .  The a b i l i t y  o f  the producer to make 
adjustments so as to  g e t  marginal co s t  and marginal 
revenue equated have long been d iscu ssed . I t  cannot be 
expected that every producer w i l l  know enough about
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economic concepts o f  equilibrium  or have c o s t  data nec­
essary  to  come out w ith  a computation as p rec ise  as i t  
i s  in  textbook theory. Whatever the case might be, i t  
i s  probably true th a t ,  in  gen era l, when the actual con­
duct and the computations o f  c o s t  and revenue are exam­
ined, the producer w i l l  have found the most favorable  
and p r o f i ta b le  output fo r  h i s  concern under given  market 
c o n d it io n s .  I f  th is  i s  true, then theory w i l l  f i t  the 
e x i s t in g  p r a c t ic e .
G enorally, producers are assumed to s e t  th e ir  
p r ic es  in  the immediate period  and to  change them as 
th e ir  c o s t s  and demand co n d it io n s  change. This s i t u a ­
t io n  i s  n ot  so in  many cases  since  producers tend to  
e s t a b l i s h  catalogue and production period  p r ic e s  which 
might run from weeks to months, or perhaps to a year  
or lo n g er .  Producers are r e lu c ta n t  to change p r ic e s  
s in ce  i t  might crea te  an unnecessary d i f f i c u l t y  fo r  
w h olesa lers  and r e t a i l e r s  th at  handle th e ir  product.
The a b i l i t y  to hold  e x i s t in g  con tracts  and to e s t a b l i s h  
p r ic e s  based upon actual c o s t s  might be very d i f f i c u l t  
i f  the e x i s t in g  theory were fo llo w ed . The actu a l c o s ts  
of production can be ascerta in ed  only a f te r  the produc­
t io n  has s ta r te d .  Many co n tra cts  are quoted on a 
fu tu res  b a s i s .  The producer must base h is  p r ic e  and
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s p r e a d  h i s  c o s t 3  u p o n  h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  s o m e  
f u t u r e  p e r i o d  w h i c h  h e  m i g h t  h a v e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n .
lb the ex ten t that marginal c o s t  can be 
accurately  determined, to  the ex ten t that marginal 
revenue can be ascerta in ed , and to the exten t that 
accurate co s t  price  measurements can be made, i t  
i s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  th at  marginal c o s t  w i l l  boar 
a very important r e la t io n s h ip  to p r ic e .  In the 
absence of accurate measurements in  a l l  the l in o s  
mentioned above, i t  i s  p o ss ib le  that the marginal 
c o s t  concept o f  p r ic in g  w i l l  have to be tempered 
somewhat from the proposals e s ta b lish e d  in  te x t  
theory.
Many producers probably never produce to  
the ex ten t  of optimum output w ith in  the l ig h t  of  
th e ir  e x i s t in g  ca p a c ity .  I f  t h i s  i s  the case , they  
operate continuously  in  a short-run period , and in  
doing such they might never be able to f igu re  
accurately  th e ir  current marginal c o s t  and marginal 
revenue. Hiey f in d  themselves in a r e la t iv e ly  
s t a t i c  s i tu a t io n  in  which they are able to expand 
output by g iv in g  con tracts  at a reduced co st  or in  
which they are able to  introduce new products and
99
gain  ad d it ion a l s a le s  and output. These producers 
p o ss ib ly  price  on the b a s is  of an o v e r a l l  average 
of a l l  th e ir  c o s t s .  This average co s t  concept 
probably bears 3 0 i n e  c lo s e  r e la t io n s h ip  to p r ice  in  
todays world. Averago c o s t  p r ic in g  i s  now gen era lly  
taken to be one of the growing concepts fo r  price  
theory in  the United S ta t e s .
The analyses of price from the standpoint 
of pure com petition , pure monopoly, duopoly, o l i ­
gopoly , and m onop olistic  com petition , have a l l  been 
based upon a one-product firm . Such a cond ition  
seldom e x i s t s  in  the American economy s in ce  most 
firm s produce more than one product. The assump­
t io n s  upon which the e a r l ie r  g e n e r a liz a t io n s  were 
based were prim arily  used fo r  s im p l i f ic a t io n  and 
they do not by any means destroy the u se fu ln e ss  of 
the a n a ly s is .  'Jhore are many adherents to  an aver­
age c o s t  type of p r ic in g ,  however, who b e l ie v e  that  
the marginal c o s t  approach has become r e la t iv e ly
49Lorie T arsh is, The Elements of Economics, 
(New York: Houghton M ifl'lin Company, 1947;, pp.
197-98; and John F. Duo, Interm ediate Economic 
A n alysis , (Chicago: Hlchard D. Irwin, I n c . ,  1951),
pp. 195-201.
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o b s o l e t e . y;ith more than one product being pro­
duced by a firm , there w i l l  be cost3  which are 
common and which ccannot be separated on an item  
b a s i s .  This con d ition  crea tes  a hazard in which 
marginal c o s t s  w i l l  have to be assigned a rb itra ­
r i l y  in  some cases;  i f  th is  i s  true, marginal co s t  
a n a ly s is  w i l l  be v/eakened.
The co s ts  o f  a m ultip le-product firm w i l l  
f a l l  in to  ca te g o r ie s :  those which are common to
the products, and those which are separable to  
p a r t ic u la r  products. The fa c t  that common co s ts  
are present does not ruin the marginal co s t  anal­
y s i s  in cases where we have m onopolist com petition, 
provided the c o s ts  can be separable to  a ce r ta in  
e x te n t .  I f  a case should e x i s t  in which the mar­
g in a l  c o s t  o f each product i s  determ inable, the 
marginal cost-m arginal revenue ru le  w i l l  be applied .  
I f  a jo in t  c 031 s i tu a t io n  a r iso s  and i t  i s  p o ss ib le  
to gain some v ar iab le  proportions of the products, 
then marginal co s t  might be equally  as w e ll  a ssigned .
“^Hobert A. Gordon, "short Period Price  
Determination," The American Economic Review, V ol. 
XXXVIII (June, ISSF)',"pp.' 235-55;
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I f  a proportionate in crease  in each of the products 
occurs v/ith v a r ia t io n s  in output, then the 3um of  
the p r ic es  must cover the sum of the c o s t s .  When­
ever marginal c o s ts  cannot be determined, the usual 
marginal C03t-marginal revenue ru le  w i l l  not work 
for  the producer and he cannot apply the ru le  to any 
of h is  p roducts. With common c o s t s ,  whether o f  a 
jo in t  or a n o n -jo in t  nature, there i s  no d e f in i t e  
averago c o s t  f igure  fo r  each p a r t ic u la r  product pro­
duced. The firm must have a t o t a l  revenue from a l l  
products which w i l l  cover a l l  cost3  over the long  
run. I f  the average of these c o s t s  i s  computed too 
high and the p r ice  i s  s e t  too h igh , then entry in to  
the f i e l d  w i l l  r a is e  the average c o s ts  o f a l l  o f  the 
producers and ev en tu a lly  there w i l l  be the proper 
average co s t  p r ic e .
Lorie T arshis comments on the matter of
average c o s t  p r ic in g  as fo l lo w s:
Because marginal and average var iab le  
c o s t s  are l i k e l y  to be very nearly  the 
same, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  formulate a 
simple ru le  for  determining the most 
p r o f i ta b le  p r ic e .  Ih is  ru le  o f  thumb 
i s  th a t  the p r ic e  should equal v a r ia b le  
c o s t  p lus a c e r ta in  percentage which i s  
f ix ed  except nt tim es when demand i s  
very h igh — then i t  should be in crea sed .
Business firms freq u en tly  claim to employ 
such a mothod of p r ice  determ ination . . .
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provided that the percentage to  be added 
i s  c a r e fu l ly  chosen, the price  thus se t  
would be very c lo se  to the most p r o f ita b le  
one. 1
In the public  u t i l i t i e s  f i e l d ,  E. W. Clemens 
says that average c o s t  p r ic in g  i s  used w ith  co n sid ­
erable j u s t i f i c a t io n :
Cost and accounting records are freq u en tly  
not s e t  up so that marginal co s t3  can be 
r e a d i ly  determined. In many in sta n ces  a 
firm has no way o f  estim atin g  expected  
marginal c o s t s  except on the b a s is  o f  
e x i s t in g  average c o s t s .  There i s  some 
p rejud ice  among business  firms aga in st  
p r ic in g  on a marginal c o s t  b a s is  where i t  
r e s u l t s  in lower than average p r ic e s .  A 
low p r ice  o ffered  to  one customer group 
c r e a te s  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  . . .  Customers 
taken on at marginal c o s t  today w i l l  be 
u sin g  equipment needed to  supply avorage 
c o s t  of se rv ic e  tomorrow. I t  then be­
comes d i f f i c u l t  to  withdraw serv ice  from 
or r a is e  the r a te s  of these  m arginal-  
co s t  custom ers. Compulsion i s  added to  
wisdom to lead  a u t i l i t y  to make i t s  
r a te s  on the b a s is  of long-run added 
c o s ts  which include not only the out of 
pocket c o s ts  but a lso  the long-run f ix ed  
c o s t s . 52
The m atter of common c o s ts  has greater  s i g ­
n if ic a n c e  for  price-making in  p r a c t ic e  than i t  does 
fo r  the theory o f  p r ice  determ ination. I f  a firm
5lQ)arshis, op. c i t . ,  pp. 201-02.
0*"Eli Winston Clemens, Economics and Public  
U t i l i t i e s , (New York: Apple ton-Century-CroiJt s ,  I n c . ,
1 6̂ 0), p p .  2 6 1 - 6 2 .
1 0 3
i s  producing a groat many d i f f e r e n t  item s, the 
problems involved in  determining marginal cost3  
bocone very numerous and very se r io u s .  The prob­
lems can be ser iou s even when the proportions of 
the various products con be varied and the marginal 
c o s t  of each product i s  determ inate. I f  some c o s ts  
are common to a l l  of the items being produced, 
then the determ ination of marginal c o s t s  and mar­
g in a l  revenue would be e n t ir e ly  u s e le s s  from the 
standpoint of the time and expense in vo lved . With 
m u ltip le  products and common c o s ts  i t  i s  necessary  
that the businessman adopt 3ome sh o r t-c u t  approach 
to  p r ic in g .  Price-making short cut3 are very dan­
gerous and such an approach might not succeed in  
always maximizing p r o f i t s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the b u s i­
ness entrepreneur can be expected to take the e a s ie r  
way out and price  on the b a s is  of the average of 
a l l  of h i s  c o s t s .
Oligopoly elements in  the market present an 
extreme d i f f i c u l t y  to the type o f  p r ic in g  described  
immediately above. Common c o s t s  tend to  in crease  
the u n certa in ty  of the producer about the rea ct io n  
of s a le s  to p r ice  changes. This u ncerta in ty  makes
1 0 4
the revenue schedules almost in d e te r m in a te .^  in  
a case such as t h i s ,  firms in  the o l i g o p o l i s t i c  
market must d is tr ib u te  common c o s ts  among the 
various products in somo standard fa sh ion ; o ther­
w ise , they w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  d i f f e r e n t  p r ic e s  on the 
various l i n e s .
The assumed com petition  in the o lig o p o ­
l i s t i c  market w i l l  tend to make the p r ic e s  on each  
product g r a v ita te  to the low est f ig u re  s e t  by any 
firm . I f  th is  doe3 happen, as assumed, then the 
firms w i l l  be unable to  cover common c o s t s .  In 
th i3  ca se , i f  marginal c o s ts  are used to cut p r ic e ,  
a marginal c o s t  p r ice  w i l l  bo very low because most 
of the c o s ts  are common in nature and they w i l l  
continue whether any p a r t ic u la r  product i s  pro­
duced or n o t. I f  a l l  producers are faced  with  
such a co n d it io n , i t  can e a s i l y  be seen that  
average c o s t  p r ic in g  would d e f in i t e ly  be the best  
method of p r ice  determ ination where common c o s ts  
are c h a r a c te r is t ic  in  an o l i g o p o l i s t i c  market.
In conclusion , i t  might be w ise to  point  
out that while the average c o s t  approach to p r ic in g
S^John P. Due, Interm ediate Economic a n a ly s is ,  
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, I n c . ,  l y b i ; ,  pp. 291-yd.
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has had s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  upon t h e  p r i c i n g  s i t u a ­
t io n , these e f f e c t s  s h o u l d  n o t  be exaggerated. A 
businessman must always consider hi3 marginal p o s i­
t io n  i f  he i s  to succeed in maximizing p r o f i t .  I f  
average c o s t  i s  used and con sid era tion s  o f  demand 
and other market s i tu a t io n s  are considered , then 
the price  w i l l  probably f a l l  in l in e  with a f igu re  
that would be s e t  w ith  the U3 0 o f  the marginal 
approach.
'ihere i s  d e f i n i t e l y  a p lace in the pre­
sen t p r ic in g  system in  our economy for  both mar­
g in a l  and average c o s t  p r ic in g  techn iques, The 
businessman i s  probably more aware of the average 
c o s t  technique because i t  seemingly f i t s  ru le s  of 
thumb which he has heard a l l  of h is  l i f e  and which 
w i l l  f i t  h is  b usiness  knowledge. Since many b u s i­
nessmen might not be aware o f  formal d e f in i t io n s  
o f  marginal c o s t s  and marginal revenue, they w i l l  
accept p ric ing  from an averago co3t stand p oin t.
The end r e s u l t  In both ca ses  w i l l  probably be one 
which w i l l  allow the firm  to get a maximum p r o f i t  
and which w i l l  allow i t  to l i v e  and l e t  l i v e  in  the 
long run.
Price theory and value determ ination have 
long been the very h eart  of economic thought. The
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C la s s ic a l  th e o r is t s  s im p l i f ie d  th e ir  p r ice  an a lys is  
and concentrated on an equilibrium  a n a ly s is  o f a 
more or l e s s  s t a t i c  nature . Their aim was probably 
one of f ind ing  the determinants o f  v a lu e , p r ic e ,  
income d is t r ib u t io n ,  and resource a l lo c a t io n  in  a 
s ta tio n a ry  economic system . Price  was the n eces­
sary variab le  in  th e ir  scheme and i t  rece ived  much 
a t te n t io n .
The Austrian school changed the approach 
to price  from one of c o s t ,  wherein supply rece ived  
most emphasis, to  one o f  u t i l i t y  and marginal 
u t i l i t y  in  which demand rece ived  more emphasis.
Prom these two con cep ts , the H e o -c la 3 s ic a l  approach 
to value and p rice  was introduced. Alfred Marshall 
made a u s e fu l  combination of both c o s t  and u t i l i t y  
in  exp la in in g  v a lu e .-  His p r ice  a n a ly s is  i s  s t i l l  
taught in  many areas with a l l  o f i t s  p r e c ise  eq u i­
librium  concepts of an in d u s tr ia l  nature. F in a l ly ,  
m onopolistic  com petition  has rece ived  much a t te n t io n  
s in ce  the la t e  1930»s. Chamberlin adhered f a i r l y  
c lo s e  to M arshallian p r e c ise n e ss  in ex p la in in g  
equilibrium  of the firm  from a p r ice  and output 
stand p oin t. His small group a n a ly s is  i s  probably  
the most accepted theory of p r ice  determ ination
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today. Notwithstanding the f in e  work of Chamberlin 
and Marshall, these l a t t e r  two analyses have been 
a lte r n a te ly  attacked and defended up to the present  
time, and some controversy s t i l l  con tinues .
Economic textbooks have been c r i t i c i z e d  
because of the manner in which they approach value  
and price  from a th e o r e t ic a l  standpoint. Broad 
income and monetary demand s tu d ie s  are analyzed, 
and price  movements based on income s t a t i s t i c s  
are p resen ted . Textbooks g en er a lly  fo llow  these  
analyses w ith  another approach to p r ice  in which 
supply and demand form the b a s is  fo r  p r ic e .  Price  
change i s  then introduced on the b a s is  o f demand 
and supply concepts. The economic d e f in i t io n s  of  
price  presented  in both of these  analyses have beon 
found to be nebulous and lo o se  by the businessman 
in many c a s e s .
The importance of p r ice  in the American 
economy cannot be over-emphasized. Price has been 
sa id  to ch aracter ize  a l l  th in gs that are economic. 
I t  i s  p r ic e ' s  job in our American system to  a l l o ­
cate resources to th e ir  most productive employment, 
to d is t r ib u te  income, to temper t o ta l  n a t io n a l
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output, and to create p u b lic  p o l ic y  dea ling  w ith  
p r ic e s  and p r ice  c o n tr o l .
The American in d u s tr ia l  scene ha3 each of 
the th e o r e t ic a l  economic approaches to p r ice  anal­
y s i s  contained in i t s  o v e r a l l  system . For example, 
markets con be found that are purely  com p etit ive ,  
others wherein pure monopoly operates , and s t i l l  
others wherein duopoly, o l ig o p o ly ,  and m onopolistic  
com petition  seem to dominate. Also elements of  
p r ic e  lea d ersh ip , p r ice  fo l lo w in g , customary p r ices  
and s im ila r  p atterns tend to emphasize the impor­
tance of economic theory in exp la in in g  the prac­
t i c a l  s ide of our economic p ic tu r e .
Marginal c o s t  p r ic in g  has been emphasized 
by the economist as probably the most important type 
of p r ic in g  done by a b u sin ess  concern. The method 
th a t  many econom ists recogn ize , however, i s  that o f  
average c o s t  p r ic in g .  Average c o s t  has come in for  
much economic a n a ly s is  in  the p a s t  sev era l years;  
i t  i s  contended that businessmen seem to hold  
f a i r l y  w e l l  to  some type of price-making based 
upon an average of a l l  o f th e ir  c o s t s .  Economists 
recogn ize th a t  too much emphasis upon t h i s  p a r t ic u ­
la r  type of p r ic in g ,  however, can p o ss ib ly  lead  to
a type of  g en er a liz a t io n  which w i l l  work to the 
disadvantage of a businessman. This i s  true par­
t i c u la r l y  i f  he i s  unaware o f  what p r ice  f lu c tu a ­
tions or price adjustments can do to enhance h is  
volume o f  s a le s .
CHAPTER I I I  
PRICE AND PRICING POLICY
The v a l id i t y  of an economic theory depends 
upon constant t e s t in g  through the use o f  em pirical  
data. Chapter 2 o f  th is  work p resen ts  th e o r e t ic a l  
thought concerning p r ice  and p r ice  p o l i c y .  Chapter 
3 i s  designed to present' em pirica l data to  t e s t  
ce r ta in  areas of the th e o r e t ic a l  a n a ly s is  in the 
forego in g  chapter.
Empirical data secured by the w riter  from 
one hundred b u sin ess  firm s i s  analyzed and in t e r ­
preted in  th is  chapter. The purpose o f  th is  work 
and the method o f  approach to the problem were 
b r i e f l y  d iscu ssed  in Chapter 1 . In order to more 
f u l l y  d efine  the method, an a n a ly s is  o f the ques­
t io n n a ir e  approach i s  given  below.
The em p ir ica l m a ter ia l used here in  has been 
gleaned from q u estio n n a ires  mailed to  manufacturers 
s e le c t e d  from the U n iv ers ity  of Texas Bureau o f  
B usiness Research*s D irectory o f  Texas Manufacturers. 
The firm s were s e le c te d  in  a s t r a t i f i e d  sample. An 
in v e r te d -b e l l  d is t r ib u t io n  was used; th is  d is tr ib u t io n
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wa3 based on the number of employees w ith  from l e s s  
than 8 to  over 5000 forming the base l im i t s .  The 
samples s e le c te d  from each stratum were random. Prom 
the 221 q u estio n n a ires ,  94 were returned w ith  a per­
centage of return of 4 2 .5 $ , S ix  ad d it ion a l personal  
in terv iew s made by the w riter  were added to round 
out 100 re tu rn s . By the admission of those answering 
the q u e st io n n a ire s ,  30 wore "small" in th e ir  industry ,  
50 wero "medium," and 20 were " largo."  The purpose 
of adding 6 ad d it ion a l to the 94 was fo r  convenience  
e n t ir e ly  and wa3 not designed to load or l im i t  the 
answers in any way.
Ihe q uestions in  the m ater ia l sent to manu­
fa c tu r ers  were e s ta b l is h e d  fo r  businessmen to answer.
A rather popular b usiness  vernacular was used as much 
as p o ss ib le  s in ce  i t  i s  assumed that businessmen are 
able to  p lo t  th e ir  answers more e f f e c t i v e l y  when 
questioned in  t h e ir  own terms. Of n e c e s s i t y  such 
th ings as marginal c o s t  and marginal revenue had to  
be u sed ,-b u t  these were lim ito d  as much as p o ss ib le ;  
the u se fu ln e ss  o f  these terms was found when a cross  
a n a ly s is  o f answers was being attempted.
Hie q uestions fo r  the businessmen are grouped 
under headings which lead  to answers th a t  can be used
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fco advantage by the w r iter  in h is  a n a ly s is .  Several  
of the q u estion s  ore analyzed more than once since  
they boar gen era lly  upon more than one to p ic .  This 
r e p e t i t io n  leads to the b est  r e s u l t s  f i n a l l y .  Repe­
t i t i o n  w i l l  3 e e m  to be present throughout th is  chap­
ter  because o f  the necessary method o f  analyzing the 
numbers and percentages in manufacturing-firm answers.
R ecognition i s  made of the f a c t  th a t  the lay  
reader might become l o s t  in  the quick interchange of  
question  a n a ly s is ;  y e t ,  i t  i s  hoped that th is  can be 
p a r t ia l ly  o f f s e t  w ith  exp lanations givon w ithin  the 
body of the top ic  m atter . S ince the q u estion s  and 
the groupings are organized along top ic  l i n e s  to f i t  
businessmen, i t  i s  necessary that the m ater ia l must 
be analyzed in  t h is  way. The c o r r e la t io n  between 
the t h e o r e t ic a l  and the em pirica l data w i l l  be e v i ­
dent to the economist from h is  knowledge of p rice  
theory, i t s  elements and r a m if ic a t io n s .
The nature o f  some questions required over­
lapping answers. For example, to a question  d ea lin g  
with the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of the type o f  product pro­
duced, firm s gave 110 tabulated  answers and 2 firm s  
did not answer. An a n a ly s is  o f  the answers to t h i s  
question  show that 37 firms produced consumer goods,
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24 produced b u ild er  su p p lie s ,  22 were ca p ita l-g o o d s  
f irm s, 6 produced r e t a i l  goods, 3 were in  the t e x t i l e  
b u s in ess ,  and 5 created  interm ediate products. Com­
ments made by the manufacturers show that some firms  
produce more than the in d ica ted  goods; they produce 
"others, meat products;" "consumer goods so ld  through 
• r e t a i l '  o u t l e t s ,  others so ld  fo r  use by in d u s tr ia l  
concerns and railroads."-*- This i s  an example of the 
type comment that could be made to each question  by 
the firms examined.
R esu lts  o f  the q u estion n a ire , comments made 
by the q u e st io n e es ,  and a s e r ie s  o f  bar charts com­
p i le d  from the q uestion n a ires  are included at the end 
of th is  c h a p t e r .  ̂ This m a ter ia l i s  appended in  order 
to allow the reader to in te r p r e t  more re a d i ly  the 
questionn aire  and i t s  answers. The q uestionnaire  
g iv es  a statem ent of the q u estions  as presented  to  
the d i f f e r e n t  b usiness  f irm s. The r e s u l t s  and com­
ments are those jU3t as c o l le c te d  from the
lpor an a n a ly s is  o f  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  
product type by f irm s, co n su lt  the tabu la tion  of  




qu estionn a ire  based upon (a) o v e r a l l  answers to  each  
question  and (b) answers on the b a s is  o f  sm all, medium, 
and large concerns. No breakdown i s  included on the 
comments s in ce  they w i l l  bo used prim arily  in a gen­
e r a l  a n a ly s is .  Ihe bar charts are designed to g ive  
a '•quick" ev a lu a tio n  of how the sm all, medium, and 
large concerns answered various q u e st io n s .
This chapter covers the various s e le c te d  
p r ic in g  and price  p o l ic y  fa c to r s  that were deemed 
of importance at the time th is  survey wa3 made. Tne 
price-maker i3  analyzed and h is  importance as w e ll  
as education  and ex p er ien ce -r a t in g  are d iscu sse d .  
Factors to be considered  in  price-making such as 
p r ic e ,  c o s t s ,  s a le s  and demand, in v e n to r ie s ,  net  
operating income, and formula are d iscu ssed  as they  
bear importance to the answering f irm s.
Price p o l ic y  i s  d iscu ssed  next and in th is  
se c t io n  such su b jec ts  as the nature o f  price  p o l ic y ,  
the period  o f  p r ice  p o l ic y ,  price  changes, and 
lead ersh ip  w i l l  be analyzed. Taxation and d isc r im i­
n ation  w i l l  a lso  be considered  as they a f f e c t  p r ice  
p o l ic y .  Costs are analyzed from a s e r ie s  of ques­
t io n s  which i t  i s  hoped w i l l  g ive some bearing on 
the use of average c o s t s ,  marginal c o s t s ,  and
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standard c o s ts  in  the p r ic in g  s tr u c tu r e .  Y/oven through­
out t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  s e c t io n ,  a r e la t i v e l y  b r ie f  a n a ly s is  
i s  devoted to the v a r ia t io n s  in the p r ice  concepts of  
sm all, medium, and large producers.
I t  i s  not intended that th i3  chapter bear any 
n ecessary  r e la t io n s h ip  to the preceding chapter which 
d e a lt  with p r ice  theory. I t  must be recognized that  
s in ce  the q uestion n aire  was designed to g ive  more or 
l e s s  s p e c i f i c  answers, a d ir e c t  p a r a l le l  between the 
m ater ia l in  Chapters 2 and 3 i s  im possib le .^  The 
m a ter ia l in  th is  chapter i s  corre la ted  with the p re­
ceding work and applied in  a to p ic a l  approach in  the 
concluding chapter.
In order to acquaint the reader w ith  the 
nature o f  the sample s e le c te d ,  two ta b les  fo l lo w .
These ta b le s  give a comparison of the s iz e  o f the 
sample from each stratum of the population  and a 
comparison between s t r a ta .
3Some se c t io n s  of the fo llo w in g  m ater ia l w i l l  
be based prim arily  upon the 6 in terv iew s which were 
added to  the 94 q uestionn aire  re tu rn s . This m a ter ia l  
w i l l  bo used to  supplement and extend demand, c o s t ,  
com petition , e t c . ,  concepts that an in terv iew  would 
r e v ea l  wherein a c lo s e ly  defined  questionn aire  would 
not allow an expanded answer.
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TABLE I
Number of Sample 
Employees
Percentage S ize  of 
Stratum
Percentage
Under 8 3 1 .3  # 1661 40.2#
8-24 13 5 .9# 1025 24.8#
25-49 32 14.5# 675 16.4#
50-99 48 21.7# 349 8 .4#
100-249 59 26.7# 274 6 .6#
250-499 40 18.1# 94 2 .3#
500-999 17 7 .7# 37 CD•
1 ,000 -4 ,999 6 2 .7# 15 .4#
5 ,0 0 0  & over 3 1 .4# 4 .1#
Total 221 100.0# 4134 100.0#
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T/i3LE I I
Market D is tr ib u -  Sample Percentage S ize  o f  Percentage  
TTorroTTro^ucT? s tr  atum
Local 2 .9% 790 19.1,1
County 1 .5% 310 7 .5 1
D is t r i c t  (Severa l  
c o u n t ie s ) 15 6,Q/o 710 1 7 .2%
State 17 7.7% 596 14 .4$
Regional (More 
than one s t a te ) 55 24.9,1 758 18 .31
N ational 73 33.0,1 622 15 .11




Total 221 100.0^ 4134 100.01
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THE PRICE-MAKER
Hie " in v is ib le  hand" of Adam Smith probably does 
not adjust through supply and demand to autom atically  
s e t  p r ic e s  today. Ihe businessman’ s idea  that competi­
t ion  s e t s  p r ice  i s  a l i t t l e  b i t  nebulous, to o .  Somebody 
must e s t a b l i s h  every p r ic e ,  s in ce  p r ic e s  do not ju st  
happen. In some markets "bid" and "ask" p r ic e s  are 
q u ite  common, and these  are f a i r l y  w e ll  e s ta b lish e d  by 
in d iv id u a ls .  Since a person e s ta b l i s h e s  a p r ic e ,  we 
must assume that h is  p r ic e s  w i l l  be in flu en ced  by h is  
own personal c h a r a c te r i s t i c s ,  by the market inform ation  
at h is  d is p o s a l ,  and by the m otivation  th a t  impels him.
In analyzing the methods by which firm s s e t  
p r ic e s ,  i t  was found that in  about 50$ o f  the ca ses  com­
m ittee  action  was used . The c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  was respon­
s ib le  fo r  e s ta b l i s h in g  p r ic e s  in  26 o f  a p o s s ib le  98 
ca ses;  the s a le s  manager was in d ica ted  a3 the price-maker  
in  12 o f  the ca se s ;  in  2 cases  the accounting department 
was g iven  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  p r ic in g .  Various other  
p rice  s e t t in g  methods were suggested  such as p r ic e s  being  
governed by governmental agencies (OPS), com petition s e t ­
t in g  p r ic e s  based upon those quoted in  the Wall S tr ee t  
Journal, and, in another ca se ,  the p r ic e  was determined by 
the a b i l i t y  o f  a vending machine to r e c e iv e  ce r ta in  c o in s .
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Tho most popular o f  the answers, that o f  commit­
tee action  given  in  47 o f  98 c a s e s ,  was f a i r l y  c o n s is te n t  
in  naming the accounting department, the s a le s  manager, 
the c h ie f  e x e c u t iv e ,  the o f f i c e  manager, and production  
department heads to the p r ice  committee. The c h ie f  ex e c ­
u t iv e  along with the s a le s  manager was named in  most 
in s ta n c e s ,  w ith  approval by the board o f  d ir e c to r s  boing  
emphasized from time to tim e. For example, one in terv iew  
revea led  that a f irm 's  committee was "composed of s a le s  
manager, c h ie f  e x e cu tiv e , and o f f i c e  manager, ffiey see  
what margin o f  p r o f i t  i s  needed and consider what the 
t r a f f i c  w i l l  bear. The s a le s  manager in d ic a te s  the mode 
o f  tho market. The o f f i c e  manager knows the c o s t  of  
production and the c h ie f  execu tive  s e t s  the o v e r a l l  p r ic e  
p o l ic y ."  I t  was found on a breakdown of the firms by 
s iz e  that committee notion was used by 11 of tho large  
f irm s, 24 of the m id d le -s ize  f irm s, and 12 o f  the small 
f ir m s .
The c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  can be expected to s e t  p r ic e s  
where committee action  I s  not u sed . In many cases  he i s  
chairman o f  the board and as such w i l l  be the p o l ic y  
making head. Of course, the c h ie f  execu tive  co n su lts  
w ith  others such as s a le s  agents, the c o s t  department, 
and the gen era l manager, Q uestionnaire returns Indicated
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t h a t  l a r g e  f i r m s  had the  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  s e t t i n g  p r i c e s  
i n  2 c a s e s ;  17 m edium -size  f i r m s  and 7 sm a l l  f i rm s  f o l ­
lowed t h i 3  p a t t e r n .
The sa le s  manager seemingly i s  very important in  
s o t t in g  p r ic e s ,  and he, l ik e  the c h ie f  e x e c u t iv e ,  u su a lly  
bases h is  acts  upon c o n su lta t io n  w ith department heads.
The sa le s  manager o f  n e c e s s i ty  would be c o n tr o lle d  some­
what by the c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  and tho board o f  d ir e c to r s ,  
but whore he i s  the resp on sib le  in d iv id u a l for  handling  
o v e r a l l  s a l e s ,  i t  i s  f e l t  that he had an almost u n lim ited  
hand. On the b a s is  o f la r g e ,  medium, and sm all f irm s,  
the returns Indicated  that in  the 12 o f  98 cases where 
the s a l e 3 manager s e t  p r ic e s ,  they ran 3-G-3.
The nature of the firm s answering e s ta b lish e d  
th at  engineers and engineering  departments in  many cases  
wore instrum ental in  h elp in g  to e s ta b l i s h  p r ic e s .  The 
production co n tro l department, time study s t a f f ,  co s t  
accountant, and published  market f ig u r e s  were a l l  l i s t e d  
as methods other than those o f  committee, c h ie f  ex e c u t iv e ,  
sa le s  manager, and accounting department which could be 
used in  firm  p r ic e - s e t t i n g .
A percentage a n a ly s is  o f  these  methods o f  p rice  
estab lishm ent shows that la r g e  firms use committee action  
in  55^ of the cases  while sm all and medium firm s fo l lo w ,
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vising i t  in  40$ and 43$ of the c a s e s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The 
c h ie f  execu tive  was not as important a3 the committee 
a ctio n , e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  the large concerns; th is  top 
o f f i c e  3et p r ic e s  in  10$, 34$, and 23$ of the cases  when 
arranged on a b a s is  o f  la r g e ,  medium, and small f irm s.
The sa le s  manager wa3 used to s e t  p r ic es  with a r e la t iv e  
co n sis ten cy  running from 10$ o f  the small firms to 15$ 
of the large f irm s. Small firm s in d ica ted  in 20$ o f  
the ca se3 th a t  some other method than a committee, the  
p res id en t ,  or the sa le s  manager wa3 used; la t e r  s t a t i s t i c s  
w i l l  prove that these firm s tend to fo l lo w  the market and 
p rice  on journal q u o ta tio n s .
Business experience rather than formal tra in in g  
in  economics, accounting, f in a n ce , or engineering  i s  the 
type o f  background needed to determine p r ic e s  in  today*3 
manufacturing economy. Many top e x e cu tiv e s  have had 
both b u sin ess  experience and some formal c o l le g e  tra in in g  
in  the f i e l d s  mentioned; however, some o f  them s e t  p r ic e s  
from business  experience on ly , Questionnaire r e s u l t s  
in d ica te  th a t  39 firm s out o f  94 answering emphasized 
that b u sin ess  experience only was the typo tra in in g  which 
ty p if ie d  th e ir  price-malcers. Approximately 44$ o f  the  
firms answering in d ica ted  th a t  both b u sin ess  experience  
and 3ome typo of formal tr a in in g  in economics, f in a n c e ,
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accounting, or engineering  were p resen t .  I t  was qu ite  
ev id ent that medium s iz e  firm s made the g r e a te s t  use of 
price-makers who had a formal education s in ce  9 of the 
11 answers f e l l  in the medium s iz e  f i e l d ;  3$ o f  the small 
and 5$ o f  the large firm s had form ally  educated p r ic e -  
makers while 18$ o f  the medium firm s had a school trained  
price-maker. Insofar as business experience only was 
concerned, o f  the 39 t o t a l  answers, 8 were for large  
concerns, 21 for  medium firm s, and 15 for sm all firm s;  
percentage d is tr ib u t io n  in th is  same s e r ie s  ran 40$, 42$, 
and 50$. The d is t r ib u t io n  of firms which in d ica ted  that  
both business experience and formal tra in in g  formed a 
b a s is  for  price-making was 50$, 40$, and 37$ on the b a s is  
of la r g e ,  medium, and sm all f irm s.
The ty p ic a l  price-maker, as in terp reted  from 
q uestion n aire  r e s u l t s ,  i s  one who b a s ic a l ly  uses h is  
b u sin ess  experience as a b a s is  fo r  p r ic in g .  He probably 
does not r e ly  e n t ir e ly  upon h is  own background and 
tr a in in g ,  however, and seeks a ss is ta n c e  from others such 
as accountants, research  and economic a n a ly s ts ,  and 
salesmen. The price-makers In sm all firm s probably de­
pend more upon th e ir  own background and b usiness  ex p er i­
ence s in ce they are not in  a p o s it io n  to rece iv e  as much 
broad market inform ation as the p r i c e - s e t t e r  in  the
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large  firm . The small firm p r ic e - s e t t c r  g en era lly  w i l l  
nob have s p e c ia l  information designed s p e c i f i c a l l y  fo r  
price-making purposes. Medium s iz e  firms seem to empha­
s iz e  education a l i t t l e  more than do the large  and small 
f irm s. Prom the q u estio n n a ire , i t  would be n oticed  that  
about 60;j of the price-makers in  these medium s iz e  firm s  
had both formal economic, f in a n ce , accounting, or e n g i­
neering tra in in g  to  go along with th e ir  b u sin ess  e x p e r i­
ence. I t  might be assumed that many o f  these medium s iz e  
firm3 w itnessed  th e ir  growth from the la t e  1930*s or 
ea r ly  1940‘s and as such are more cognizant o f  what f o r ­
mal c o l le g e  tra in in g  could do in  price-m aking. Middle 
s iz e  firm s in  many c a s e s ,  too , might be more p rogress ive  
than e i th e r  large  or small firm s, and i f  such were the 
case , they might tend to swing more to s c i e n t i f i c  prac­
t ic e  in  p r ic in g .
PACTORS IN PRICING 
The fa c to r s  involved  in  p r ic in g  are those which 
w i l l  be considered by the price-m aker3, based upon the 
tra in in g  o f  price-makers and the methods by which firm s  
s e t  p r ic e s  as described  in  the immediately preceding  
m aterial.. With th is  background i t  may be p o s s ib le  to  
a sc er ta in  reasons why the q u estion ees  would answer p r ic e  
fa c to r  questions as they do.
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Ihe p r ice-m ak ers' a t te n t io n  tends to be focused  
c h ie f ly  upon c o s t3 ,  net operating income, s a le s ,  and 
p r ic e ,  i f  tabu la ted  returns are to  bo accepted. F i f t y -  
four firm s o f  95 answering in d ica ted  that c o s t s  were o f  
most importance to  t h e ir  price-makers* The method of  
u sin g  these c o s t s  were in  many cases  tempered by such 
th ings as s a l e s ,  net operating income, and e x i s t in g  
p r ic e ;  in  some cases they were adjusted according to  
agreement w ith in  the in du stry .
The importance of committee type p r ic in g  in d ic a te s  
that the accountants and engineers have a r e la t iv e ly  im­
portant p lace  in  e s t im a tin g  and analyzing c o s t s .  In 
nearly  every case where cost3  were announced to be o f  
most importance, some typo o f  formula was found to be in  
u s e .  For example, one firm sa id  that on s p e c ia l i t y  goods 
they had a 100$ markup on co st  on a l l  item s; on stock  
merchandise they had a 33 1 /3$  markup; and on a s id e l in e  
item ( fu r n itu r e )  they had a 100$ markup on c o s t ,  l e s 3  a 
15$ d isco u n t. A f l e x i b l e  type of formula was a lso  sug­
g es te d  wherein there was no s e t  markup on the l in e  o f  
merchandise o v e r a l l  but that a var iab le  markup was 
f igu red  on standard c o s t  w ith  h igher markups in  some 
l i n e s .  This p a r t ic u la r  in terv iew ee suggested that a 
shrewd a n a ly s is  o f p r ice  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  wa3 undertaken
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and then co s t  p lus d es ired  markup was made in  the l i g h t  
of s a l e s .  This in r e a l i t y  g iv es  a very broad answer and 
shows that w hile basic  a t te n t io n  i s  p o ss ib ly  on c o s t s ,  
s a le s  and n et operating income must 3urely be con sidered .
The 54 firms in d ic a t in g  c o s ts  to  be o f  c h ie f  im­
portance to  th e ir  price-makers were broken down on the 
b a s is  o f 16 sm all f irm s, 27 medium firm s, and 11 large  
f irm s. This fu r th er  emphasizes the p o in t p rev io u sly  made 
wherein i t  was assumed that medium s iz e  firms probably 
la id  more emphasis on formal education  and b u sin ess  ex ­
perience rather than on b u sin ess  experience a lo n e .41
Net operating income wa3 the most important p r i c ­
ing item in d ica ted  by 16 o f  the firms rep ly in g ; 4 sm all,
9 medium, and 3 large firm s compose t h i s  f ig u r e .  Again 
i t  can be n o ticed  that the accounting o f f i c e  and the s a le s
^Question 7a d ea lin g  w ith  the importance of 
c o s t s  a3 a p r ice  determining fa c to r  o f  in crea s in g  or 
decreasing  importance would load one to b e l ie v e  that  
most businessmen had some fear  o f  incroasing  importance 
o f  c o s ts  in  the long run. Of 92 firm s answering the 
q u estion  of t h is  nature, 90 of them b e lie v e d  that c o s t s  
were in cr ea s in g  in importance. Comments along th is  l in e  
were such that p r ic in g  a u th o r it ie s  b e lie v ed  that they 
were in creas in g  in  importance in  the e n t ir e  f i e l d ,  th at  
they were in creasin g  over a period o f  y ea rs , and fo r  the 
e n t ir e  f i e l d  t h i s  would mean th a t  they were n e ith e r  o f  
decreasing  or in croasin g  importance. This question  w i l l  
be analyzed more f u l l y  in  the c o s t  an a lys is  s e c t io n  o f  
t h i s  chapter.
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force  probably had some impact here s ince between 13^ 
and 14yt o f the t o t a l  answers f e l l  in  th is  category* The 
n et operating income would p o ss ib ly  tend to be o f  most 
importance to f i r a s  operating near the margin.
Sa les  were o f  most importance in 10 cases w ith  
the ansv/ers on the b a s is  o f  sm all, medium, and large  
firm s f a l l i n g  1 -7 -2 .  A percentage answer on the b a s is  
o f  Importance in  each o f  these c a teg o r ie s  v/ould be 
3^-14$s-10$. Sale3 would g ive  some in d ica t io n  o f  a 
knowledge o f  demand when taken in to  con sid eration  with  
p r ic e .  Price was r e l a t i v e l y  more important than net 
operating income and s a le s  to the small firm s; 16Je o f  
the sm all firm s in d ica ted  price  to be the item o f  most 
importance. Only o f  the medium firms and Sfs o f  the  
large  firm s in d ica ted  that p r ice  was of very much im­
portance.
P lacing  s a le s  and p r ice  together should g ive an 
in d ic a t io n  o f  both demand and com petition knowledge on 
the part o f  the businessman. Businessmen seemingly know 
l i t t l e  o f  the marginal concept so fa r  as th e ir  revenue 
i s  concerned. They are aware o f  demand, to  be sure, but 
they are u ncerta in  as to what e l a s t i c i t y  means. An anal­
y s i s  o f q u estion s  2a and 2b d ea lin g  with com petitive  
p o s i t io n  and fea r  o f  com petition  in d ic a te s  that businessmen
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are u ncerta in  as to  how many com petitors they might have 
and how tho demand for  th e ir  product might be s p l i t  up. 
S ix ty -sev en  per cent o f  the firms in d icated  that they 
Y/ere very com p etit ive , 30$ in d ica ted  about average com­
p e t i t i o n ,  and 3$ in d ica ted  very l i t t l e  com petition . 3y 
c o n tr a s t ,  o f  97 ansv/ers on fea r  o f  com p etition , 29 firms  
had very much f e a r ,  45 in d ica ted  not very much fe a r , and 
23 in d ica ted  th a t  they were not at a l l  a fra id  o f  compe­
t i t i o n .  To g iv e  a very unusual a n a ly s is  i t  might be 
n o tic ed  that 85$ o f  the large  firm s in d ica ted  that they 
v/ere very com petitive and y e t  50$ o f  them sa id  that they  
h eld  no fea r  o f  com p etition . .Approximately 95$ of both  
the sm all and medium firm s Indicated  that they were "very 
com petitive" to "about average" in  co m p etit iv en ess , and 
they answered that they were "very fea r fu l"  to  "not very  
much afraid" o f  com petition  in  from 70$ to 85$ of tho 
c a s e s .
Question 2c d ea lin g  w ith  b e l i e f  in  c o l lu s io n  in  
p r ic in g  by a fev/ b ig  s e l l e r s  g iv e s  another in d ic a t io n  o f  
the com petitive  nature o f  b u s in e ss .  S ix t y - f iv e  per cent  
o f  the large  firm s sa id  th at  t h i s  was a b so lu te ly  f a l s e ,  
w hile  30$ sa id  i t  was p o s s ib ly  true; 65$ o f  the medium 
s iz e  firm s thought i t  was f a l s e ,  while 30$ in d ica ted  
that i t  was p o s s ib ly  tru e , and 6$ thought that i t  was
128
d e f in i t e ly  true* Small firm s were not quite  30 sure th a t  
thoro wa3 a lack  of c o l lu s io n  in p r ic in g  since only 33£> 
b e liev ed  that there wr»3 no c o l lu s io n ;  Z6% in d ica ted  that  
there p o ss ib ly  wan c o l lu s io n  and lo;'j in d icated  that there  
d e f i n i t e l y  was c o l i t is  ion ,  ̂
The three queationn analyzed above would in d ica te  
that large firm s were the most com p etit ive , that they 
feared  th is  com petition tho l e a s t ,  end that they b e lie v ed  
that there was no c o l lu s io n  in  p r ic in g .  Medium s iz e  
firms were about average to com p etitive; they  had a mod­
era te  fea r  o f  com petition , and they thought i t  might pos­
s ib ly  be tru e , but probably was n o t ,  that c o l lu s io n  in  
p r ic in g  wa3 p ra ct iced  by a few b ig  s e l l e r s .  Small firms 
were about a3 com petitive  as medium s iz e  firm s, and th e ir  
foar o f  com petition  was about the same as th e ir  medium­
s ized  coh orts , w hile  in  most cases they b e liev ed  that i t  
was tru e , or p o ss ib ly  tru e, that c o l lu s io n  in  p r ic in g  
was p ra ct iced  by the b igger s e l l e r s .
The importance o f  p r ic e  in  marketing s tra teg y  
must be considered  while analysing the price-m akers’ 
knowledge o f  com petition  and demand. There was only one
$Where percentages run l e s s  than 100 in  the 
cases  throughout t h i s  chapter, i t  i s  because firm s  
f a i l e d  to  answer s p e c i f i c  q u e s t io n s .
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fa c to r  b e liev ed  to  be more important than p r ic e  in  mar­
k etin g  s tra teg y  by a l l  firm s and th at  was q u a l i ty .  
Another unusual r e s u l t  obtained along t h i s  l in e  was the 
f a c t  th a t  large  firms answered both q u a l i ty ,  s e r v ic e ,  
and p rice  as being o f  r e l a t i v e l y  equal importance in  
t h i s  c a s e .  Of 113 answers g iven  by 100 q u e s t io n e e s ,  70 
in d ica ted  that q u a li ty  was more important than p r ic e ,
11 in d ica ted  th a t  s e r v ic e ,  and 11 in d ica ted  th a t  s t y le  
were more important. Twenty firm s in d ica ted  th a t  no 
fa c to r  was more important. Percentages in  th is  a n a ly s is  
are rath er  warped since the large  firm s gave almost 50$ 
too many answers. I t  was unusual th a t  small and medium 
firm s p a r a l le le d  in  nearly  every c a se ,  being never more 
than 4$ apart on any answer. They b e lie v e d  th a t  q u a li ty  
was the most important fa c to r  in  66$ of the ca ses  while  
s t y le  was Important in  about 9$ of the cases;  both b e­
l i e v e  th a t  serv ic e  was a more important fa c to r  in  6$ o f  
the c a s e s .  Price was the most important fa c to r  fo r  16$ 
o f  the sm all f irm s and 20$ o f  the medium s iz e  f ir m s .
The la rg e  firms in d ica ted  th a t  q u a li ty  was o f  more im­
portance than p r ic e  in 50$ o f  the ca se s  w hile se rv ic e  
and s t y le  were more important in  20$ and 12$ r e s p e c t iv e ­
l y .  P rice  was assumed to  be o f  most importance in  16$
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of the c a s e s .6 On t h i s  b a s i s ,  large firm s would tend  
to  p lay down q u a lity  and emphasize s t y le  a l i t t l e  more 
while p la c in g  much greater  emphasis on se r v ic e  when com­
pared w ith  small and medium f ir m s . This i s  one good 
check of common knowledge when everyday ob servations  
in d ica te  th a t  large  firms do ca ter  to  s t y le  and se rv ice  
while a llow ing q u a l i ty  p o ss ib ly  to  s l i p  because o f  mass 
production tech n iq u es .
An a n a ly s is  o f  q u a l i ty ,  s t y l e ,  beauty, and price  
a l l  in d ic a te  th a t  the businessman i s  aw are o f  demand.
His knowledge of i t s  importance cannot be denied; how­
ever, i t  i s  doubtfu l i f  he i s  aware o f  what the economist 
thinks o f  when con sid er in g  demand. The matter o f  e l a s ­
t i c i t y  and com petition  lead3 businessmen to think o f  
th e ir  b u s in e ss  as being  m onopolist ic  a l ly  co m p etit iv e .
The concept o f  a s lo p in g  demand curve, however, i s  more
60ne important v a r ia t io n  between questionnaire  
answers and those rece iv ed  from the 7 in terv iew ees  in ­
cluded in  the s t a t i s t i c a l  c a lc u la t io n s  i s  th a t ,  o f  tho
7 in te rv ie w ees , 4 in d ica ted  that p r ice  was of most im­
portance in t h e ir  o v e r a l l  p r ic in g  s tra te g y  w hile  q u a li ty  
ranked in  three c a s e s .  One o f  those cases Indicated  
that s p e c i f i c a t io n s  had to be met on some o f  t h e ir  pro­
ducts; t h i s  would assume a q u a lity  answer, Thi3 might 
lead  one to accept the f a c t  that d i f f e r e n t  answers 
could have been rece ived  had 100 in terv iew s been used 
rath er  than 7 in terv iew s and 95 q u e s t io n n a ir e s .
or l e s s  unknown. Businessmen o f  n e c e s s i ty  must know 
demand, but th e ir  a b i l i t y  to erec t  a schedule o f  quanti­
t i e s  at' various p r ic e s  i s  almost im p o ss ib le . The a b i l i t y  
to s h i f t  and adjust p r ic e s  i s  almost beyond th e ir  imagi­
nation except as a d iscount might be involved  in  compet­
ing for one p a r t ic u la r  con tract or s a l e .  The matter of  
f ig u r in g  demand w i l l  hinge upon salesmen, e x p ec ta t io n s ,  
weather c a lc u la t io n s ,  econ om ists1 e s t im a te s ,  and sev era l  
other f a c t o r s .  To move a p r ic e ,  however, and have a 
whole s e r ie s  o f  p r ic e s  e i th e r  in  one day, one week, or 
even one y ea r , or p o s s ib ly  over 5 or 10 years i s  beyond 
the realm of  comprehension for  the average businessman. 
They are aware th a t  they must know demand, but as to  what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  a thorough knowledge o f  demand they are un­
c e r ta in .  To them demand i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  s a le s  at a given  
p r ic e ,  and the in crea ses  and decreases in  demand are o f  
more importance than the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand fo r  th e ir  
p a r t ic u la r  product,
Kost businessmen through th e ir  fear o f  price  
com petition  of a cu tth roat nature probably hope to  impart 
the id ea  to  com petitors th at the o v e r a l l  demand fo r  each  
one o f  them w i l l  be h ig h ly  i n e l a s t i c .  This cond ition  
comes about because they are unable to  adjust p r ic e s  con­
s ta n t ly  upward and downward so as to choose a p r ice  that
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w i l l  g ive  immediate b est  re tu rn s , price  in crea ses  and 
decreases up to might have very l i t t l e  e f f e c t  upon 
3 a le s ;  however, from 5f3 to  1 0 v a r ia t io n s  in  p r ice  might 
lead  to  lon g  run adjustments wherein 3a les  would d e f i ­
n i t e l y  be a f fe c te d .  The businessman has to  consider the 
knowledge o f  h i s  buyers, and most manufacturers are 
f a i r l y  sure th at  th e ir  buyers w i l l  have a r e la t iv e ly  
good knowledge o f  the market. I t  must be remembered 
that the impact of a sm all price  d eclino  might not be 
e f f e c t e d  immediately s in ce  other producers might fo l lo w .  
A3 a r e s u l t ,  the firm i n i t i a t i n g  the lower p r ice  might 
end with the same share o f  the.market but w ith  a lower 
p r ic e  which would tend to  cut h is  p r o f i t .  An increase  
in  p r ice  might lead  to  an almost immediate reduction  in  
s a le s ;  and i f  tho com petitors held  to  th e ir  o r ig in a l  
p r ic e ,  which would be lower than the i n i t i a t i n g  f irm 's  
p r ic e ,  then the o r ig in a l  firm would tend to  su ffe r  a 
l o s s • This i s  the exp lanation  g iven  fo r  the kinked 
demand curve when m onopolist ic  com petition  and o lig o p o ly  
are d isc u sse d . H all and Hitch in  th e ir  a r t i c l e ,  "Price 
Theory and Business Behavior," which was p rin ted  in  the  
Oxford Bconomic Papers, g ive  a good exp lanation  (based 
on an em pirica l a n a ly s is )  of the kinked demand curve 
which w i l l  fa ce  most manufacturers in  today's  markets.
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The businessman, s in ce  he i s  probably unaware o f  
the exact nature o f  h i s  own demand curve, i3  not respon­
s iv e  to  a d isc u ss io n  o f  a kinked demand curve. He is  
in te r e s te d  in  s a l e s ,  and u su a lly  these  s a le s  come over a 
cata logue period which might be 6 months or a year in  
le n g th .  I f  t h i s  i s  the c a se ,  he i s  not in te r e s te d  in  
short-run demand a n a ly s is  but more in  what occurs in  h is  
production p er iod . This concern, o f  course, w i l l  lead  
to  study before p r ice  changes are made and these s tu d ie s  
probably w i l l  take in to  co n s id er a tio n  many non-price  
fa c to r s  as w e ll  as the p r ice  fa c to r  I t s e l f ,
Demand f lu c tu a t io n s  do a f f e c t  many manufacturers, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  c a p i t a l  goods producers, because they have 
a derived  demand, and when the demand fo r  consumer goods 
f a l l s  i t  tends to r e f l e c t  in  a m agnified  manner upon 
c a p i t a l  goods* The more or l e s s  d r a s t ic  demand f lu c tu a ­
t io n s  o f  th is  nature are probably b e t te r  known to the 
businessman than i s  the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  h is  demand.
I t  13 probable that many b u sin ess  firm s do run 
3ome simple type o f  t e s t  o f  e l a s t i c i t y  and th at  they are 
aware o f  grea ter  or l e s s  s a le s  w ith  p r ice  changes in  
immediate and long-run p e r io d s .  Most businessmen seem 
to b e l ie v e  th a t  p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  i3  b e s t ,  however, to  
examination o f  q u estion  4c dea lin g  w ith  p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y
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and of F late 11 (page 229) in d ic a te s  that over 65^ of  
sm all firms consider p rice  s t a b i l i t y  to  be good; 82% of 
the middle s iz e  firms and 60% o f the large firms con­
s id e r  th is  s t a b i l i t y  to  be b e s t .  The m atter of a b e l i e f  
in p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  being b es t  i s  probably an in d ica t io n  
that businessmen are s l i g h t l y  afraid  of th e ir  lack o f  
knowledge o f  immediate demand concepts.
C h a r a c ter is t ic  o f  the market in  American industry  
sin ce  World War I I  has been the constant seeking of new 
and b e t te r  products. This t in ge  of d i f f e r e n t ia te d  pro­
ducts and keener com petition  has led  many manufacturers 
in to  an aggressiveness  which was. not found in  our e a r l ie r  
p r ic in g .  The matter of s t y le  and design  to f i t  consumer 
needs c r ea te s  much a tte n t io n  today among manufacturers. 
This lead s  t o  more a tte n t io n  and a keener assessment of 
demand. With com petition as keen as in d ica ted  by ques­
t io n  2a and P late 2 (page 220), i t  i s  only natural that  
businessmen w i l l  g iv e  more and greater a tten tio n  to demand 
in  the fu tu r e .  Market research  and a n a ly s is  along the 
l in e  of demand w i l l  probably become more important than 
they are now.
The impact of a lack  of knowledge of demand among 
businessmen i s  gain ing  much a tte n t io n  even down to the 
small b u s in e s s .  The matter of r iv a l  products cr e a te s
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much I n t e r e s t .  While most manufacturers make note o f  and 
seek information about r iv a l  producers’ products, they  
seemingly know very l i t t l e  o f  the e f f e c t  which a r i v a l  
product w i l l  have upon th e ir  own s a l e s .  One manufacturer 
in terview ed  s ta te d  that he takes r iv a l  products as a 
tra d e-in  and junks them. He hopes to hold  h is  market 
with a b e t to r  machine and superior se rv ic e  in  the fu tu r e .  
Another manufacturer s ta te d  th a t  com petition  sometimes 
hurt fo r  a few years bub that i t  soon died out because 
he was aware of what h is  r i v a l s  were d o ing . Another 
sta te d  th a t  he feared  com petition  and i t s  impact upon 
h i3  demand 15 years ago, but th a t  there was not much fear  
at th is  tim e. He intim ated that he had b u i l t  up customers 
and a l i n e  o f  good3 which was almost com petition  fr e e  and 
he assumed the demand to  be r e l a t i v e l y  co n sta n t . This 
type of answer in d ic a te s  th a t  these  in d iv id u a ls  hope to  
capture a market from com petitors and then they assume 
that they w i l l  crea te  replacement demand in  the long run.
Demand co n d it io n s  are important to those who s e l l  
in  im perfect markets. Since I t  i s  sa fe  to conclude that  
most manufacturers d eal in  an Imperfect market, b u s in e s s ­
men must c a lc u la te  the o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  of changes in  o u t­
put upon p r ic e s  and revenue. Most manufacturers appre­
c ia t e  that p r ic e c u t t in g  might bring  r e p r i s a l s ,  and u n le s s
1 3 6
the demand fo r  the product which they 3 e l l  i s  great enough 
o v e r a l l ,  and i s  l i k e l y  to in c r e a se ,  they w i l l  r e a l i z e  no 
appreciable n e t  ga in . The time taken fo r  buyers to r e ­
spond to p r ice  changes and the market adjustments n eces­
sary in  the long riui lead  to many u n c e r ta in t ie s  as to  
e l a s t i c i t y  of demand. This lead3 businessmen to want a 
s ta b le  p r ic e .  The very nature o f  p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  and 
catalogue p r ic in g  over production periods almost pre­
cludes the econom ist’s concept of measurements o f  demand 
e l a s t i c i t y  as o f  one tim e.
While the businessman i s  probably a l i t t l e  hazy 
as to marginal concepts about h is  revenue and about the 
o v e r a l l  average revenue which ho can expect from changing 
p r ic e s  and judging s a le s  in  the short run, i t  i s  found 
that most o f  them assume th a t  they know what the demand 
for  t h e ir  p a r t ic u la r  products w i l l  bo . Several b u s in e ss ­
men were asked i f  as price-makers they attempted to  
minimize in s e c u r ity  even at a s a c r i f i c e  o f  p r o f i t ,  because 
they were aware that they knew l i t t l e  about the con d ition s  
o f  demand at any g iven  tim e. In some ca ses  they answered 
with a f l a t  no. In mo3t ca ses  they answered that they 
knew the co n d it io n  o f  demand or that th e ir  agents worried  
about demand. Most o f  them f e l t  that they were in  touch  
with demand and th a t  they knew enough to go ahead and
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“gamble and take what he th in k s i s  r ig h t ."  Most of them 
assumed that thoy could judge very w e ll  th e ir  s a le s  in  
c e r ta in  l i n e s  on the b a s is  o f  pa3t experience; in  con­
ta c t s  which they had with the market they wore able to 
know approximately I f  p r ic e s  should be pushed up or down 
and.v/hat the demand would be in  e i th e r  ca se . One manu­
fa c tu rer  s ta te d  that demand Y/as no problem, that h is  r e a l  
problem was in  g e t t in g  h i s  product produced. This would 
be a c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  a producer in  an expanding market 
and in a growing economy. Other producers might not be 
quite  as fortun ate  and might have to  v/orry about p r ic in g  
fo r  s a le s  volume.
There are d ou b tless  other fa c to r s  which en ter  
in to  p r ic in g  beyond those of c o s t ,  n et op erating  income, 
p r ic e ,  s a l e s ,  demand, and com petition; however, thoy are 
u s u a l ly  r e f l e c t io n s  o f  these  broad c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .  For 
example, in v en to r ie s  at times w i l l  in flu en ce  p r ic in g ,  
and th is  can bo d iscu ssed  more e a s i l y  under p r ice  p o l i c y .  
U n f i l le d  orders, tho c lim ate o f  opinion  in  the market 
p la c e ,  formula p r ic in g ,  and other concepts are probably  
used in  a l im ite d  number o f  c a s e s .  As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  
where c o s t s  are o f  most importance as a fa c to r  in  p r ic ­
in g , businessmen u su a l ly  work upon some system o f  overhead 
markups to d er ive  a p r ic e .  The many fa c to r s  such as
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consumer v a r ia t io n s  in d e s ir e ,  u t i l i t y ,  h a b it ,  and 
fr ie n d sh ip ,  along with numerous other e x i s t in g  r e la t io n ­
sh ip s ,  in  many cases can have a greater in flu en ce  on 
p r ic in g  than does the impact o f  p r ic e ,  c o s t ,  net income, 
or severa l o f the other fa c to r s  analyzed. Tho manufac­
turers who consider these elements u su a l ly  have some 
inborn or acquired technique which they use as a p r ic in g  
fa c to r  th a t  can be used above those e a r l i e r  mentioned 
and which w i l l  be supplemented by them rather than being  
U3ed to supplement them.
PRICE POLICY 
Price p o l i c i e s  are general market s t r a t e g ie s  
whereby p r ic e s  are used in  some predetermined manner to  
a t ta in  s e t  g o a ls  pursued by a firm . These p o l i c i e s  are 
u s u a l ly  adapted for  the l i f e  o f  the firm; however, they  
might be s h i f t e d  tem porarily because of general economic 
con d ition s  or because o f  some s p e c i f i c  economic con d i­
t io n  which fa c e s  the in d iv id u a l f irm . As a general r u le ,  
however, the s t r a t e g ie s  that are to  be used w i l l  be 
adhered to  throughout the ex is te n c e  of a p a r t ic u la r  
f irm . S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  firm s can adopt any one o f  a number 
o f  s t r a t e g ie s  or a combination o f  sev era l d i f f e r e n t  
s t r a t e g ie s  to  make t h e ir  one p a r t ic u la r  goa l a v a i la b le .
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For example, a firm might adopt a 3ystem of maximizing 
p r o f i t s  fo r  a whole product l i n o .  Again, they may seek 
a large  volume o f  s a le s  at a r e la t iv e ly  low p r ic e .  They 
may adopt a p r ice  which i s  below that charged by most 
other competing f ir m s . S t i l l  again, they might adopt a 
high q u a l i ty  and h igh  price  combination in  order to  
serve a p a r t ic u la r  type o f  market. They can charge tho 
same p r ic e s  charged by other producers and hold f a i r l y  
w ell  to  a given and, perhaps, s t a t i c  marketing s tr a te g y .  
I f  the occasion  re q u ires ,  they can adopt a number of  
those types of marketing s i t u a t io n s .
Firms answering the q uestionn aire  on a d ir e c t  
q u e stio n , "What i s  your p r ic in g  policy?"  answered in 
about 50$ of the cases  th a t  th e ir  b a s ic  p o l ic y  was to 
promote the long-run w elfare  of the firm . In 35 of 110 
answers g iven , the answer was to adapt price  to  f i t  the 
in d iv id u a l com petitive  s i t u a t io n .  In 16 cases  f l e x i b l e  
p r ic e s  to meot changes in  economic con d ition s  were 
named, and in  10 cases  a s e t  and system atic  method o f  
p r ic in g  new products was g iven  as the answer fo r  p r ic in g  
p o l i c i e s .  The answers showed th a t  60$ o f  the large  
firm s attempted to  promote the long-run w elfare  o f  the 
f irm . This compared w ith  30$ and 50$ r e s p e c t iv e ly  fo r  
sm all and medium s iz e  firms* Again i t  w i l l  be noted
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that using' a p r ice  to f i t  the in d iv id u a l com petitive  
s i tu a t io n  was givon in  about 3C$, 35^, and 40^ o f  the  
cases  for sm all,  modium, and large  producers# The mid­
d le s iz e  firm s were f a i r l y  strong (roughly 20£ of the 
c a s e s )  in  answering that a f l e x i b l e  p rice  to  meet changes 
in  economic con d ition s  was th e ir  b asic  method of s e t t in g  
p r ic e s .
Eie 7 in terv iew s which were usod to supplement 
th is  study probably g ive  a b e t te r  o v e r a l l  p ic tu re  o f  
what was meant when firm s answered as they did on p r ic ­
ing p o l i c i e s .  For example, in  most c a s e s ,  while answer­
ing that they attempted to promote tho long-run w elfare  
o f  the firm , they assumed th a t  th is  meant su rv iv a l o f  
th e ir  f irm . When g iven  a question  dea lin g  with p r ic in g  
o b je c t iv e s ,  su rv iv a l was given  as the d e f in i t e  p r ic in g  
o b je c t iv e  in  a l l  but one o f  the 7 c a s e s .  In the other  
case the answer was to  keep key men on the p a y r o l l .
Both o f  these answers would tend to p o in t  up long-run  
w elfare  o f  the firm . Hov/ever, one of the firm s that  
answered th a t  su r v iv a l  was a p r ic in g  o b je c t iv e  gave a3 
the p r ic in g  p o lic y  the maximization o f  p r o f i t s  fo r  the 
whole product l in e  above that o f  promoting long-run w el­
f a r e .  This same firm  in d ica ted  that i t  never attempted 
to  discourage com petition , and th at  i f  com petition  did
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en ter  bhat I t  would prico to f i t  the in d iv id u a l competi­
t iv e  s i t u a t io n  encountered by d i f f e r e n t  products.
Most answers to the questionnaire  aid to  the 
in terv iew s in d ica ted  that the businessmen, in g e t t in g  a 
s tr a ig h t  question  about p r ice  p o l ic y ,  had to consider  
what they intended to do. The q uestionn aire  answers 
d o u b tle ss ly  gave them some id ea  as to what should be 
expected from a p r ic in g  p o l ic y ,  and they used these  
Insofar as they would f i t  th e ir  p a r t ic u la r  f irm s. In 
no case wa3 any p r ic in g  p o l ic y  l i s t e d  other than those 
suggestod In the q u e stio n n a ire .
The matter o f  p r ic in g  p o l ic y  and p r ic in g  ob jec­
t iv e s  i s  perhaps f lavored  somewhat by the date at which 
the q u estionn a ire  and in terv iew s were made. The general  
economic p ic tu re  wa3 very b r igh t and most businessmen 
were look ing  fo r  growth in  th e ir  p a r t ic u la r  l in o ;  th is  
probably p laced  the matter o f  long-run w elfare and sur­
v iv a l  p r e t ty  w e l l  in  th e ir  mind. The f a c t ,  too , that  
many of the concerns answering were m id d le -3 lzed -to -3 m a ll ,  
In th e ir  own es t im a tio n , would show that the company 
e i th e r  had to decide whether i t  wanted to continue to 
grow or m aintain th e ir  presen t s iz e  and turn away some 
b u s in e s s .  Without a doubt p r ic in g  o b je c t iv e s  are b a s i ­
c a l ly  designed to make money fo r  the firm; however, the
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a b i l i t y  to  hold a share o f  the market and to  meet e x i s t ­
ing com petition probably le a v es  an in d e l ib le  mark upon 
the mind of-m ost business p r ic in g  e x e c u t iv e s .
The questionnaire  r e s u l t s  on p r ic in g  p o l ic y  are 
somewhat l im ited  because o f  the nature o f  keeping ques­
t io n n a ir es  r e la t iv e ly  l im ite d  in le n g th .  When d isc u ss in g  
p rice  p o l ic y  in  in terv iew s, however, the w riter  found 
that businessmen, once they adjust to  p r ice  p o l ic y  id ea s ,  
u su a lly  are w i l l in g  to  vo lu nteer  why they might maintain  
th e ir  e x i s t in g  p o l i c y .  An o v e r a l l  look at the 7 in te r ­
views might be worth w h ile .  In 6 o f  the 7 c a se s ,  s e l f -  
p reserv a tio n  was g iven  as the reason fo r  m aintaining  
price  p o l ic y ;  in  the 7th c a se ,  the answer was that i t  was 
a trade p r a c t ic e  to  hold  the l in e  fo r  a season and in  
that p a r t ic u la r  b u sin ess  the year was 9 months, as they 
did not s e l l  much in  July, August, and September. F o l­
lowing t h i s  b asic  reason fo r  m aintaining p rice  p o l ic y ,  
the o v e r a l l  answer was that in  most ca ses  com petition  
tended to  keep the p r ic e  from going up and th at th e ir  
buyers were f a i r l y  w e l l  informed. Price changes would 
also  create  a nuisance to agents and salesmen and i f  
th e ir  p r ic e s  were to go up i t  would lead  to lo s s  o f  
orders. They in tim ated , to o , that s e l l i n g  below c o s t  
did not pay because i t  was a good way to create  enemies
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and lo s e  fr ien d s  in  most c a s e s .  I t  was g en era lly  agreed 
that they needed to protoct the margins o f  th e ir  r e t a i l e r s  
and that thi3 had some s l i g h t  e f f e c t  upon m aintaining  
p rice  p o l ic y .  A lso , i t  was f e l t  th a t  the maintenance o f  
a p r ice  p o l ic y  might discourage other e n tr ie s  in to  the 
market. B a s ic a l ly  they b e l ie v e d  that p r ic e c u t t in g  compe­
t i t i o n  should be avoided s in ce  in  most cases  i t  would 
only cr ea te  trouble  in  the long run.
Remembering the impact that co s t  of production  
had upon the price-m aker, and that the long-run w elfare
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of the firm  and p r ic e s  to f i t  in d iv id u a l com petitive  
s i tu a t io n s  were s a l i e n t  fe a tu r e s  o f  p r ic in g  p o l ic y ,  i t  
would only be n atu ra l th a t  p r ice  p o l ic y  would be based 
on com petitive  con d ition s  and c o s t  a n a ly s is .  This 
proved true in 56 answers out o f  117 given on the 100 
questionnaire  returns and in te rv ie w s .  In 41 o f  the 117 
cases  a "reasonable return" was g iven  as the base for  
p r ic e  p o l ic y ;  "cost analysis"  le d  "contract" by 16 to  4 .
Of the 56 firm s in d ic a t in g  that com petitive con d ition s  
and c o s t  a n a ly s is  were most important, i t  was found that  
roughly 63$ of the small firm s and between 50$ and 55$ 
of the medium and large  firm s b e lie v e d  in  t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  
type o f  b ase . Further, i t  was noted that on the b a s is  
o f  "reasonable return ,"  the firm s answered from 25$ to
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50^ dependent upon small s iz e  to large s i z e .  These 
f ig u r e s  ran roughly 25^-45^-50^ on the b a s is  o f sm all,  
medium, and large f irm s . In the matter o f  co s t  a n a ly s is  
alone, the answers were about the same, running roughly  
15^ in  a l l  three ca c o s . The small and medium s iz e  firm s  
in d ica ted  that in  a few cases  contract p r ic in g  was th e ir  
b a se . Large firms o v e r a l l  were most in te r e s te d  in  com­
p e t i t i v e  con d ition s and co s t  a n a ly s is  and a reasonable  
re turn.
The m atter o f  trade a sso c ia t io n s  has to be con­
sidered  In many l i n e s  and p a r t ic u la r ly  in  l in e s  wherein 
middle s iz e  firm s are important. The trade a sso c ia t io n  
probably shoots at a reasonable return , allowing the 
individual, firm s to  do 3omo con tract and agreement p r ic ­
ing in  s p e c ia l  c a s e s .  One firm  in d ica ted  that i t  used  
a p r ic in g  formula as a base fo r  i t s  p r ic e  p o l ic y  and 
th is  formula was quoted th is  way: "Labor and m a ter ia l
c o s ts  p lus 150% overhead p lus 25% gross p r o f i t ."  This 
p a r t ic u la r  firm Indicated  too th a t  i t  used th is  formula 
and did  not bother to  p r ice  on a p r ice  leader; however,
I t  was in fluenced  by I t s  trade a s so c ia t io n  to base p r i ­
marily on a reasonable re tu rn . Ihe m atter of c o s t  anal­
y s i s  was in d ica ted  to be a " f u l l  cost" ju s t  as the formula  
above would in d ic a te  a f u l l  c o s t;  " f u l l  cost" and "average" 
cost" connote about the same to  a businessman.
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I t  i s  In te r e s t in g  to  note that one o f  the firm s  
commented, when answering the question  d ea lin g  w ith  the 
b a s is  fo r  i t 3  p r ice  p o l ic y ,  that i t  p r iced  on the b a s is  
o f  the p r ice  which customers wanted and were w i l l i n g  to  
pay. This i s  probably in  the back o f  every price-m aker»s 
mind; however, they might p o ss ib ly  look at the p r ic e  the 
buyer i s  w i l l in g  to pay in  a l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t  l i g h t  from 
that which the buyer has in  h i s  mind.
In the matter o f  a l te r in g  a p r ic e  because o f  a 
depression  I t  was found th a t  the firm s were f a i r l y  con­
s i s t e n t  in  saying that they would not a lto r  th e ir  p r ic o 3 . 
An answer o f  ’’no" was g iven  in  60 ca3e3 with 35 firms  
in d ic a t in g  that they would a lte r  th e ir  p r ice  p o l ic y  in  
a d ep ression . Five f irm s, 2 o f  the middle s iz e  and 3 
la r g e ,  d id  not answer t h i s  q u estion . Of the 60 firms 
answering no, i t  was found that 73fS of the small firms  
in d ica ted  that they would not change th e ir  p o l ic y  while  
52fo o f  the middle s iz e  firm s fo llow ed  s u i t  and over 65f0 
of the large  firms in d ica ted  t h is  answer. Thi3 le a d 3 one 
to b e l ie v e  th a t  middle s i z e  firms might be a l i t t l e  more 
com petitive than e i th e r  sm all or large  firms s in ce  they  
tend to b e l ie v e  in  lowering th e ir  p r ic e  more r e a d i ly  
because o f  lowered co s t  and lowered demand c o n d it io n s .
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She matter of changing p o l ic y ,  o f  course, ran 
more or lo s s  the opposite  of the percentages l i s t e d  in  
the paragraph above. For example, 0 small f irm s, 22 
middle s iz e  f irm s, and 5 large  firm s in d ica ted  that they 
would d e f in i t e ly  change th e ir  p r ic e  p o l ic y .  The comments 
fo l lo w in g  t h i s  question  were q u ite  numerous and v a r ied .  
For example, one firm in d ica ted  th a t  i t s  p r ice  wa3 based  
prim arily  on operating and merchandise cost3  and that a 
depression  would bring p rice  down a l l  along the l i n e .
In most c a se s ,  because o f  the downward trend in  o v e r a l l  
c o s t s ,  i t  was f e l t  th a t  the p r ic e  change would be down­
ward and th a t  th e ir  b a s ic  p o l ic y  might be to swing to a 
l i t t l e  c lo s e r  margin. The m atter o f  a p r ic e  a lte r a t io n  
to increase the volume to avoid having unused capacity  
would bo almost compulsory in  some l i n e s .  One firm  
in d ica ted  th a t  a net return th a t  would permit continued  
employment o f  personnel and op erations would be n ecessary  
and t h i s  would probably lead  to a b as ic  p r ic e  p o l ic y  
change. The m atter of com petition  brought on by others  
lowering p r ic e  was f e l t  to  be a compulsory action  toward 
b a sic  changes along t h i s  l i n e .
Reviewing the f a c t s  b r i e f l y ,  one find 3  that  
firm s g e n er a lly  base th e ir  p o l i c i e s  upon com petitive  
c o n d it io n s ,  c o s t  a n a ly s is ,  and a reasonable return; and
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in  about tw o-th irds o f  the c a s e s ,  they w i l l  not a l t e r  
th e ir  b a s ic  p o l ic y  in  a d ep ression . In the l i g h t  o f  
these co n d it io n s  i t  i s  probably worth while to  examine 
what the in terv iew ed  firm s b e lie v ed  about p r o f i t  stand­
ards fo r  p a r t ic u la r  products and the p o s it io n  o f  the 
balance sheet in p r ic in g .  Interview ees were asked i f  
they had a p r o f i t  standard by which products had to  be 
measured. * I t  was noted that In only 2 o f  5 cases  was 
the answer y e s .  In 5 o f  these  cases  i t  was in d ica ted  
that the products did not have to  meet any p a r t ic u la r  
p r o f i t  standard, such as, a t o t a l  d o l la r  Income over  
the l i f e  o f  the product minus the t o t a l  expenditure for  
the product. Further, in  answer to a question  dea lin g  
with the balance sh ee t  p o s i t io n  and i t s  importance in  
r e la t io n s h ip  to  the p r ic in g  p o l ic y ,  i t  was found in  
n early  every case th a t  the balance sheet probably did  
not have any e f f e c t .  Ihere was a c lea r  in d ica t io n  that  
there was not any p a r t ic u la r  d es ired  quantity  o f  a l l  the 
various items in  the balance sh ee t;  n e ith e r  were there  
any d isturbances in  the stru cture  that would tend to  se t  
in  motion fo r c e s  th a t  would be hoped to re s to re  any 
d iseq u ilib r iu m  in  the s ta tu s-q u o .
Price p o l ic y ,  i t s  base, and the reasons for  
hold ing  to I t ,  le d  many o f  the in terv iew ees  to  be rather
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t a lk a t iv e .  Notes taken during in terv iew s in d ic a te  that  
many of them mentioned that most o f  th e ir  goods were 
'•bread and b u tter  goods” and that they seldom bothered  
with what would be considered l in e  com pleters. Because 
of the bread and b u tter  nature o f  the goods, t h i s  prob­
ably meant that they would attempt to hold on to any 
b a sic  p r ice  p o l ic y  that they might have. The matter o f  
low p r o f i t  le a d e r s ,  however, caused sev era l o f  them to  
in d ica te  that they might reduce th e ir  p r ice  from 8$ to 
10$ so that i t  might look good on the p r ice  l i s t .  Where 
they had se v e ra l  competing goods, the manufacturers 
in d ica ted  that they might use one or two for  a low
p r o f i t  lea d e r . In the matter of p r ice  p o l ic y ,  too , I t
was found that some o f  them had a p o l ic y  for  s e l l i n g  
old products. In no case did they in d ica te  that  they 
would make a t i e - i n  sa le  apply in  these c a s e s .  In some 
cases where custom work was done, there were no d i s ­
counts allowed u n less  i t  might bo to  appease a d i s ­
p leased  customer. Manufacturers Ind icated  that with  
scrap and old products they e i th e r  disposed o f  them a3 
junk or so ld  them In bulk so as to  move them In a hurry; 
th is  l a t t e r  case was more or le s3  a giveaway p r ic e .
Because o f  the bread and b u tter  nature of th e ir
goods, most o f  the Interviewed firm s in d ica ted  that they
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did not use sp ec u la t iv e  new commodities. Of in t e r e s t  
along t h i s  l i n e ,  however, v/as the Tact that one o f  the 
firm3 in d ica ted  that a l l  o f  i t s  new commodities were 
sp ec u la t iv e  3ince the firm did  not know how farmers might 
react  to any innovation . In con sid er in g  product addi­
t io n s ,  the p o l ic y  was determined g en er a lly  by the sa le s  
s t a f f ,  w ith  two o f  the firm s in d ic a t in g  that customers 
entered in to  th is  p ic tu re  along with the s a le s  s t a f f ,  
flie matter o f  research  v/as given  secondary importance 
behind the s a le s  s t a f f  by one firm . 3efore adding new 
products, most o f  the firm s in d ica ted  that they would 
make use o f  the company's know how before in crea s in g  
th e ir  e x i s t in g  product l i n e .  The m atter o f  knowing 
demand c h a r a c te r is t ic s  and whether or not the th ing  
would s e l l  was o f  some importance, w hile the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  supplementing e x i s t in g  l i n e s ,  being able to d i s t r i b ­
u te  through common channels with those e x i s t i n g ,  and the 
a b i l i t y  to use common raw m a ter ia ls  with those already  
being used, v/ere o f  extreme importance. Insofar  a3 
adding now products was concerned, the o v e r a l l  p o l ic y  
o f  the firm s interview ed seemed to be that they b e l ie v e d  
th at  there wa3 a commitment to stay  v/ith a new venture  
u n t i l  i t  hod a f a i r  t r i a l  and p o s s ib ly  lo n g er . Two o f  
the firm s in d ica ted  th a t  they might p o ss ib ly  stay  v/ith
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the now addition s too long because th e ir  experience had 
been p retty  r isk y  in  being able to  fo r e c a s t  the su ccess  
o f  now products. Some of the firm s f l a t l y  in d ica ted  
that they had no in te n t io n  of adding any new products 
to tho ir  l in e  and that th e ir  3ucces3 along th is  l in e  
had boon n i l .  The h ig h e s t  percentage g iven  on f o r e ­
c a s t in g  aucceso o f  new products was Q0%, The matter of 
u n su ccess fu ln ess  was h ig h e st  when one firm  in d ica ted  
th at  in  not over 10% o f  the c a s e 3 were they s u c c e s s fu l .  
I t  was p o ss ib lo  th a t  in  some areas the p i l o t  run would 
t e s t  s u c c e s s fu l ly  and y e t  in  the en tire  t e r r i t o r y ,  once 
they v/ere t r ie d ,  they would only be about 10,S su c c e s s ­
f u l .  This human equation In d ica tes  that sometimes 
sampling can be very weak. 7/here now products did not  
s e l l  the f a i lu r e  was in  most ca ses  due to what v/as con­
sid ered  poor market research . Secondarily  along th is  
l in o  v/as the matter of poor d es ig n , and next come low 
manufacturing q u a l i ty .
Price  S t a b i l i t y . 3 u s in ess  f irm s, 03 a whole, 
l ik e  fo r  p r ic e s  to  be s t a b le .  A free  com petitive  p r ic e  
which would tend to  bounce around would not be l ik e d  by 
about 75Js o f  the manufacturing concerns in  our economy 
i f  questionnaire  and Interview returns ore any in d ic a ­
t io n  o f  what the average businessman d e s ir e s ,  ’//lien
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asked to g iv e  an opinion on p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  as to whether 
i t  was good, bad, or o f  l i t t l e  consequence, i t  was found 
that 74 of 97 firms answering in d ica ted  th at  i t  wa3 good. 
Eleven firm3 in d ica ted  that p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  was bad and 
12 firm s, 6 o f  which wore large firm 3, in d ica ted  that i t  
wa3 of l i t t l e  consequence.
Medium and sm all s iz e  firm s were f a i r l y  w e ll  con­
v inced  that i t  was b e t te r  to have s ta b le  p r ic e s  in  82$ 
and 70/a of the c a ses ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  S ix ty  per cen t of  
the large firm s b e lie v e d  in  s ta b le  p r ic e s .  Insofar as 
p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  being bad, 5$ o f  the large firms thought 
t h i s  way w hile  10$ and 16$ o f  the medium and small f irm s,  
r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  considered p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  to be bad.
Medium s iz e  firm s were very s k e p t ic a l  of p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  
being of l i t t l e  s ig n if ic a n c e  s in ce  only 6% o f  them gave 
t h i s  answer. Ten per cent o f  the sm all firm s assumed 
th a t  p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  made very l i t t l e  d iffe r en ce  w hile  
30$ o f  the large  firms expressed a s im ila r  b e l i e f .
An o v e r a l l  a n a ly s is  o f  these percentages would 
show that about 75$ o f  the firm s b e lie v e d  that p r ice  
s t a b i l i t y  i s  good; about 10$ of them consider i t  to  be 
bad and about 6$ to 10$ of the small and medium s iz e  
firm s consid er  i t  to  be of l i t t l e  consequence w hile  30$ 
o f  the large  firms f e l l  in to  t h i s  category . Comments
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which were added to the questionnaire  and which were 
gained from in terv iew s shod more l i g h t  on t h i s  m atter.
One firm sta ted  th a t  p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  was of l i t t l e  con­
sequence as long as gross margins were s u f f i c i e n t  s in ce  
th e ir  industry  was geared to p r ice  change. One firm  
f l a t l y  s ta te d  that the meaning of p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  was 
not known. Another producer in  the con stru ction  indus­
try  in d ica ted  that published  p r ic e s  on many manufactured 
commodities should be r e l a t i v e l y  s ta b le ,  at l e a s t  for  
short p eriods o f  tim e, in  order that planning might pro­
ceed based upon r e l a t i v e l y  s ta b le  p r ic e s  issued  by manu­
fa c tu r e r s .  One in terv iew ee in d ica ted  th a t  h is  firm  had 
to  hold p r ic e s  for  one year s in ce  th e ir  cata logu es wore 
issued  on an annual b a s i3 .  One t e x t i l e  manufacturer 
in d ica ted  that p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  would indeed be very good 
sin ce  i t  would allow him to p r ic e  in  the f a l l  and l o t  
that p r ic e  run through the y ea r . He in d ica ted , however, 
that u n se t t le d  world co n d it io n s  caused cotton  p r ic e s  and 
cotton  acreages to  go up and down so th a t  one could never  
be sure o f  how lon g  he could hold one p r ic e .
In terview ees were able to expand more f u l l y  upon 
the m atter o f  p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  and to go so fa r  as to 
d iscu ss  the advantages and disadvantages o f  s ta b le  
p r ic e s .  Their exp lan ations a lso  in d ica ted  when firm s
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tended to change p r ic e ,  whether or not these changes 
would bo met promptly by com petitors, whether or not  
they could  reverse  p r ice  changes, why they would change 
p r ic e s  up or down, and how soon any p r ice  change might 
be e f f e c t i v e .  In the matter o f  advantages and d isad ­
vantages o f  a s ta b le  p r ic e ,  the outstanding advantage 
seemed to be in  p r ice  l i s t  p r in t in g s  and ad v ert is in g  
expenditure m atters . Price s t a b i l i t y  v/as a matter o f  
p r o f i t  and lo s s  to  one concern. The price-maker ex­
p la ined  that he had to p lace  orders fo r  s t e e l  about s ix  
months ahead o f  time and i f  market changes occurred, he 
stood to lo s e  money, A s ta b le  market to th is  firm v/as 
the d if fe r e n c e  between p r o f i t  and l o s s .  One firm ex­
p la ined  that i t s  customers could expect p r ic e s  to hold  
u n less  there was a great change in  the cotton  market, 
labor co n tra c t ,  or f r e ig h t  c o s t s .  Other firms l i s t e d  
such th in gs  as more l ib e r a l  c r e d it  terms, longer d i s ­
count p er io d s , ex tr a  s e r v ic e ,  more free  r e p a ir s ,  and 
the a b i l i t y  to improve d esign  as advantages o f  a s ta b le  
p r ic e .
D isadvantages o f  a s ta b le  p r ice  are rather hard 
to f in d  in so fa r  as many price-makers are concerned. One 
firm  s ta te d  that "competition can get out from under 
you," .Another firm th a t  used salesmen e x te n s iv e ly
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in d ica ted  that the salesman would be at a disadvantage  
i f  he could n ot compete on a p r ice  b a s i s .  Another firm  
in d ica ted  that labor and raw m ateria l c o s ts  have tended 
to  increase  s t e a d i ly  over the p ast  few years and t h i s  
was one disadvantage o f  a s ta b le  p r ic e .  These few 
answers tend to  prove that the v a s t  m ajority  o f  the 
firm s f in d  very l i t t l e  disadvantage to a s ta b le  p r ic e .
■interviewees c o n s is t e n t ly  s ta te d  that they 
changed th e ir  p r ic e  both upward and downward when they  
considered  th a t  they wore in  the middle o f  the p r ice  
change, or a f te r  a l l  o thers had e i th e r  increased  or de­
creased  and they were forced  to fo llo w  s u i t .  Five of  
the 7 firm s in terview ed  in d ica ted  th a t  th e ir  p r ice  cu ts  
were l i k e l y  to  be met promptly v/hile two o f  the firm s  
Indicated  that com petitors were slow about in creas in g  
and d ecreasing  th e ir  p r i c e s .  One firm in d ica ted  that  
as soon as I t  put out a p r ic e  l i s t  the other two con­
cerns that were I t3  n ea rest  com petitors came out imme­
d ia te ly  with the same p r ic e s  and sometimes they priced  
a l i t t l e  low er .
Firms were ju s t  about even ly  s p l i t  in so fa r  as 
t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to reverse  p r ice  re d u ct io n s . Three o f  
the firm s in d ica ted  th a t  they could e a s i l y  reverse  p r ic e  
red u ctio n s , and one of these  in d ica ted  that a lack  o f
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repeat s a le s  would be one reason fo r  reversin g  a p r ic e  
red u ction . Another o f  these firm s in d ica ted  that the
price-mokor could reverse a p r ic e  reduction  based on h is
own knowledge o f  c o s ts  remaining r e la t i v e l y  s ta b le .  One 
r e l a t i v e l y  large  firm in d ica ted  that i t  could not reverse  
p r ic e  re d u ct io n s . Another firm hedged a l i t t l e  b i t  in  
saying that i t  could reverse  p r ice  redu ctions but i t  was
not easy to do so .
Price  changes in fe r  immediately that p r ic e s  must 
be e i th e r  in creasin g  or decreasing  and d i f f e r e n t  circum­
sta n c es ,  o f  course, would be r e f l e c t e d  in  e i th e r  o f  the 
two c a s e s .  For example, the b ig g e s t  reasons given  fo r  
in cr ea s in g  p r ic e s  were those o f  making a d d it io n a l p r o f i t s ,  
f i r s t ,  and in creas in g  them because c o s t s  increased ,  
second. One firm sta ted  that i t  increased  p r ic e s  when­
ever the government would allow i t  to do so . Another 
firm in d ica ted  that i t  made p r ice  adjustments only when 
changes in  the base p r ice  o f  i t s  c h ie f  raw m ateria l  
changed, tending to never depart from i t 3  p r ice  p o l ic y  
except in  raw m a ter ia l c o s t  in crea s in g  s i t u a t io n s .
Price redu ction s are in  general based upon c o s t  reduc­
t io n s  which to se v er a l  o f  the firm s in d ica ted  a depres­
s ion  c o n d it io n . A secondary reason fo r  p r ice  redu ction s  
given  in  n ear ly  every case was that o f  fo llo w in g  a
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com petitive price  or o f  attempting to gain  ad d it ion a l  
markets. One firm  in d ica ted  that i t  reduced p r ic es  in  
order to stim ulate  season a l s a le s  and that on one of  
i t s  com petitive l in e s  i t  made c y c l i c a l  p r ic e  adjustments. 
Another price-maker in d ica ted  that price  reductions are 
sometimes made in  order to g e t  s a le s  fo r  planned e f f i ­
c ien cy  u t i l i z a t i o n .  A contractor in d ica ted  that he 
sometimes reduced p r ic o s  in  order to ob ta in  large con­
t r a c t s ,  ^Another firm reduced p r ic e s  to  c le a r  old  s to ck .  
Many other reasons could  probably be c i t e d  for  reducing  
p r ic e s  but b a s ic  to  a l l  p r ice  reductions seemingly i s  
the matter of depression  or c o s t  reduction  p r ice  drops 
along w ith  attempts to obtain more s a le s  o ith o r  to g ive  
planned e f f i c i e n c y ,  st im u late  s a l e s ,  or d ispose of su r­
p lu s  products.
The e f f e c t  on volume produced by changing p r ice  
would normally depend upon the time allowed for buyers 
to rea d ju st  th e ir  h a b its  and fo r  com petitors to r e a c t  to 
the changed s i t u a t io n  in  which they f in d  them selves. I t  
was found w hile  in terv iew in g  se v e r a l  businessmen th at  
t h e ir  es t im a tes  o f  how long t h i s  period might be fo r  
th o lr  p a r t ic u la r  b u sin ess  ran a l l  the way from immediate- 
e f f e c t  to  a 90-day period  in  order to g e t  the market 
adjusted . One businessman sa id  th a t  there was a very
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rapid  adjustment to  p r ice  change by both customers and 
com petitors and he assumed that two to three days would 
mark the longth  o f  time* Another businessman ind icated  
that three days to a week would allow the necessary ad­
justment w hile one businessman in d ica ted  that I t  would 
take at l e a s t  90 days in  order fo r  the e f f e c t  upon volume 
to be com pletely worked ou t. One price-maker in d icated  
th at  h i s  firm was a p r ice  fo llo w er  and that he attempted 
to meet competitors* p r ic e s  30 as to hold h is  own b u s i­
n ess;  he was not worried w ith  ad justing  volume because 
he managed to maintain about the 3ome part o f  the market 
with h i s  p r ice  fo llow in g  t a c t i c s .  The o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  on 
volume then seems to depend more upon the nature of the 
b usiness  and the manner o f  d is tr ib u t io n  than anything 
e l s e  and w i l l  run from two or three days to as much as 
three months before a l l  o f  the market r a m if ica t io n s  are 
f e l t  as they a f f e c t  volume.
The economist u su a lly  assumes that a lower p r ice  
w i l l  expand t o t a l  s a le s  and that so long as firms are 
operating  at something l e s s  than cap acity  output, the 
increased  volume w i l l  decrease u n it  c o s t s .  When b u s i ­
nessmen look  at the matter o f  a lowered p r ice  they nor­
m ally  think f i r s t  in  term3 o f  the reduction  in  u n it  
revenue th a t  w i l l  occur. I t  was in te r e s t in g  to note
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that tv/o o f  the interview ed firms s ta te d  that freq u en tly  
the to ta l^ in c re a se  in  s a le s  would not o f f s e t  the reduc­
t io n  in  u n it  revenue. Another firm in d ica ted  that a 
lower p r ice  would not expand to ta l  s a le s ;  s t i l l  another 
firm in d icated  th a t  i t  would not lower p r ice  to g e t  more 
sa le s  but would merely do so only to meet com petition  
and to hold  i t s  own market. S t i l l  another firm in d ica ted  
that i t  wa3 p o ss ib le  that a lowered p r ic e  could lead  to 
expansion to the p o in t  of o f f s e t t in g  reduced u n it  revenue 
but th at  care should always be given in  considering  
whethor or not the firm should expand to any groat  
e x te n t ,  'fliis reso lved  i t s e l f  in  a c tu a l i ty  to a case of  
determining what share of the market the firm wanted to  
handle. Two of the firm s interview ed were f a i r l y  s ta b le  
in th e ir  production and marketing outputs and there was 
no tendency to in terru p t the s ta tu s  quo.
A comparison of the co n sid era tio n s  immediately  
above d ea lin g  w ith  price  s t a b i l i t y  and price  change when 
compared to an e a r l i e r  question  d ea lin g  with the compet­
i t i v e  p o s i t io n  o f  firms would lead  one to b e l ie v e  that  
a s ta b le  p r ice  would always be d e s ir e d . Most firms  
assume that they are f a i r l y  com petitive which probably 
means 3omathing on the order of m onopolist ic  or o l ig o p o ­
l i s t i c  com p etition . O vera ll ,  firm s b e l ie v e  that a p r ice
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reduction  w i l l  nob add nuch to s a le s  3inco t h i s  reduction  
w i l l  probably be met f a i r l y  f a s t ,  A p rice  increase might 
not bo fo llow ed  quito a3 r e a d i ly  and i t  i s  p o ss ib le  that  
a lo s s  o f  s a le s  might occur, p r ice  in c r e a se s ,  too, come 
only when businessmen have increased  c o s ts  or when they 
b e lie v e  that there i s  an expanding market in  which they  
can make on ad d it io n a l p r o f i t .  Interviewed firms in d i ­
cated  that they changed p rice  in  the middlo; th is  would 
in d ic a te  that they wanted to bo sure of an o v e r a l l  in ­
crease or decrease in  the industry before thoy committed 
them selves. I f  a l l  o f  those th ings hold true, then i t  
i s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  that the businessman assumes that  
h is  3a les  would f a l l  o f f  r e l a t i v e l y  f a s t  i f  he increased  
p rice  because h is  com petitors would not fo l lo w  s u i t ;  he ' 
f e e l s  th a t  a p r ice  reduction  would be quickly  fo llow ed  
and th a t  he would not gain  an appreciable advantage in 
the market, Thi3 view would lead  to tho b e l i e f  that the 
demand fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  product would tend to be r e l a ­
t iv e l y  e l a s t i c  above the e x i s t in g  p r ice  l e v e l  and r e l a ­
t iv e l y  i n e la s t i c  below th a t  e x i s t in g  p r ic e ,  Such tends 
to v e r i fy  or g ive credence to a kinked demand curve con­
ce p t .
■Agreements, Monopoly, and Leadership. B u sin ess­
men when questioned about p r ic in g  agreements, monopoly
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p r ic in g ,  and prico  lead ersh ip  are normally slow to admit 
any of th e se  th in g s .  B a s ic a l ly ,  they amount to the same 
p r ic in g  r e la t io n s h ip .  In the matter o f  agreements i t  i s  
p re tty  w e l l  known that trade a sso c ia t io n s  e x i s t .  Monop­
oly  probably e x i s t s  in  many l o c a l  areas v/ith fran ch ise  
r e la t io n s h ip s  and by agreements w ithin  an indu stry .
Large producers are probably able to determine whether 
p r ic e s  v / i l l  go up or down. Determining the exten t to  
which businessmen are in fluenced  by these fa c to r s  in  
s e t t in g  p r ic e s  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  task .
While q u estion in g  in d iv id u a l businessmen about 
agreements and trade a sso c ia t io n  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ithin  
th e ir  in d u s tr ie s ,  i t  v/as found that 3 of the prico-makers 
in terview ed  in d ica ted  that th e ir  p r ice  p o l ic y  was based 
upon trade a s s o c ia t io n s .  These a s so c ia t io n s  might not 
e s t a b l i s h  the exact  p r ice  which would be charged but they 
were instrum ental in su ggestin g  a "good" base p r ic e .  The 
trade a s so c ia t io n  gave a reason able-return  price  in  most 
cases  which v/ould be something on the order o f  a l i v e  and 
l e t - l i v e  p r ice  fo r  both the large  and small producers.
Agreements w ithin  the industry v/ere e s ta b lish e d  
by two price-makers as being a major fa c to r  in th e ir  
p r ice  p o l ic y .  The agreement w ithin  the industry was in  
one case attempted only as a matter of n e c e s s i t y .  The
161
manufacturer was large enough apparently to have some 
In fluence and h is  com petitive area was f irm ly  enough 
e s ta b lish e d  that he did not worry except in  unusual 
c a s e s .  P r ic in g  on a p r ice  leader was given by two 
price-makers a3 a key to  th e ir  b a s ic  p r ice  p o l ic y .  In 
both cases these firms were r e l a t iv e ly  sm all and, as 
would bo expected , they tended to fo llo w  the larger  
m anufacturers. One entrepreneur even went 30 fa r  as 
to say that i f  he did not fo l lo w  the "big 5" manufac­
turers that he would c la s s  h im self  out of the market; 
hence, he had to follov/ th e ir  lea d ersh ip . Another 
businessman roported that he was a r e la t iv e ly  small 
producer and th at  he had to  fo llov / the le a d e r .  I f  he 
happened to g e t  above the le a d e rs ,  he v/ould lo s e  s a le s ;  
and I f  he got below, he would tend to moke s a le s  but 
h is  c o s t  was so w e ll  a ligned  v/ith the lea d ers  that I t  
would tend to narrow h is  p r o f i t s  too much.
Businessmen are re lu c ta n t  to admit that they  
attempt to  0 3 ta b llsh  any degree o f  monopoly in  th e ir  
p r ic e  p o l ic y .  Questionnaire returns on th is  matter  
showed th a t  large  b u sin ess  concerns were very p o s i t iv e  
in  90^ o f  the cases that they never attempted monopoly; 
the other 10^ of these firm s in d ica ted  that they seldom 
attempted monopoly in  th e ir  p r ic e  p o l ic y .  This compares
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w ith  7G> o f  the small firm s and 60^ of the medium firm s  
that in d ica ted  they never attempted to e s ta b l i s h  monopoly 
through a prico  p o l ic y ,  and 24% of the medium firm s and 
2% o f  tho sm all firm s that in d ica ted  they seldom attempted 
such p r ic in g .  Both sm all and medium firm s answered that  
they "generally" would attempt some monopoly in 6% o f  the 
cases  and "occasionally"  was in d ica ted  by 6% o f the small 
firm s and 10% o f  the medium, s iz e  f irm s. These f ig u r e s  
wherein firms attempted to e s ta b l i s h  some degree o f  monop­
o ly  was ansY/ered "never" by 71 o f  the f irm s . F if te e n  
firm s in d ica ted  that they "solaom" attempted to e s ta b l i s h  
monopoly. I f  "never" and "seldom" can be in terp re ted  to 
mean that concerns gen era lly  ore not in te r e s te d  In e s ta b ­
l i s h i n g  monopoly, then t h i s  s i tu a t io n  w i l l  hold true in  
86,^ o f  the c a s e 3 o v e r a l l .
A r e la te d  q uestion  asking businessmen i f  they 
b e lie v e d  there might be c o l lu s io n  in  p r ic in g  by a fev/ 
b ig  s e l l e r s  le d  to  the fo l lo w in g  p erc en ta g e s: 65% o f  
la rg e  firm s and 64% o f  medium s iz e  firm s sa id  that t h i s  
was not true; 30% o f  these two c la s s e s  sa id  that i t  
might p o s s ib ly  be tru e; and 6% o f  the medium s iz e  firm s  
sa id  th a t  i t  was d e f in i t e ly  true . These f ig u r e s  tonded 
to  c o r r e la te  very c l o s e l y .  Small f irm s v/ere somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  w ith  47% o f  the firm s in d ic a t in g  th at  I t  was
1 6 3
p o s s ib ly  true that c o l lu s io n  in  p r ic in g  did take p lace  
by a few b ig  s e l l e r s .  Thirteen o f  the firm s in d ica ted  
th a t  i t  was d e f in i t e ly  tru e , w hile only 33$ in d ica ted  
th at  i t  wa3 f a l s e .  Three firms did not answer th is  ques­
t io n ,  2 sm all firm s and 1 large  firm .
The q uestionn aire  returns on c o l lu s io n  and monop­
o ly  show th a t  businessmen tend to adhere f a i r l y  w e l l  to  
t h e ir  d i s b e l i e f  in  these su b jec ts  g e n e r a l ly .  When in te r ­
view ees were asked i f  they b e lie v e d  that there v/as some 
v e i le d  or su b tle  type o f  c o l lu s iv e  p r ic e ,  in  a l l  but one 
case they answered th a t  i t  v/a3 not tru e . However, there  
might be some divergence in  pub lic  opinion and en trep re­
neurs* id eas  on the matter o f  c o l lu s iv e  p r ic in g  and 
monopoly, A statem ent contained in  "Cold P acts ,"  pub­
l i s h e d  by the N ational A ssociation  o f  R efr igerator  Ware­
houses, reported  a survey to show th a t  60$ of the farmers 
think corporations meet together to f i x  p r ic e s  and 39$ 
o f  these same farmers th ink  that b usiness  p r o f i t s  are 
too  h igh .
Monopoly p r ic e  and c o l lu s iv e  p r ic in g  ore many 
tim es assumed to lead  to some type o f  agreement wherein  
the customer can be charged the h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  p r ic e .  
When a3ked i f  they b e l ie v e d  that in  the lon g  run mar­
k e te r s  in  a fr e e  economy very probably charge the
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customer the h ig h e s t  p r ic e  that in  th e ir  opinions they  
could afford to  ask, 95 firm s answering said  "yes'* in 50 
ca ses  and ’’no” in  45 c a s e s .  When broken down between 
sm all, medium, and large  firm s, i t  was d e f in i t e ly  e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  that sm all .firms were f a i r l y  3ure that th is  v/as 
tru e; the percentages dropped from medium to large f irm s .  
S ix ty  per cent o f  the large  f irm s, 58$ o f  the medium s i z e ,  
and 47$ o f  the small firm s thought that i t  was not tru e .
An equal number of small firm s, 47$, thought that i t  v/as
d e f in i t e ly  true that the h ig h e s t  p o ss ib le  p r ic e  would be
charged, w hile 38$ and 35$ o f  the medium and largo f irm s,  
r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  considered th i3  to  be tru e . From these  
percentages i t  can be concluded fo r  a l l  c la s s e s  o f  b u s i ­
n ess  firm s p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  th is  survey, from 35$ to 45$ 
consid er  that businessmen charge the h ig h e s t  p r ice  th a t  
they think they can g e t  from the customer; 50$ to 60$
think that t h i s  i s  not tru e .
From a comparison o f  the " c o llu s iv e  pricing"  
q u estion  and the "highest p o s s ib le  p r ice  from the con­
sumer" q u estio n , i t  w i l l  be found that sm all,  medium, 
and large f irm s , w hile  widespread in  th e ir  op in ion , tend 
to hold  b a s ic a l ly  to th e ir  g iven  id e a s .  Small firm s  
seem to b e l ie v e  that there i s  some su b tle  c o l lu s iv e  
p r ic in g  and th a t  businessmen attempt t h i s  to g e t  the
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moat p o s 3 i b l e  from t h e i r  cu sto m ers;  medium and la r g e  
f irm s g e n e r a l ly  c o n s id e r  t h i s  to  be u n tr u e .
Taxation. Businessmen, as a general r u le ,  are 
r e lu c ta n t  to  admit that taxation  has any important bear­
ing on th e ir  p r ic in g  or on th e ir  p r ic e  p o l ic y .  They 
might re a d i ly  admit that i t  i s  of importance; hov/ever, 
they w i l l  never d iscu ss  the matter from a c o s t  stand­
p o in t s ince the government req u ires  that taxes bo con­
sidered  a 3hare o f  p r o f i t  rather than a co s t  o f  b u s in e ss .
Economic tax theory assumes that taxes  in  most 
cases can be s h i f t e d  and that a businessman v / i l l  do so 
whenever i t  i s  p o s s ib le .  I t  i s  recognized  further  that  
the income tax i s  one o f  the most d i f f i c u l t  to s h i f t ;  
however, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  that a manufacturer could con­
s id er  l a s t  y e a r 's  tax as a c o s t  and adjust h is  p r ic e s  
accordingly , or he could estim ate  h is  current taxes  and 
adjust h i s  p r ic e  on t h i s  b a s i s .  Businessmen interview ed  
would not admit th a t  e i th e r  o f  these wa3 the ca se ,  how­
ev er . A ll businessmen seem ingly worry about taxes and 
r e a l iz e  th e ir  importance, y e t  I t  i s  very d i f f i c u l t  to  
g et  a d e f in i t e  statem ent as to  how Important taxes are 
in  actu a l p r ic in g .
The importance o f  taxe3 can r e a d ily  be seen when 
i t  i s  considered th at  a firm  which makes on s a l e s ,
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before taxes , w ith  $10 m il l io n  gross sa le s  w i l l  r e a l iz e  
a p re -ta x  p r o f i t  o f  $500,000. At current corporate  
income tax r a te s ,  assuming no tax c r e d it s  fo r  dividends  
and other item s, th is  would mean th a t  the corporation  
would f e e l  a tax impact of approximately $254,500 from 
i t s  p re-tax  p r o f i t  of $500 ,000 . In sp ite  of government 
attempts to c l a s s i f y  the tax as a share o f  p r o f i t ,  there  
i s  no comraon-sense reason to b e l ie v e * th a t  the businessman 
would not con sid er  i t  as a c o s t ;  normally anything that  
su b tracts  from n et income must c e r ta in ly  bo a d i s u t i l i t y  
connected with the operation of a b u s in e ss .  Surely , any 
b u sin ess  firm would welcome a salesman who could guaran­
tee  $10 m il l io n  in new b u s in e ss .  J u stly  so , the h ir in g  
o f  a tax expert who could r e c l a s s i f y  and resummarize 
c e r ta in  expense item s, c a p it a l  item s, and d ep rec ia tion  
items so as to save part of the $254,000 tax  load should 
be eq u a lly  welcome. Many firms make more than 5$ and 
some make l e s 3 .  Whatever the percentage o f  income, how­
ever , taxes p lace  a tremendous drain on the businessman 
and most o f  them probably consider the tax as a co s t  of  
doing b u s in e ss .
Questionnaire r e s u l t s  show taxes to  be of most 
Importance to medium s iz e  f irm s. E ig h ty -e ig h t  per cent  
of these firms sa id  th at  taxes were of primary importance
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or th at  they were one of many fa c to r s  included in  th e ir  
p r ic in g  p o licy*  iho remaining 12$ of these firms in d i ­
cated  that taxes wore of not very much importance. The 
small and iarge firms ind icated  that taxes were of p r i ­
mary importance or one o f  many fa c to r s  in 66% and 70$ o f  
the c a s e s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  To show the impact of g r e a te s t  
importance, i t  can be noted that 23$, 36$, and 20% were 
the returns gained from sm all, medium, and large  con­
cern s, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  when considering the primary im­
portance o f  tax impact on p r ice  p o l ic y .  The small firm s  
in  17$ o f ‘ the cases  sa id  that taxes  were not very impor­
tant and i t  can be notod that none of the large  firm s  
were included in  th is  category . Of in t e r e s t ,  too, i s  
the f a c t  that a s im ila r  17$ of the small firm3 and 15$ 
o f  the large firm s in d ica ted  that taxes were not con­
sid ered  at a l l  in  th e ir  p r ic in g ,  w hile the middle s iz e  
firm s would not p a r t ic ip a te  in t h i s  category at a l l ,  
assuming th a t  taxes were o f  some importance in  every  
p r ic in g -s i- tu  at io n .  Of in t e r e s t ,  too , i s  the fa c t  that  
15$ o f  the large  firms gave no answer.
The t o t a l  r e s u l t s  o f  tax Impact upon p r ic in g  
p o l ic y  i s  in d ica ted  when i t  i s  n o ticed  that 29 firm s  
sa id  i t s  taxes were o f  very great importance. Roughly 
h a l f  o f  the answering firm s considered  taxes to bo one
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o f  many fa c to r s  involved  in  p r ic in g  and 11 of the firm s  
assumed that taxes were not very important in  th is
re3p oct. E ight of the firm s did not consider taxes at
a l l  in  regard to p r ic in g  and 5 o f  the large  firm3 did  
not bother to answer the q u e stio n .
In analyzing the answers and the procodure fo r  
answering q u estions  above, i t  i s  noted that medium s iz e  
firm s tend to be more aware o f  the tax problem than do 
sm all or la rg e  f irm s. Large firm s g en er a lly  consider  
taxos but they do not attach  too much importance to them 
in so fa r  as p r ic in g  i s  concerned. Small firm s g en er a lly  
are impressed by taxos but apparently they are not 
always in  a p o s i t io n  to do much about s h i f t in g  them 
s in ce  they probably are somewhat dominated in  th e ir
p r ic in g  o b je c t iv e s .  In the case o f  the 7 firm s i n t e r ­
viewed, the entrepreneurs would not expand beyond the 
f a c t  th at  taxes  were important in  th e ir  p r ic in g .  The 
in terv iew ees  attempted to shrug o f f  any question  on 
manner in  which taxes might be applied in  p r ic in g ;  they  
e i th e r  d id 'n o t say or ju s t  d id  not know how they could  
3 a fe ly  con sid er  taxes as a c o s t  in stead  o f  a part of  
th e ir  p r o f i t  which the government shared. Considering  
the fa c t  th a t  over 65Jo o f  a l l  firm s assume th at p r ic e s  
were a f fe c te d  appreciably by ta x e s ,  i t  i s  unusual to
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f in d  th a t  the 7 interview ed firm s could not ex p la in  just  
how p r ic e s  were a f fe c te d .
D iscr im in ation . Price  d iscr im in ation  ha3 been 
thoroughly analyzed by economic t h e o r is t s  and by b u s in e ss ­
men in  the past 75 y ea rs .  The government has attempted 
to l im i t  d iscr im in ation  and to see that p r ic e s  are main­
tained  so as to  g iv e  r e t a i l e r s  an even break through r e ­
sa le  p r ic e  m aintains law3 or through curbs to check 
monopoly and u n fa ir  com p etition . I t  wa3 f e l t ,  in  d i s ­
cussing  d iscr im in a tio n  w ith  the businessmen, that the use 
of the term d iscr im in a tio n  might cause them to co lo r  
th e ir  answers; hence, the businessmen were approached in  
a questionnaire  w ith  a concept o f  charging d i f f e r e n t  
p r ic e s  to  d i f f e r e n t  customers, or p la c e s ,  under certa in  
c o n d it io n s .  The co n d it io n s  l i s t e d  fo r  them were quantity  
d isco u n ts ,  annual d isco u n ts ,  f in a n c ia l  terms, o ff-peak  
b u s in e ss ,  method of s a le ,  any other reasons, and no d i f ­
fer e n t  p r ic e s  charged.
One hundred th ir ty - th r e e  answers were rece ived  
from the one hundred q u e3 tion ees . D ou b tless ly  there had 
to be somo overlapping s in ce  some firm s would consider  
two or p o s s ib ly  more d i f f e r e n t  methods o f  charging d i f ­
fer e n t  p r ic e s  to  customers or lo c a t io n s .  Quantity d i s ­
counts le d  as a b a s is  fo r  g iv in g  a price  d i f f e r e n t i a l ;
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t h i s  was f o l l o w e d  by  t h o  m ethod  o f  3 o l e ,  as t o  w h e t h e r  
i t  wa3 to  a d i s t r i b u t o r ,  w h o l e s a l e r ,  r e t a i l e r ,  e t c .  
F o l l o w i n g  q u a n t i t y  d i s c o u n t s  and method  o f  3 a l e  i t  was 
n o t i c e d  t h a t  r o u g h l y  20$ o f  th e  f i r m s  d i d  n o t  moke p r i c e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  any c a s e .
Quantity d iscou n ts  were used by 55 o f  the firms  
answering and t h i s  c o n s t itu te d  56$ of the small f irm s,
50$ o f  the medium firm s, and 65$ of the large, f irm s.
One o f  the small firm s allowed annual d isco u n ts;  f in a n ­
c i a l  tern s  were allowed in  approximately 3$ in a l l  c a s e s .  
The methsd o f  sa le  wa3 used as a b a s is  fo r  p r ice  d i f f e r ­
e n t ia l s  in  some 30$ to 32$ o f  the cases  and 6$ o f  the 
sm all firm s and 10$ o f  the medium firm s used off-peak  
b usin ess  co n d it io n s  as a b a s is  for  p r ice  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  
F if te e n  firm s l i s t e d  other reasons which w i l l  be d i s ­
cussed s h o r t ly .
Firms th a t  held  th e ir  p r ic e s  without making a 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  in  any case were l im ite d  more to small and 
medium 3l-3e firm s than to large  f irm s . Between 22$ and 
23$ o f  tho sm all and medium firm s held  to th e ir  p r ice  
l in e  w hile  only 10$ o f  the large  firms accepted one p r ice  
l i n e .
Some o f  the reasons g iven  fo r  allow ing d i f f e r e n t  
p r ic e s  to  d i f f e r e n t  customers or p la c e s  were those based
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\ipon c o s t  o f  transportation  and d e l iv e r y  d is ta n c e ,  
tra d e - in  allowances for  used equipment, a reduced p r ice  
to meet com petition; sev era l of the firm s l i s t e d  spe­
c i f i c  typos o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  based on c o s t s ,  customer 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  and d a tin g . B a s ic a l ly ,  the comments 
which were attached to t h i s  q u estion  wore hinged upon 
quantity  d iscoun ts  and the method o f  sa le  as to whether 
i t  wont to a jobber, chain , department s to r e ,  e t c . ,  or 
to  p a in te r s ,  d e a le r s ,  in du stry , r e t a i l ,  e t c .  One i n t e r ­
viewed firm which d ea lt  w ith  Mexican businessmen in d i­
cated that i t  would g ive  the fo re ig n  firm s an opportunity  
to  g e t  pesos favorable to tho American d o lla r  by allowing  
6 months c r e d it  terms. S p e c if ic  types o f  d iscou n ts  were 
used from time to time such as a llow ing salesmen to make 
s p e c ia l  con cess ion s  or g iv in g  b e t te r  serv ice  or terms to 
a good customer th a t  had been trad ing  with the producer 
fo r  a long  p er iod .
More U3e i s  made of d iscou n ts  by sm all firms than 
by e i th e r  the medium s iz e  or large f irm s. The large  
firm s are g en er a lly  in te r e s te d  in  quantity  d iscou n ts  and 
the method o f  sa le  only; 95# o f the d i f f e r e n t i a l s  allowed  
by large  firm s can be traced  to these  two c a te g o r ie s .
This i s  b a s ic a l ly  true fo r  both sm all and medium s iz e  
firm s; however, tho medium s iz e  firm s g ive a r e la t iv e
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a d v a n ta g e  t o  m ethod  o f  s a l e  when compared  t o  s m a l l  and 
l a r g e  f i r m s  i n  q u a n t i t y  d i s c o u n t  p r i c i n g .  S m a l l  and 
medium 3i z e  f i r m s  b o t h  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  g i v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
t e r m s  and a l s o  i n  c l o s i n g  o u t  s t o c l :  t h r o u g h  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
when b u s i n e s s  i s  o f f - p e a k .  One b u s in e s s m a n  commented 
t h a t  h i s  f i r m  d i d  r e d u c e  p r i c e  to  p a r t i c u l a r  b u y e r s  when 
b u s i n e s s  wa3 o f f ;  h o w e v e r ,  he e m p h a s iz e d  t h a t  n o t  t o o  
much o f  t h i s  wa3 done by  h i s  f i r m  and t h a t  a c t u a l l y  i t  
h a d  h a p p en e d  o n l y  once i n  6 y e a r s .
The broad p icturo  of d iscr im in ation  in  p r ic e s  
shows th at  large  firm s g ive more d i f f e r e n t - p r ic e s  based  
on quantity  and method o f  sa le  than do small or medium 
s iz e  firm s and y e t  the small and medium firm s allow more 
d if f e r e n t  types o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  than do the large  f irm s.  
Many small firm s and medium s iz e  firms f in d  themselves  
in  a p o s i t io n  wherein they cannot allow d if fe r e n c e s  in  
th e ir  p r ic e s  to various customers or p la c e s .
COST AND PRIC2 POLICY
Cost of production to the oconomist serv es  a3 
one o f  the r e q u is i t e s  for p r ic e  s ince c o s t  i s  a sso c ia ted  
v/ith supply. Cost o f  production to tho businessman 
shows a d i s u t i l i t y  a sso c ia ted  w ith production; I t  w i l l  
determine h i3  not income when compared to the p r ice  
which he r e c o lv e s  fo r  goods being  producod*
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The businessman, when production s t a r t s ,  must 
consider  such th ings a3 the product or products which he 
w i l l  produco, the period in  which he w i l l  produce them, 
the output which ho can expect from h is  e x i s t in g  ca p a c ity ,  
and the manner in  which he w i l l  go about e s t im a tin g  h is  
c o s t s  for a future production p er iod . These items w i l l  
bo considered  in  an o v e r a l l  a n a ly s is  o f output in  the 
l i g h t  of whatever demand the businessman con exp ect.
The matter o f  es t im a tin g  c o s t  5.3 one which c a l l s  for  some 
method o f  co s t  determ ination on a uniform b a s is  and i t  
must c o n s ic t  o f  e i th e r  a p re -c o s t  an a lysis  or a p o s t - c o s t  
a n a ly s is .
Most producers have a d e f in i t e  id ea  03 to the 
type, s t y l e ,  d esign , and packaging of t h e ir  product or 
products. Any ideas o f  new additions to the product 
l in o  or to changes in  the e x i s t in g  s t y l e ,  design , or 
packaging w i l l  l i k e l y  load to  an a n a ly s is  fo r  the coming 
production period in  which c o s t  w i l l  bo estim ated . The 
m atter o f  a production period lends some credence to tho 
fa c t  that the businessman must f u l l y  analyze h is  product 
l in o  and the d e s ir e s  o f  the consumer before beginning  
any output fo r  h is  fu ture market.
Operational Capacity. An a n a ly s is  o f  output on 
the part o f  businessmen shows that  most o f  them operate
1 7 4
in  what they consider to be a normal output range. H iis  
would probably l i e  at about 65$ to 85$ o f  capacity# For 
example, one businessman, when in terv iew ed , ind icated  
that h i 3 p la n t  could produce G7,000 u n its  w ith in  i t s  
capacity# He r e a l iz o d  that p r o f i t s  increased  rap id ly  
above a given po in t o f  production . The p o in t o f  maximum 
e f f ic ie n c y  as he considered i t  vvao normally around 50,000  
u n i t s .  This was the po in t at which he r e a l iz e d  the 
g r e a te s t  p r o f i t .  T h ir ty - f iv e  thousand u n i t 3 gave 10$ 
l e s s  p r o f i t  than that at peak e f f i c i e n c y  w hile above
50 ,000  u n its  he r e a l iz e d  almost 15$ p r o f i t .  He con sid ­
ered th is  15$ to be b e t te r  than he should re ce iv e  on the 
b a s is  o f  h is  c a lc u la t io n s  up to th a t  p o in t .  He in d ica ted  
that from 50 ,000  u n it s  up to around 60,000 u n it s  that h is  
overhead and taxes did not Increase ,
Capacity to the businessman probably means some­
thing on the order o f  what he has experienced in  the p ast  
as a h igh norm o f  production . I t  i s  e n t ir e ly  po33ible  
that t h i s  w i l l  not be the p e r fe c t  maximum that could be 
achieved i f  a l l  con d itions  were proper and In a lign  so
4
as to g iv e  p e r fe c t  output. Hie matter o f  operating at 
le s 3  than ca p a c ity  and es t im a tin g  c o s t s  can probably be 
found to l i e  in  the f a c t  that many firm s must keep some 
reserve  of p lan t f a c i l i t i e s  a v a ila b le  to  moot em ergencies.
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Those emergencies might be such th ings as in crea ses  in  
orders fo r  some expected reason, tomiiorary breakdowns, 
readjustm ents, r e p a ir s ,  renew als, or the fa c t  that c e r ­
ta in  types o f  machinery or product p rocesses  are su s ­
c e p t ib le  to breakdowns*
I t  i s  e n t ir e ly  p o ss ib le  to g e n e r a l ise  and assume 
that any producer who has power over p r ic e ,  and who in ­
tends to f i x  h is  p r ic e  with referenco  to h is  co st  o f  pro­
duction and h is  own estim ate  of demand, w i l l  base h is  
estim a tes  o f  cost  in  a production period  upon some 
assumption o f  a normal or standard output. Tills has 
been found to be somewhat l e s s  than tho f u l l  maximum 
output o f  the p la n t .  I t  was found that 28,j o f  the firms 
questioned 11 g e n e r a l ly ” operated at something lo s s  than 
cap acity  w hile 53,  ̂ o f  thorn sa id  that they '•o ccas ion a lly” 
operated under excess  c a p a c ity .  This compared w ith  15£ 
th a t  Indicated  they ’’seldom” operated at l e s s  than ca ­
p a c ity  and 3^ that in d ica ted  they ’’never” operated under 
excess  c a p a c ity .  Ono firm commented that "our s t e e l  
c a s t in g s  department Is  u su a l ly  operated at cap acity ;  our 
r o l l in g  m i l l  ( s t e e l  bars) Is  always operated at l o s s  
than c a p a c i t y .”
The firm a n a ly s is  on the b a s is  o f  3 ize  in d ica ted  
th at 17^ o f  tho sm all f irm s, 16fi o f the medium f irm s , and
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only 10$ o f  tho large  firm s in d ica ted  that they '’se ldom ,11 
i f  ever , operated at anything l e s s  than ca p a c ity .  S ix  
per cent of the medium firm s in d ica ted  they never oper­
ated at anything other than cap ac ity  output and the 
remainder o f  a l l  s iz e  f irm s, other than the percentages  
mentioned immediately above, in d ica ted  that they were 
"generally" or "occasionally" operated at something l e s s  
than cap acity  output. This answer i3 based upon the 
assigned or normal output which the businessman has some­
how f ix e d  in  h is  mind. I t  probably d i f f e r s  from that  
estim ate  which the engineer who in s t a l l e d  h is  machinery 
considered  to  be ca p a c ity  output. A ctually , th is  d i f ­
ference  i s  many times very g rea t. I t  w i l l  depend upon 
the type o f  machinery, the in du stry , the nature o f  the 
market for  the product, and p o ss ib ly  the experience of  
the p a r t ic u la r  businessman.
Businessmen seem to be convinced that through 
c e r ta in  areas o f  output, marginal co s ts  tend to remain 
f a i r l y  co n sta n t .  They are su re , too , th at  with an ex­
pansion of output up to cap acity , o v e r a l l  c o s t s  w i l l  
tend to  decrease on a u n it  b a s i s .  This i s  in d ica ted  
when between 73$ and 85$ of the firm s grading from small 
to  large  in d ica ted  that an in crease  in output w ith  th e ir
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e x i s t in g  cap acity  would cause th e ir  c o s ts  to  decrease .  
Twenty per cent o f  the sm all f irm s, 22% o f  the medium 
f irm s, and only 5% of the large  firms in d ica ted  that  
such an increase in  output would cause th e ir  c o s ts  to 
remain about the same, A furth er  in d ic a t io n  th a t  b u s i­
nessmen were operating at something l e s s  than capacity  
output and that th e ir  c o s t s  would not increase w ith  an 
in crease  in  output i s  in d ica ted  when only of the 
firms o v e r a l l  in d ica ted  th a t  th e ir  c o s t  would increase  
with an increase in  output.
Perhaps i t  i s  mere prudence that keeps most 
businessmen operating at something l e s s  than what they 
consider  to  be the absolute maximum of cap acity  of  
output for th e ir  p la n t s ,  A great deal o f d iffer en ce  
in  average c o s t s  can be found when there i s  a con sid e­
r a t io n  of maximum output in  the p la n t  and a normal or 
u s u a l ly  expected output in  the p la n t ,  This matter i s  
of in crea s in g  importance in  many productive l in e s  when 
demand i s  h igh  or when an element o f  p r ice  com petition  
i s  present in  the market.
Method of Cost D eterm ination. The c a p i t a l i s t i c  
producer i s  faced  w ith  production fo r  a fu tu re  market
7See P late 25, p . 243.
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and as such h i s  p r ic in g  must be based upon es t im a tes  o f  
c o s t s  which are prepared prior  to actua l production.  
Many businessmen probably use what they would consider  
an "educated guess" o f  what c o s t  i s  l i k e l y  to be while  
many firm s w i l l  have a thorough and complete standard 
c o s t  and budgetary co n tro l sy stem ,8 Prom an economic 
standpoint the m atter w i l l  be about the same; the p rice  
at which the greater  part o f  the output o f  goods i s  
so ld  i s  not the actu a l c o s t  o f production but i s  based 
more or l e s s  upon the es t im a tes  o f  c o s t  which enter  
in to  th6 en trepreneur's  ex p ecta t io n s  when he i s  making 
d e c is io n s  about the amount o f  output and the s e l l i n g  
p r ice  to  be f ix e d  fo r  i t .
L i t t l e  can be gained by analysing the c o s t  
accountant's f ig u r e s  which would en ter  in to  the b u s i­
nessman's ex p ecta t io n s  of co s t  when an "educated guess" 
i s  u sed . I t  i s  almost im possib le  to  s t a b i l i z e  any 
p a r t ic u la r  r u le s  when i t  i s  considered  that many e s t i ­
mates o f  co s t  w i l l  be based upon p a st  y ea rs '  production  
f ig u r e s  w ith  adjustments fo r  expected changes in  the 
p r ic e s  o f  raw m a ter ia ls  and wages which w i l l  en ter  in to  
the f in is h e d  product. Such simple es t im a tes  are very
8See P la te s  16, 18, 20.
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common in  American in d u stry . I f  the b u sin ess  firm i s  
r e la t iv e ly  sm all, or tends to  be m id d le -s ized , and 
there are few tec h n ic a l  changes in  the in du stry , i t  i s  
p o ss ib le  th a t  these r e s u l t s  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  and w i l l  
give about the same f ig u r e s  as could be gained from a 
d e ta i le d  c o s t  accounting a n a ly s is .
Many large firm s f in d  that there i3  but one way 
to  achieve su ccess in  p r ic in g  and that i s  to  have a 
budgetary plan and adopt some system o f  standard c o s t ­
in g .9 This can be in terp re ted  from two q u estion s  con­
sid ered  by the firm s return ing  answers to  the q u estio n ­
n a ir e ,  The f i r s t  q u estion  asked i f  the firm s were able 
to  c a lc u la te  accurate ly  under varying circum stances  
th e ir  output and revenue that would maximize p r o f i t s .
The second q u estion  concerned the amount o f  a t ten t io n  
given  to  c o s t  f ig u r e s  prepared by c o s t  accountants in  
s e t t in g  p la n t  s c a le .  To the f i r s t  q u estion  about c a l ­
cu la t in g  output fo r  maximum p r o f i t s ,  i t  was found that  
the firm s answered "yes" according to  s iz e  from sm all 
to la r g e ,  37$, 54$, and 60$. This compared w ith  a "no" 
answer in  53$ of the cases  for sm all f irm s, 38$ fo r  
medium f irm s, and 30$ for  large  f irm s. While consid er ing
9See P la tes  16 and 20,
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the coat a c c o u n ta n ts  importance, i t  was found that  
large firm s paid  "very much attention"  to these f ig u r e s  
in  50$ o f  the cases  while medium concerns and sm all 
concerns fo llow ed  s u i t  in  44$ and 33$, r e s p e c t iv e ly .
To the answer "about average," medium s iz e  firm s ex­
a c t ly  matched w ith  44$ those which had answered "very 
much" w hile  small firm s used "about average" as an 
answer in  37$ o f  the cases;  large  firm s used t h i s  
answer in  20$ o f  the c a s e s .  "Very l i t t l e "  a t te n t io n  
was paid  to  c o s t  accountants in  23$, 10$, and 20$ o f  
the c a se s  when graded from small to  medium to la r g e .
Modern b u s in e ss ,  w ith i t s  la r g e - s iz e  business  
u n it  which w i l l  f i x  p r ic e s  fo r  a long  period and have 
these  p r ic e s  s t a b le ,  f in d s  th a t  average c o s ts  over a 
period  cannot be determined e x a c t ly .  I t  i s  n ecessary ,  
th e r e fo re ,  for  these u n it s  to have some method of f o r e ­
c a s t in g  co s ts  w ith  a reasonable degree o f  accuracy.
Prom the answers to  the two q u estion s  g iven  above and 
from P la te s  16 and 20 i t  can be seen th a t  large  pro­
ducers pay more a t te n t io n  to co st  accountants and at 
the same time they are able to accurate ly  c a lc u la te  
th e ir  output and revenue to maximize p r o f i t s .
Budgetary c o n tr o ls  and standard c o s ts  e s ta b l i s h  
a model c o s t  and force  the businessman to analyze h is
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operations at every stage in  the manufacture of h is  
products and to c a lc u la te  accurate ly  the c o s t  at each  
s ta g e .  That t h i s  i s  true can be found when i t  i s  noted  
th at  66$ of the firms questioned  sa id  that they used a 
r a t io n a l  plan to e s ta b l i s h  the most e f f e c t iv e  sc a le  of  
p la n t  o p era tio n s . On a s iz e  breakdown, t h is  was found 
to be 63$, 65$, and 68$ fo r  sm all, la r g e ,  and medium 
s iz e  producers. Twenty-seven per cent of the small 
firm s in d ica ted  that they used t r i a l  and error to e s ta b ­
l i s h  the most e f f e c t iv e  sc a le  of p la n t  operations; only  
18$ and 20$ o f  the medium and la rg e  firm s in d ica ted  
t h i s  answer. The f a c t  th a t  approximately tw o-th irds o f  
a l l  firms use a r a t io n a l  plan in d ic a te s  that budgetary 
c o n tr o ls  and standard c o s t s  have e v id e n t ly  had some 
impact upon the businessman. This i s  much b e t te r  than 
u sin g  a p o s t - c o s t  system wherein i t  i s  p o s s ib le  that  
unusual expenditures might have been lumped in to  the 
o v e r a l l  c o s ts  and in  which the firm  has departments 
wherein c o s t s  lumped togeth er  w i l l  f a i l  to  show i n e f f i ­
c i e n c ie s .
Firms operating where com petition  i s  keen must 
know immediately of i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  o f  organ ization  and 
of id le n e s s  anywhere in  the p la n t  and these  items must 
be brought fo r c ib ly  and q u ick ly  to the a t te n t io n  o f
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production managers. I t  i s  assumed in economics that  
extreme com petition  w i l l  force  the businessman to use 
h i3  knowledge o f  marginal co s ts  to  so t  p r ic e s .  While 
answering a q uestion  as to  the degree of importance of  
a knowledge o f  marginal c o s t s  to rock bottom p r ic in g ,  
i t  was found th at 80$ o f  the firm s o v e r a l l  thought th is  
knowledge very important. Seventy-three per cent of  
the sm all f irm s, 82$ o f  the medium firm s, and 85$ of  
the large  firm s were found to  be in  t h i s  b rack et. Only 
12$ of the f irm s o v e r a l l  considered  th is  knowledge o f  
marginal c o s t  to  be o f  only moderate importance; 8 
f irm s— 5 sm all, 2 medium, and 1 la r g e —gave no answer 
to  t h i s  q u e s t io n . F a ilu re  to note c o s t  d iscrep a n c ies  
can lea d  to lo s s  o f  s a le s  when p r ic e s  are f ix e d  upon 
the b a s is  of too -h igh  c o s t s  due to  I n e f f i c ie n c ie s  in  
any one s e c t io n  or department. The purpose of standard  
c o s t in g  i s  to  allow a c lo se  estim ate  of the c o s t  o f  
producing an item over a c e r ta in  period  of production  
and to  allow t h i s  co s t  to  serve as the b a s is  fo r  e s ta b ­
l i s h in g  p r ic e .  Since p r ic e s  w i l l  be f ix e d  fo r  a ca ta ­
logue period or some season a l p er iod , the firm  must 
m aintain  a c lo s e  c o s t  co n tr o l  so as to keep actual c o s t  
as near as p o s s ib le  to  the id e a l  which has been e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  by the accountant. B a s ic a l ly ,  a l l  methods of
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standardized c o s t in g  and budgetary a n a ly s is  fo r  f ix in g  
p r ic e s  in  a long period  are s e t  up to show standards of  
expected performance wherein con d ition s  of normal opera­
t io n  of p lan t and equipment can be expected to r e s u l t  
over the p r ic in g  period#
I t  i s  im possib le to determine the ex ten t  to  
which "educated guesses" and standard co s tin g  can 
achieve equal r e s u l t s  or in  which e i th e r  w i l l  achieve  
b e t te r  r e s u l t s .  The process of u s in g  past c o s t  as a 
b a s is  fo r  p r ic in g  in  a fu ture  period  and the method o f  
using  accounting co n tr o ls  are both adaptable to p a r t icu ­
la r  s i tu a t io n s  and co n d it io n s  in  in du stry . The b u s in e s s ­
man w i l l  be a l l  c o n tr o l l in g  in  th is  matter and whether 
he u ses  a method of past c o s t  or future c o s t in g  on a 
standard b a s is  w i l l  in  many cases  determine h is  future  
p r o f i t s .  In e i th e r  case p ast  experience and current 
thought in  the trade w i l l  probably guide or be the 
determ inant.
The expense involved  in  u sin g  a system which 
req u ires  a thorough a n a ly s is  of productive operations  
might be too great fo r  many sm all businessmen. This i s  
in d ica ted  when 60# o f  the sm all b u sin ess  firm s in d ica ted  
th a t  they e i t h e r  paid "very l i t t l e "  a tte n t io n  to c o s t  
accou n tants1 f ig u r e s  or that they assumed they were
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’•about average” in con sid er in g  what the co s t  accountant 
prepared; only 33^ paid a g rea t  degree of a t te n t io n  to  
the c o s t  accountant. Again, i f  a d e c is io n  must be made 
at a c r u c ia l  time, then i t  i s  p o ss ib le  that the use of  
expected c o s t  o f  production in  a forthcoming period  w i l l  
be more e f f i c i e n t  and b e n e f i c ia l  to the company than the 
time required to  run a la t e r  d e ta i le d  es t im a te . I t  i s  
found th a t  frequent changes in  some in d u s tr ie s  c a l l  for  
a system o f  standard co s t in g  so as to allow for  rapid  
c a lc u la t io n s  where design or s t y le  change in  the product 
i s  imminent. Whatever the case , the com plexity o f  the 
product and the nature of the in dustry , as w e ll  as the 
experience of the businessman, w i l l  determine the nature 
of c o s t  a n a ly s is  fo r  production fo r  a future market.
Marginal C o sts . One necessary r e q u is i t e  fo r  
the businessman under the conventional a n a ly s is  o f  equ i­
librium  fo r  the firm , as expressed by Chamberlin and 
Robinson, I s  th a t  the businessman must operate at the 
p oin t where marginal co s t  i s  equal to marginal revenue. 
Of p a r t ic u la r  in t e r e s t  here i s  v/hether or not the b u s i ­
nessman can know d e f in i t e ly  and e x p l i c i t l y  whether h is  
p r ic e  i s  based on such a p r e c ise  concept. Many econo­
m ists  accept as fa c t  that in  the American in d u s tr ia l  
scene very few producers have a knowledge of tho
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economic concept of marginal c o s t .  Many largo  f irm s, no 
doubt, do employ econom ists and accountants v/ho under­
stand the term and can apply i t  properly . In the case  
of some sm all and medium s iz e  business  concerns, however, 
i t  i s  doubtfu l i f  m arginal c o s ts  are accurate ly  app lied .
A ll producers are aware that in  the t o t a l  co s t  
of production there w i l l  always be some olements of co s t  
which do not vary p rop ortion ate ly  w ith  output. This i s  
the b a s is  fo r  marginal co s t  when marginal c o s t  i s  defined  
as the ra te  a t  which add ition s are made to  t o t a l  co3t  
w ith  an increase  in  the volume of production. S ince the 
average c o s t  per u n it  tends to  vary with changes in  the 
volume o f  output, t h i s  g iv es  the producer a b a s is  fo r  
computing actual marginal c o s t s  even though he might not 
know e x a c t ly  what the term means. In many cases where 
mass production i s  being used, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  batch  
u n it s  or large  b locks o f  output must be given  some type 
of average fo r  v a r ia t io n s  in  u n it  c o s t s .  Y*here a sm all  
firm  i s  u s in g  v a r ia t io n s  in  output but where l i t t l e  
a tte n t io n  i s  given to c o s t  co n tr o l  and the budgetary 
plans of c o s t  accountants, i t  13 p o ss ib le  that these  
c o s ts  w i l l  be ignored. For example, 17$ o f  the sm all 
firm s as compared w ith  4$ and 5$ o f  the medium and large  
firm s f a i l e d  to answer a d ir e c t  q u estion  dea ling  w ith
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the importance o f  a knowledge of marginal c o s t s .  Since 
17^ o f  them f a i l e d  to answer th is  q u estio n , i t  might be 
assumed they would not be in  a p o s i t io n  to r e a l iz e  
e i th e r  the importance o f  marginal c o s t s  or of c o s t  con­
tr o ls  and budgetary plans of c o s t  accountants. In 
la rg er  en ter p r ise s  d e f in i t e  c a lc u la t io n s  can be made in  
some cases  by in creasin g  output beyond ce r ta in  es ta b ­
l i s h e d  l e v e l s  purely  as a check upon the f ix e d  and 
v a r ia b le  elem ents in  c o s ts  as e s ta b l ish e d  by p a st  
records and by c o s t  accountants.
Business price-makers are re lu c ta n t  to d iscu ss  
marginal c o s ts  from the standpoint of entrepreneurs. 
Businessmen seem to b e l ie v e  that the term i s  somewhat 
u s e le s s  and many o f  them refu se  to  even guess what i t  
might mean. In terview s w ith  lo c a l  businessmen in d ica te  
th at many f a i l  to  grasp the importance of a marginal 
c o s t  q uestion  and y e t  l a t e r  they answer q uestions  d e a l­
ing w ith  v a r ia t io n  in  u n it  c o s t  w ith  v a r ia t io n  in  output.
Businessmen are able to d is t in g u is h  between 
f ix e d  and va r ia b le  c o s ts  and they use th is  knowledge in  
order to  gain  a knowledge o f  how u n it  costs' tend to vary 
w ith v a r ia t io n s  in  output. I t  i s  the variab le  co s ts  
p rim arily  that create  elem ents to  g ive  changes in  mar­
g in a l  c o s t  and most businessmen are able to  ex p la in  that
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they r e a l iz e  ce r ta in  c h a r a c te r is t ic  changes w i l l  occur 
here i f  th is  i s  defined  as marginal c o s t .  These c o s t s  
tend to fo l lo w  a somewhat regu lar  pattern  w ith  v a r ia ­
t io n s  in  output. For example, most businessmen w i l l  
ex p la in  th at  u n it  c o s t s  w i l l  f a l l  from zero output 
u n t i l  a c e r ta in  output has been reached. Economies in  
buying and in  the proper d is t r ib u t io n  and d iv is io n  of  
labor among the various p rocesses  o f  production create  
a p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  outputs which w i l l  g ive  a f a i r l y  
p red ic ta b le  d ecreasing  u n it  c o s t  v a r ia t io n .  There 
w i l l  be a range of outputs s t a r t in g  somewhere around 
10$ to 15$ below the normally expected output in  which 
marginal c o s t s  w i l l  become f a i r l y  co n sta n t . The m in i­
mum at which these c o s t s  become constant g iv e s  a p o in t  
below which, i f  output should be lowered, marginal 
c o s t s  would tend to  r i s e .  I f  the output i s  continued  
beyond t h i s  p o in t ,  the same labor force and the o v e r a l l  
normal output range could be regarded as a comfortable  
maximum output without much s t r e s s  or s tr a in  upon the 
p la n t .  Beyond a c e r ta in  p o in t ,  perhaps 85$ of absolute  
cap ac ity  on an average fo r  a l l  f irm s, marginal c o s ts  
are known to r i s e  as volume expands. Once the output 
reaches beyond the comfortable maximum working cap acity  
of the p la n t  and s t r e s s e s  are put upon labor and
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equipment, the c o s ts  w i l l  s t a r t  in cr ea s in g  f a i r l y  f a s t .  
This can be in ferred  from an e a r l i e r  statem ent made by 
one in terview ee when he in d ica ted  that w ith  a 67 ,000  
u n it  capacity  he could operate p r o f ita b ly  anywhere from
35.000 to 67 ,000 u n i t s .  He p referred  to operate around
50.000  u n i t s ,  y e t  he could go to 60,000 u n it s  and s t i l l  
not have any increase in  overhead and ta x es  between
50.000 and 60,000 u n i t s .
I t  i s  known that businessmen probably attempt 
to g e t  the b e s t  c o s t  p o ss ib le  when producing fo r  a 
com petitive  market. Two-thirds of the firm s o v e r a l l ,  
when questioned , in d ica ted  th a t  they used a r a t io n a l  
plan fo r  e s ta b l is h in g  the most e f f e c t i v e  sca le  for  
p lan t op eration s , and 48^ of them in d ica ted  that they  
paid  a grea t deal o f  a t te n t io n  to u n it  c o s t s  in  s e t t in g  
the 3calo of operation  fo r  the p la n t .
I t  would be im possib le to analyze the trends in  
marginal c o s t  over the flow  which was mentioned above, 
that i s ,  d ecreasing , con stant, and then in crea s in g  mar­
g in a l  c o s t s .  The matter of tra c in g  f u l l y  a long smooth 
curve fo r  marginal c o s t  i3  almost an im p o s s ib i l i t y .  The 
entrepreneur normally chooses an output and he w i l l  vary 
only s l i g h t l y  around t h i s  l e v e l  o f  production . He con­
s id er s  the b a sic  equipment and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r
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a lte r in g  by adding or su btracting  from output when he 
begins h is  op era tion s . Since he works about a sm all 
p o in t of output, i t  would hardly be p o ss ib le  to trace  
back and fo r th  over a l l  of h i s  ranges o f  output to  
a sc e r ta in  e x a c t ly  how h is  p a r t ic u la r  marginal c o s ts  
vary. Adjustments w ithin  narrow l i m i t s ,  then, are 
p o s s ib le  over the period o f  production but to  move fo r ­
ward and backward over wide ranges o f  output could not 
be achieved along a smooth curve. In some in d u str ie s  
i t  i s  f a i r l y  w e l l  defined  th a t  kinks w i l l  occur in  the 
marginal co st  curve and th a t  these probably occur just  
below and at a p o in t  somewhere above that p o in t  which 
the businessman considers to  bo h is  b e s t  normal ra te  of  
output•
Dae con stant marginal c o s t  concept i s  probably 
a lo g i c a l  one when we consider th a t  most producers 
probably operate in  a range somewhat below the output 
fo r  t h e ir  p lan t and equipment. They operate at a range 
which we con assume w i l l  run somewhere bo tween 65$ and 
85$ of ca p a c ity .  In th e ir  own minds t h is  i s  100$ out­
put; however, i f  we consider  the manner in  which much 
in d u s tr ia l  price-making i s  done, we w i l l  f in d  that the 
w holesa ler  or the r e t a i l e r ,  in  ordering, normally can 
vary h i s  q u a n t i t ie s  and s t i l l  r e c e iv e  the same b asic
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price* This means that the output of the manufacturer 
must be f a i r l y  f l e x i b l e  s in ce  in  one period  he might 
s e l l  one m il l io n  u n it s  o f  an item and in  the next period  
s e l l  only 750,000 unit3  o f  the same item . I f  the demand 
tends to  vary and y e t  the manufacturer holds a catalogue  
price  which i s  steady, then he mu3t recogn ize that there 
i s  some f l e x i b i l i t y  in  h is  output which w i l l  g ive  the 
same marginal u n it  C03t throughout. Somewhere in  h is  
production he has reached a con d ition  wherein h is  raw 
m ateria l c o s ts  become proportionate from a u n it  stand­
p o in t as he in crea ses  output. His labor c o s ts  have 
achieved approximately the 3ome u n it  p ro p o r t io n a lity  
with output because now he i s  able to  expand and con­
tra c t  w ith in  c e r ta in  l im i t s  and s t i l l  have the same 
b a sic  u n it  marginal c o s t .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  a constant marginal co s t  
con d ition  might not be true for  every industry; however, 
from on in d u s tr ia l  standpoint, many manufacturers prob­
ably have some range in  which th e ir  marginal c o s ts  are 
f a i r l y  con stant. The constant part of the marginal c o s t  
curve i s  not the whole curve; I t  c o n s t i tu te s  only a 
w e ll -d e f in e d  s e c t io n  of that curve. This f i t s  the prac­
t i c a l  aspect probably b e t te r  than some o f  the t h e o r e t i ­
c a l  asp ects  wherein the marginal c o s t  curve can be
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d efined  ao f a i r l y  f l a t  or as one long smooth U shape 
curve depending upon the th e o r e t ic ia n .
The businessman no doubt has a c e r ta in  amount 
of f e e l  in  h i s  b u s in e ss ;  he might know fo r  sure about 
the constant marginal c o s t  fea tu re  in  h is  output range 
w hile the th e o r e t ic a l  economist might have trouble  
d efin in g  the exact l im i t s  ju s t  as the businessman does.  
Somewhere in  the range of production , raw m ater ia l and 
labor c o s t  more than l i k e l y  w i l l  become f a i r l y  propor­
t io n a te  w ith  output. I t  i s  obviously  true that bulk  
buying p r ic e s  vary as the q uan tity  in crea ses  because 
of the savings on d is t r ib u t io n  c o s t s  fo r  the manufac­
tu rer . Munufacturers w i l l  make b ig  p r ice  cu ts  for  bulk  
orders and in  some ca ses  w i l l  cu t in to  th e ir  p r o f i t s  
g r e a t ly  in  order to  s e l l  more g o o d s .^  I f  twice the 
normal amount i s  ordered or i f  h a l f  o f  the normal order 
should be made, the sc a le  o f  output fo r  manufacturers 
would be changed and the p r ic e s  would tend to be d i f ­
fe r e n t  at every stage  of production . Normally, though, 
manufacturers do not vary t h e ir  p r ic e s  w ith  in crea ses  
or decreases in  normally expected consumer orders and
l°0ne manufacturer sa id  th at  he purposely put a 
25$ gross mark-up item in  h i s  price-making formula to  
allow b ig  reductions a t  t im es .
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th e ir  p r ic e s  remain f a i r l y  s t a b le ,  in d ic a t in g  that there  
must be some co n s is te n c y  to the constant marginal co s t  
concept over f a i r l y  l im ited  l e v e l s  o f output.
In creasin g  marginal c o s ts  come about when output 
i s  pushed beyond the amount which i s  normally produced 
w ith in  the e x i s t in g  p lan t and with e x i s t in g  equipment. 
The producer u su a lly  w i l l  budget an output which w i l l  
give  a f a i r l y  steady flow  of goods con sid er in g  h is  over­
a l l  production . He w i l l  consider a smooth working pace 
fo r  h is  labor and w i l l  attempt to see that h i s  machines 
and h is  raw m ateria l resou rces are not s tra in ed . In  
budgeting, he i s  aware that he cannot drive machines, 
men, and m a ter ia ls  at f u l l  ca p a c ity  from an id e a l  stand­
p oint year in  and year out and day in  and day ou t. I f  
i t  were p o s s ib le  to  run a p lan t a t  f u l l  speed and never  
have to worry about reserves  fo r  overhauling or fo r  
breakdowns, then the production budget would d e f i n i t e l y  
g ive  a grea ter  output than i t  does under normal circum­
sta n ces .  I f  t h i s  p e r fe c t  budget were prepared, assuming 
e f f o r t l e s s  and f r i c t i o n l e s s  m o b il ity  o f  a l l  reso u rces ,  
then the employer would have a much greater  output 
f igured  than he does b a s ic a l ly .  However, s in ce  i t  I s  
p o s s ib le  fo r  a machine to  break down when i t  i s  pushed 
beyond i t s  normal operating  speeds and where there are
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no machines held  in  r e ser v e , then without a doubt a 
b ottlen eck  could appear in  some department# T his, o f  
course, would crea te  a ser io u s  stoppage, p o s s ib ly  over 
the whole flow  o f  production . Ihe matter o f  having  
in cr ea se s  in  sp o ila g e  because o f  pressure on machines 
and men must be considered in  t h is  same l i n e .  Attempt­
in g  to in crease  e f f o r t s  rap id ly  in  many cases  lead s  to  
i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  th a t  cannot be ironed out q u ick ly .
Increased  lab or c o s t s  because of overtime and 
n ig h t  s h i f t  work, where a continuous manufacturing pro­
c e s s  I s  not used, w i l l  cause these c o s ts  to  more or l e s s  
double up. An unusual th ing  about in cr ea s in g  marginal 
c o s t s ,  however, i s  th a t  labor and raw m ater ia ls  are not  
the on ly  item s which cause these  c o s ts  to go up ra p id ly .  
In some manufacturing l i n e s  i t  i s  ev ident that there i s  
an abrupt break In the in crease  in  u n it  marginal cost  
once the normal op erating  range i s  broken from and out­
put i s  expanded. The a d d it io n a l u n its  which are being  
produced c o s t  more because the f ix e d  c o s ts  o f  the p lan t  
are a lso  being s tr e s se d  to a c e r ta in  e x te n t .  The mar­
g in a l  c o s t  d efined  as the ad d it ion  to t o t a l  co s ts  that  
are incurred by production o f  a d d it io n a l u n it s  makes i t  
c le a r  th a t  i t  i s  t o t a l  o f  a l l  c o s ts  and not ju s t  raw 
m ateria l and labor co s ts  which f ig u r e  in to  marginal
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coat; th is  becomes im portant when a p la n t i s  pushed fo r  
a d d itio n a l u n its  o f  output above the norm ally expected
range o f output.
While labor and raw m a ter ia ls  are norm ally  
assumed to  be the b a s is  fo r  marginal c o s t s ,  when in ­
crea sin g  marginal c o s ts  are con sid ered , i t  i s  n ecessary  
to  p lace  the f ix e d  c o s ts  o f  the p lan t as w e ll as the 
two v a r ia b le  item s mentioned in to  the realm of thought. 
Raw m a ter ia ls  can be figu red  fo r  very l i t t l e  ad d ition  
to  u n it  c o s ts  u n less there i s  an extreme shortage in  
the raw m ateria ls  being used . I f  the q u an tity  o f  a 
raw m ateria l which i s  norm ally used i s  short and i t s  
demand i s  i n e l a s t i c ,  raw m ateria ls  might crea te  an in ­
crease in  c o s t .  The b a sic  p o in t to  be con sid ered , how­
ev er , i s  the fa c t  th a t lab or  c o s ts  in crea se  and th a t  
the breakdowns in  the f ix e d  c o s t  f i e l d  w ith in  the b u si­
n ess  op eration s norm ally go togeth er to  push m arginal 
c o s ts  up once normal op eratin g  ca p a c ity  i s  p assed .
Many in d u s tr ie s  probably c o n sta n tly  s h i f t  th e ir  
op eratin g  arrangements and make con tin u a l p lant and 
p rocess s tu d ie s  so as to make known th e area o f  output 
in  which th e ir  m arginal c o s ts  tend to  be f a i r ly  con­
s ta n t . This range w i l l  vary depending upon economic 
circum stances and can vary $%  to 10% below normal output
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and i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t i t  might in crea se  above normal 
by ju s t  as much. With t h is  s h if t in g  in  the output range 
o f the con stan t u n it  m arginal c o s t s ,  s tu d ie s  to  show the 
exact or approxim ately the exact p o in t at which c o s ts  
w i l l  in crea se  are n ecessa ry . When production f a l l s  
below the norm ally expected  minimum outp ut, c o s ts  w i l l  
tend to go up, and when output i s  pushed beyond the 
r e s i l i e n t  range o f ou tp ut, the c o s t  w i l l  tend to  go up. 
This m arginal c o s t  fe a tu r e , w ithout a doubt, i s  e ssen ­
t i a l  in  the op eration  o f  a b u sin ess and i s  b a sic  to  
p r ic in g  when com p etition  i s  k een .11
Coat P eriod . The determ ination  o f  a b u s in e ss ­
man’ s p eriod  o f  production  a r is e s  in  connection  w ith  
the a n a ly s is  o f  short and lon g run e f f e c t s  in  b u sin ess  
o p era tio n s . I t  i s  im p ossib le  to  determ ine the len g th  
o f time in vo lved  in  e ith e r  the short or the lon g  run 
except to s ta te  th a t the lon g  run i s  any len g th  o f time 
n ecessary  to  make a fundamental change in  supply w hile  
the sh ort run i s  any len g th  time sh o rter  than the long  
run. Again, we assume th a t the short run i s  supposed 
to  be the len g th  o f  time wherein te c h n ic a l equipment 
i s  f ix e d  and the maximum output cannot be a lte r e d . The
n See P la te  22 .
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long run i s  one in  which alm ost any and every change in  
the l e v e l  o f output can be made. As to  whether these  
p a r t ic u la r  d e f in it io n s  f i t  the b u sin ess scene or not i s  
q u estio n a b le . There i s  l e s s  r i g id i t y  in  te c h n ic a l  
equipment and working co n d itio n s o v e r a ll than in  other  
elem ents in  the production  p lan , such as those imposed 
on the producer by the nature o f h is  product in  a 
m o n o p o lis t ic a lly  com p etitive market, or those imposed 
upon a businessman who f ix e s  h is  p r ice  fo r  a long period  
o f  time and i s  a fra id  o f  u nstab le p r ic e s .
The period  o f  production  which we s h a l l  d e fin e  
as the short run i s  the production  period  o f  an in d i­
v id u a l firm  in  i t s  normal o p era tio n s. There i s  no s e t  
time fo r  t h is  p eriod  in  th a t i t  may be one month* tw elve  
months, e ig h teen  months, or p o s s ib ly  even lo n g er . Each 
in d iv id u a l firm  w i l l  vary i t s  production  p eriod  somewhat 
and each can have a d if fe r e n t  production p er io d . The 
len g th  o f  time covered by a period  o f  production gen­
e r a l ly  i s  tw elve months in so fa r  as p lanning and budget­
in g  i s  concerned. Some firm s have two or three "seasons" 
which may overlap  in  the d if fe r e n t  f i s c a l  p e r io d s .
Production p eriod  a n a ly s is  i s  being adapted more 
and more in to  p r ice  period  a n a ly s is  and the two are 
being meshed. For example, i f  a businessman has to
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e s ta b lis h  f ix e d  p r ic e s  in  a cata logue fo r  a p eriod  o f  
s ix  months, then he more than l ik e l y  w i l l  p lan  h is  ou t­
put fo r  a six-m onths p eriod  and have two o f these pro­
duction  p eriod s in  one yoar. In cases where sev era l 
products are being produced, i t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t even  
though th ese  products might bo complementary or supp le­
mentary products, the production p eriods w i l l  tend to  
o v er la p .
The short-run  p eriod  i s  recogn ized  as one in  
which p r ic e s  w i l l  be more or l e s s  steady; and, u n less  
the product i s  so ld  in  a market or exchange where 
p r ic e s  are quoted d a i ly ,  demand can have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  
upon p r ice  and output* In con sid er in g  the lon g  p eriod  
o f  p rod uction , however, the businessmen w i l l  d e f in i t e ly  
con sid er  the changes th a t might occur in  demand or the 
changes th a t have occurred in  demand in  the p a st sh o r t-  
run p er io d . In con sid er in g  a production budget fo r  the  
coming p er io d , he can change h is  output and h is  produc­
t io n  process to  such an ex ten t as to  crea te  a fundamen­
t a l  change In  supply to  meet demand c o n d itio n s .
There i s  no s e t  period  which we can d efin e  as
the sh ort run nor a s e t  period  which we can d efin e  as
the lon g run. Firms vary in  th e ir  production p o l ic i e s  
and th e ir  production  p eriod s; products, sea so n s, and
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b u sin ess  ad visors can a l l  change the len g th  o f these  
p er io d s . The econom ist can use a th e o r e t ic a l d e f in it io n  
and i t  w i l l  be very c lo se  to  that which the businessman 
u ses  in  p r a c t ic e .
The impact o f  c o s t  upon p r ice  and the ex ten t to  
which c o s t  serves as a price-determ in ing  fa c to r  are 
probably tempered somewhat by the nature o f the p r ic in g  
market. During a p eriod  o f expanding markets and expand­
ing production , c o s t  would d e f in i t e ly  have a d if fe r e n t  
p r ic in g  e f f e c t  than during a period  in  which markets are 
d ecreasin g  and in v en to r ie s  are h igh .
During the period  o f  research  included in  th is  
t h e s is ,  firm s f e l t  th a t c o s ts  as a p rice-d eterm in in g  
fa c to r  were very important and were in crea sin g  in  im­
portance. N inety per cent o f the firm s o v e r a ll b e liev ed  
that c o s ts  were d e f in i t e ly  in crea sin g  in  importance as 
a p rice-d eterm in in g  fa c to r  and only 2$ o f the firm s f e l t  
th a t they were d ecreasing  in  im portance. On the b a s is  
o f sm all, medium, and large firm s, the breakdown fo r  
" in creasin g  in  importance" was 90$, 94$, and 80$, 
r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Ten per cent o f  the sm all firm s d id  not 
answer th is  q u estio n , and i t  i s  noteworthy th a t not one 
sm all firm  thought th a t c o s ts  were decreasing  in  impor­
tance as a p rice-d eterm in in g  fa c to r . F ifte e n  per cent
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of the large  firm s d id  not answer the q u estion  and 5%
thought that c o s ts  were decreasing  in  im portance. Only
2 % o f the medium s iz e  firm s thought th a t c o s ts  were 
d ecreasing  in  importance w hile 4$ of these firm s d id  
not answer. Some of the comments r e la t iv e  to co st  as 
a p rice-detorm in in g  fa c to r  are th ese : "They are in ­
crea sin g  in  importance in  the e n t ir e  f ie ld ; "  "They are 
s ta y in g  ra th er s ta tio n a ry ;"  and "Over a period  of years  
c o s ts  are a determ inant o f p r ic e s  and th erefore  can 
n e ith e r  be in crea sin g  nor d ecreasing  in  importance."
The a tte n tio n  paid  to c o s t  as i t  a f fe c t s  p r ice
in  th is  chapter i s  thought to be j u s t i f ie d  on the b a s is
o f th e o r e t ic a l  economics and on the b a s is  of importance 
to  the businessm an. Since c o s t  must be considered  as 
the b a s ic  supply-determ ining fa c to r , o f n e c e s s ity  any 
paper d ea lin g  w ith  p r ice  would have to  include c o s t  
a n a ly s is  and c o s t  p o lic y .
The m a ter ia l contained  in  th i3  chapter has not 
been intended to be a l l  in c lu s iv e  o f p r ic e , p r ice  fa c ­
to r s , p r ice  p o lic y , and c o s t  of production . The a n a ly s is  
of the modern day prico-m aker and the fa c to r s  which he 
con sid ers in  p r ic in g  are those which the w riter  con sid ers  
o f most im portance. In d ea lin g  w ith  p r ice  p o lic y , as 
such, there are many ra m ifica tio n s  th a t cannot be brought
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out in  a q u estion n a ire method o f re sea rch . I t  i s  n eces­
sary in  every case to  s e le c t  only those th ings which are 
assumed to be rather g en era lly  accepted in so fa r  as p rice  
p o lic y  i s  concerned. Such th in gs as p r ice  s t a b i l i t y ,  
agreements, monopoly, lea d ersh ip , ta x a tio n , and d is ­
crim ination  c e r ta in ly  are only a few o f the th in gs which 
would temper p r ic e  p o lic y . These item s, however, prob­
ably need more a n a ly s is  than others which have been more 
f u l ly  exp lored .
In the se c t io n  d ea lin g  w ith  c o s t , i t  must be 
recogn ized  th a t co st  of production i s  such a broad term 
th a t i t  in clu d es much that both the econom ist and the 
accountant ta lk  about. I t  i s  co n sta n tly  on the mind of 
the businessm an, and to the econom ist, i t  serves as a 
b a s is  fo r  supply and as such i t  becomes e s s e n t ia l  in  
p r ice  determ ination , income a n a ly s is , and r e la te d  
f i e l d s .  Many c o s t  concepts of both  the econom ist and 
management have been om itted in  th is  a n a ly s is  sin ce  
i t  has been assumed that th ese w i l l  probably be known. 
For example, an emphasis upon 3uch economic id eas as 
f ix e d  c o s t s , v a r ia b le  c o s t s ,  m arginal c o s t s ,  average 
c o s t3 , t o ta l  c o s t s ,  and other c o s t  concepts has been 
re stra in ed  p u rp osely . J u stly  so , management concepts  
o f f ix e d  c o s t s ,  both recu rren t and a llo c a b le , se m i-fix ed
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c o s ts , d ir e c t ly  v a r ia b le  c o s t s ,  to ta l  c o s t ,  m arginal 
c o s t , standard c o s t ,  and other c o s t  id eas have been 
g en era lly  om itted , to o . Such th in gs as te c h n ic a lity  
and p rocess changes and th e ir  e f f e c t s  upon p r ic e s ,  and 
the m atter of f l e x i b i l i t y  of output and co st changes 
have not been trea ted  f u l l y .
The purpose of th is  chapter has been to p resen t  
s e le c te d  fa c to r s  which en ter  in to  price-m aking and 
p r ice  p o l ic y . These fa c to r s ,  when considered  in  the 
l ig h t  o f  current economic thought as presented  in  
Chapter 2 , should g ive  some b a s is  fo r  analyzing both  
economic analyses and b u sin ess  p r a c t ic e . This w i l l  be 
undertaken in  the fo llo w in g  chapter.
APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE AND QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
2 0 3
P lease  n o te : In cases where se v era l answers might apply,
p lea se  in d ic a te  r e la t iv e  importance w ith  
1 , 2, 3 , e t c .
1 . A. How would you c la s s i f y  the type o f  product produced
by your firm?
Consumer goods
 C apita l goods
 T e x tile s
 R e ta il goods
 Interm ediate products
 B uilders su p p lie s
 Others (S p e c ify )____________ ____________ _
B. How would you c la s s i f y  your concern as to  i t s  s iz e  




2. A. How would you c la s s i f y  your concern in  so fa r  as
i t s  com p etitive s itu a t io n  i s  concerned?
 Very com petitive
 About average
Ver.v l i t t l e  com petition
B. How much do you fea r  com petition?
 Very much
No t very muoh 
Not a t a l l
C. Some econom ists b e lie v e  th a t most markets are 
ch aracterized  by a few b ig  s e l l e r s  and that there  
i s  g en e r a lly  a b eh in d -th e-scen es element o f  o o llu  
s io n  in  p r ic in g . Do you th ink  that t h i s  i s
 True
 P o ss ib ly  true
 F alse
D. I s  there any fa c to r  more im portant than p r ice  in  
your marketing s tra teg y ?





3 . A. Who s e t s  the p r ic e s  fo r  your concern?
 A committee (c h ie f  e x e c u tiv e , s a le s  manager,
e t c . )
 The c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e
 The accounting department
 The s a le s  manager
 Others (S p ec ify )_______________________________
B. Are your p r ice  makers tra in ed  and experienced in :
 B usiness experience on ly
 Formal econom ics, f in a n ce , accounting , or
en gin eerin g
Both




 S a les
I n v en to r ies
y e t  op eratin g  income
Un f i l l e d  orders
 Climate o f  op in ion
 Formula
 Other (S p e c ify )_________________________________
A. A. What i s  your p r ic in g  p o licy ?
 Maximize p r o f i t s  fo r  the whole produot l in e
 Promote the long-run  w elfa re  o f  the firm
Discourage com petition  from en ter in g  the f i e ld
 Adapt p r ic e  to  f i t  the in d iv id u a l com p etitive
s itu a t io n  enoountered by d if fe r e n t  products
 A s e t  and sy stem a tic  method o f  p r ic in g  new
products
 F le x ib le  p r ic e  so as to  meet changes in  eco ­
nomic co n d itio n s  
 Other (S p e c ify )_________________________________
B. Do you attem pt to  e s ta b lis h  some degree o f  monopoly 
in  your p r io in g  p o licy ?
 G enerally




C. In your opinion i s  p r ice  s t a b i l i t y  
 Good
 Bad
 Of l i t t l e  consequence
D. On what would you say your p rice  p o lic y  i s  based? 
 Reasonable return
 Trade a s so c ia t io n s
 Cost a n a ly s is
 Agreement (w ith in  th e industry)
 P rice  consumers want
 Com petitive co n d itio n s  and co s t a n a ly s is
 On p r ice  lead er
 By con tract
 What th e market w i l l  bear
 Other (S p e c ify )________________________________
E. Have you ever a lte r e d , or would you be l ik e l y  to  
a l t e r ,  your b a sic  p r ice  p o lic y  in  case o f  a 
d ep ression  in  your industry?
 Yes
 No
Tf""answer i s  y e s , p lea se  sp e c ify :
F. How im portant i s  the n a tte r  o f  ta x a tio n  in  i t s  
impact upon your p r ice  p o licy ?
 Qf primary importance
 One of many fa c to r s  a f fe c t in g  p o lic y
 Not very important
 Not considered  a t a l l
5 . Does your firm  ever charge d if fe r e n t  p r ic e s  to  
d iffe r e n t  customers or p la ces  in  cases such as 
t h e s e :
 Q uantity d iscou n ts
 Annual d isco u n ts  (to  preserve a market
te r r ito r y ,  e t c . )
 F in a n c ia l terms (F.O .B. fa c to r y , e t c . )
 Method o f  s a le  (d is tr ib u to r s , salesm en, r e t a i l
o u t le t s ,  e t c . )
 O ff peak b u sin ess
 Others (S p e c ify )_______________________________
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6 . A. Are you ab le  to  c a lc u la te  a ccu ra te ly  under varying
circum stances your output and revenue th a t maximize
p r o f its ?
 Yes
 No
B. Do you s e le c t  the maximum revenue a t a l l  tim es?  
 Yes
 No
C. In e s ta b lis h in g  th e most e f f e c t iv e  sc a le  o f  p lant 
o p era tio n s , do you
__Have a r a t io n a l plan  
 Use t r i a l  and error
D. How much a t te n t io n  i s  paid to  u n it  c o s ts  in  s e t t in g
the s c a le  o f  op eration s fo r  the p lant?
 Very much
 About average
 Very  l i t t l e
E. How much a t te n t io n  i s  paid to  c o s t  f ig u r e s  prepared 
by co s t  accountants in  s e t t in g  p lan t sca le?
 Very  much
 About average
 Very  l i t t l e
7 . A. Do you th in k  th a t c o s ts  as a p r ice  determ ining  
fa c to r  are
 In creasin g  in  importance
 D ecreasing in  importance
How im portant i s  a knowledge of m arginal c o s ts  to  
p r ic in g , p a r t ic u la r ly  rock bottom p ric in g?
Very important
 Of moderate importance
 Not important
Do you b e lie v e  th a t in  th e  long run "marketers in  
a f r e e  economy very  probably charge th e  customer 
th e  h ig h est p r ice  th a t  in  th e ir  op in ion s th ey  can 




9 . A. Is  your p lan t operated w ith  ex cess  capacity?
 G enerally
 O ccasion ally
 Seldom
 Never
B. In the l ig h t  o f  your e x is t in g  cap acity  w i l l  an 
in crea se  in  output cause your u n it  cost to
 Increase
 Decrease
 Remain about the same
208
Number before t i t l e  in d ic a te s  t o t a l  answers; numbers 
fo llo w in g  t i t l e  in d ic a te  sm all, medium, and la rg e  concern  
answers, r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Where t o t a l  answers are more or 
l e s s  than 100, e ith e r  two or more answers were perm iss­
ib le  or the answers were exp lan ation s th a t could not be 
adapted. Where comments were made by th e answering firm s, 
they are included  im m ediately below the summaries o f  firm  
answ ers.
1 . A. C la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  firm s by type of product
37 Consumer goods * 10-18-9
22 C ap ita l goods 3-14-5
3 T e x t i le s  1 - 2-0
6 R e ta il  goods 4 - 1-1
5 Interm ediate products 3 -  1-1
24 B u ild ers su p p lie s  7 -10-7
13 Other products 5- 8 -0
2 (Firm s, no answer) 1 - 1-0
Comments: O thers—meat products; Consumer goods 
so ld  through " r e ta il"  o u t le t s ,  o th ers  
are so ld  fo r  use by in d u s tr ia l  concerns 
and r a ilr o a d s .




2 . A. C la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  firm s by com p etitive  p o s it io n  
67 Very com p etitive  19-31-17
30 About average 9 -1 8 - 3
3 Very l i t t l e  com petition  2 - 1 -  0
Comments: About average: Becoming more com p etitive  
a l l  th e  tim e (consumer goods—medium); 
Not a t a l l ,  but re sp ec t i t  h igh ly  
(b u ild er s  su p p lie s—la r g e ) .
B. C la s s i f ic a t io n  o f firm s by fe a r  o f  com petition
30 Very much fe a r  10-17-3
45 Not very much 12-26-7
23 Not a t  a l l  7 -6 -10
2 (Firm s, no answer) 1 -1 -  0
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Comments: Our in d u stry  i s  over expanded probably 
100$; Fear com petition  very much; A 
moderate amount.
C. C la s s i f ic a t io n  o f firm s by th e ir  b e l i e f  in  c o l lu ­
s io n  o f  p r ic in g  by a few b ig  s e l l e r s
7 T'rue 4 -  3 -0
35 P o ssib ly  tru e 14-15-6
55 F a lse  10-32-13
3 (Firms, no answer) 2 - 0 -1
Comments: F a lse . This does not occur in  our
in du stry  (c a p ita l  goods—medium); F alse  
in  our l in e ;  Could p o ss ib ly  have been 
tru e in  th e  p ast; I doubt i t  tod ay . I  
th ink  th ey  fo llo w  co s t  lea d er , however.
D. Factors b e lie v ed  to  be more important than p rice  
in  marketing s tr a te g y
11 S ty le  3 - 4 - 4
70 Q uality  20-34-16
1 Beauty 0 -  0 - 1
11 S erv ice  2 - 3 - 6
20 No fa c to r  more important 5 -1 0 - 5
Comments: T otal c o s ts ;  A v a ila b il i ty  o f m ater ia l as 
w e ll as p r ice ; A ll fa c to r s  are eq u a lly  
im portant; Design fe a tu r e s ;  Q uality  w ith  
ce r ta in  products only; P rice i s  above a l l ,  
q u a lity  i s  second; P rice  and q u a lity ;  
Demand: Not p a r t ic u la r ly  although a l l  
th ree  ( s t y l e ,  q u a lity , beauty) sometimes 
a f fe c t  sa le ;  P rice; Q uality  i s  eq u a lly  
im portant w ith p r ice; Need (new develop­
m ents); P rice  and fr e ig h t  c o s t;  General 
d esign  fo r  a p p lica tio n ; S ty le  and p r ice  
are eq u a lly  im portant; Economy of opera­
t io n ;  Q u ality , s e r v ic e , and p rice; Not 
more im portant— p rice  i s  primary, q u a lity  
i s  secondary; P ro d u ctiv ity  i s  f i r s t ,  
q u a lity  i s  second; Combination o f  th ese  
fa c to r s ,  s e r v ic e  r e s u lt in g  from products; 
Q u ality—but you have to  be com p etitive  
p rice  w ise; S erv ice  to  customer; A ll four  
fa c to r s  l i s t e d  eq u a lly  important w ith
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p r ic e , en g in eerin g  d esign  i s  a ls o  impor­
ta n t;  Q u ality  o f product i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  
continu ing su cc ess;  No, beauty, second, 
q u a lity , th ir d .
3. A. Methods by which firm s s e t  p r ices
47 A committee 12-24-11
26 The c h ie f  execu tive  7 -1 7 - 2
2 The accounting department 2 -  0 -  0
12 The s a le s  manager 3 -  6 - 3
11 Other methods 6 - 2 - 3
Comments: A com m ittee, th e accounting department,
C.P.A. a ls o ;  The government a g en c ies— 
OPS, the c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e; The c h ie f  
ex ecu tiv e  in  co n su lta tio n  w ith  o th ers;
A committee a f te r  f ig u r e s  from co st  
department; C om petition, o f  co u rse , we 
must meet p r ic e s  la r g e ly  based on Wall 
S treet Journal q uotations; The s a le s  
manager w ith  d e f in i te  h elp  from account­
in g  department; Production and c h ie f  
ex ecu tiv e; S a les manager and department 
heads; Based on engineering department 
co st  estim a tes; Based on e s tim a te s  by 
estim ating  department; C onstruction  con­
t r a c t s  by com p etitive b idding; Follow  
published  market; The s a le s  manager, 
aided  by h is  s t a f f ,  in  co n su lta tio n  w ith  
production  co n tro l department, tim e  
study s t a f f ,  c o s t  accountant, e t c . ;  Mer­
chandise department; A b i l ity  o f the  
vending machine to  r e c e iv e  ce r ta in  co in s;  
Cost, a ls o  engineering department; 
General manager and p res id en t.
B. P r ice  makers are tr a in ed  as fo llo w s:
49 B usiness exp erien ce on ly  15-21-13
11 Formal econom ics, f in a n ce ,
accoun ting , or en gin eerin g  1 -  9 - 1
41 Both 11-20-10
3 (Firms, no answer) 2 -  0 -  1
Comments: Both but b u sin ess exp erien ce p r im a rily .
P rice makers a tte n t io n  i s  focused  on 
54 C osts 16-27-11
16 Net operating income 4 - 9 -  3
11 S a les  2 - 7 - 2
10 P rice 5- 4 -  1
5 (Firms, no answer) 2 - 1 -  2
Comments: C om petitive p r ic e  and c o s ts ;  Com petition  
i s  main th in g  p r ice  maker’ s a t te n t io n  i s  
on; In ap p licab le  (as p lant must be kept 
operating  24 hours per day and w ith in  
narrow l im it s ,  c lo s e  to  ca p a c ity , and 
w ith  storage lim ite d  to  ’’norm al,'’ th e  
product must co n sta n tly  flow  to  purchaser 
Cost, th e r e fo r e , operates on ly  in  the  
long-run  and determ ines whether you s ta y  
in  b u s in e ss . We must r e f in e  c lo s e  to  
ca p a city  to  keep our crude o i l  sou rces. 
O therwise, they  would be l o s t  permanently 
You might make a comparison o f petroleum  
to  farm products on p e r is h a b il i ty ) ;  Com­
p e t it io n  a c tu a lly  determ ines p r ic e , s a le s  
must be m aintained to  balance inventory; 
Com petitive p r ic e s ;  Com petition; A ll  
above and supply and demand; A ll o f  th ese  
plus judgment; Combination of the fa c to r s  
l i s t e d  on th e  q u estion n a ire and other  
fa c to r s ;  Competitors p r ic e s  on comparable 
q u a lity .
P ric in g  p o l ic ie s
49 Promote th e long-run w elfare o f
th e  firm  11-25-13
35 Adapt p r ice  to  f i t  the in d iv id u a l
com p etitive  s itu a t io n  10 -17 - S
16 F le x ib le  p r ice  to  meet changes in
economic co n d itio n s  4 -1 1 - 1
10 A s e t  and system atic  method o f
p r ic in g  new products 4 -  6 -  0
2 (Firm s, no answer) 2 - 0 -  0
Comments: Set system  required under OPS; We p r ice  
to  return  a f a i r  p r o f i t — oth erw ise , we 
don’t  s e l l  i t .
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B. Firms th a t attem pt to  e s ta b lis h  some degree o f  
monopoly
Comments: Encourage our d ea lers  to  avoid  p r ice  cu t­
t in g ;  Never attem pt to  e s ta b lis h  monopoly 
in  p r ic in g  p o lic y , but do t r y  to  e s ta b lis h  
patent m onopolies; Never, your question  
rep resen ts an im p o s s ib il i ty .
C. Firms con sid er p rice  s t a b i l i t y  to  be
Comments: Of l i t t l e  consequence as long as gross
margin i s  s u f f i c i e n t —in d u stry  i s  geared  
to  p r ic e  change; Extremely n ecessary; I 
do not know what you mean by p r ice  s t a ­
b i l i t y .  Published p r ic e s  on many manu­
factu red  commodities should be r e la t iv e ly  
s ta b le ,  at l e a s t  for short p eriods o f  
tim e, in  th e b u ild in g  in d u stry . Con­
s tr u c t io n  planning could not proceed  
were b u ild ers  unable to  determ ine c o s ts  
based upon p r ic e s  is su e d  by m anufacturers.
D. Firms base th e ir  p r ice  p o l ic i e s  on 
56 Com petitive co n d ition  and co st
Comments: Supply and demand (except when under
c o n tr o ls ) ;  P rice  customers want and are 
w ill in g  to pay.
5 G enerally  
7 O ccasion ally  
15 Seldom 
71 Never 
2 (Firms, no answer)
2 -  3 -  0 
2 -  5-  0 
1 - 12 -  2 
2 3 -3 0 -lS  
2 -  0 -  0
74 Good 
11 Bad
12. Of l i t t l e  consequence 
3 (Firms, no answer}
3 - 3 - 6 
1 -  1 -  1
a n a ly s is  
41 Reasonable return  
16 Cost a n a ly s is  
4 Contract 
2 (Firms, no answer)
19- 26-11 
£ -23-10  
4-  9 - 3 
1 -  3 -  0 
1 -  0 -  1
Firms that v^ould a l t e r  t h e ir  b a sic  p r ice  p o lic y  in  
a depression
35 Yes 3 -2 2 - 5
60 No 22-26-12
5 (Firms, no answer) 0 -  2- 3
Comments: Yes, our p r ice  i s  based p rim arily  on
op erative and merchandise c o s t s .  A 
depression  would bring p r ice  down a l l  
along the l in e ;  Downward; Change s a le s  
methods to reduce c o s ts ;  Take l e s s  
p r o f it ;  Could probably operate on c lo s e r  
margin during d ep ression ; Yes, i f  p rice  
a lte r a t io n  would in crea se  volume to  
avoid  op era tiv e  ex c ess , th ere  would be 
no a lte r n a t iv e ;  To determ ine a net 
return th a t would permit continued  
employment of personnel and o p era tio n s, 
yes; Yes, we would reduce c o s t s  and 
p r ic e s;  Yes, to  meet com p etition , reduce 
l o s s ,  e t c . ;  Com petitive co n d itio n s and 
co s t  a n a ly s is ;  Probably downward to  meet 
com petition; C onditions would govern  
a c tio n s;  Have a lte r e d  p r ic e s  but not 
b a sic  p r ice  p o lic y ;  Yes, down to  meet 
com p etition . (Of th e  14 l i s t e d  above,
5 were sm a ll, 3 medium, and 1 la r g e ) .
The importance o f  ta x a tio n  in  i t s  impact upon p rice  
p o lic y
29 Of primary importance 7 -1 6 - 4
49 One o f many fa c to r s  13-26-10
11 Not very important 5 - 6 - 0
3 Not considered  at a l l  5 - 0 -  3
3 (Firm s, no answer) 0 -  0 -  3
Firms charging d if f e r e n t  p r ice s  to  d if f e r e n t  custom ers 
or p la ces
55 Q uantity d iscou n ts 17-25-13
1 Annual d iscou n ts 1 -  0 -  0
4 F in a n c ia l terms 1 - 2 - 1
32 Method o f  s a le  (D is tr ib u to r s , e t c . )  10 -1 6 - 6
6 O ff peak b u sin ess  2 -  4 -  0
15 Other reasons 2 -1 0 - 3
20 No d iffe r e n t  p r ice s  7 -1 1 - 2
Comments: Cost o f  tra n sp o r ta tio n ; Kind o f  m ateria l 
used and d e liv e r y  d is ta n ce ; Trade-in
allow ances fo r  used equipment, vary; 2$,
10 days i s  standard other than  our d is ­
tr ib u to r s ;  Dating; Jobber, ch a in , depart­
ment s to r e ;  No s e t  pattern ; For d iscon ­
tin u ed  numbers; Q uantity d isco u n ts , a 
published p lan  known to a l l ;  Trade d is ­
counts; Q uantity d isco u n ts on some products; 
May reduce a p r ice  t o  meet com petition; 
Outside s a le s  are c h ie f ly  custom equipment 
on s p e c ia l  order; D ifferen t c l a s s i f i e d  cus­
tomers take a d if fe r e n t  p r ice  (p a in ter s , 
d e a le r s , in d u stry , r e t a i l ) ;  B asic p o lic y  i s  
firm , d if fe r e n t  p r ic e s  charged only w ith in  
framework o f p o lic y ;  Q uantity d i f f e r e n t ia l  
based on c o s t s .
Firms th a t are a b le  t o  c a lc u la te  a ccu ra te ly  under 
varying circum stances th e ir  output and revenue th a t  
maximize p r o f it s
Comments: Make s a le s  fo r e c a s t s ,  and from th e s e ,  
budget p lan t o p era tio n s.
Firms s e le c t in g  th e  maximum revenue a t  a l l  tim es
Comments: No, a t  tim es we s e l l  merchandise a t  a lo s s
because i t  would be good pub lic p o lic y  and 
consequently  good company p o licy  to  w ith ­
draw from a gen era l market; Charge what 
t r a f f i c  w i l l  bear in  some in s ta n c e s .
Methods o f  e s ta b lis h in g  the most e f f e c t iv e  s c a le  o f  
plant op eration s
50 Yes 
41 No 
7 (Firm s, no answer) 
2 Firms, yes and no
11 - 27-12  
1 6-19 - 6 
3 -  2 -  2 
0 -  2 -  0
22 Yes 
70 No
& (Firms, no answer)
9 -  9 -  4 
1C-3C-14 
3 - 3 -  2
66 Have a r a t io n a l plan  
21 Use t r i a l  and error  
10 (Firm s, no answer)
3 Firms, both methods
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Comments: Build m ostly  fo r  orders (c a p ita l  goods);
Governed by market co n d itio n s; B usiness  
based on many item s fa b r ica ted  to  s p e c i­
f ic a t io n s ,  cannot e s ta b lis h  uniform  
op eration .
D. Degree of a t te n t io n  paid to  u n it c o s ts  in  s e t t in g
the. sc a le  o f op eration s fo r  th e  p lant
4$ Very much 15-22-11
33 About average £ -2 1 - 4
11 Very l i t t l e  4 -  5- 2
£ (Firms, no answer) 3 - 2 - 3
Comments: Level of s a le s  determ ines l e v e l  o f p lant
o p era tio n s, u n it  c o s t s  observed in  
determ ining whether to  in crea se  or 
decrease in ven tory .
E. Degree of a t te n t io n  paid to  c o s t  f ig u r e s  prepared 
by c o s t  accountants in  s e t t in g  p lan t s c a le
42 Very much 10-22-10
37 About average 11-22- 4
16 Very l i t t l e  7 - 5 - 4
5 (Firm s, no answer) 2 -  1 -  2
7 . A. Firms f e e l  th a t c o s ts  a s  a p r ice  determ ining fa c to r  
are:
90 In creasin g  in  importance 27-47-16
2 D ecreasing in  importance 0 -  1 - 1
£ (Firm s, no answer) 3 - 2 - 3
Comments: In creasin g  in  importance in  th e e n t ir e
f i e ld ;  They are  sta y in g  rather sta tio n a r y ;  
Over a period  o f years c o s ts  are a 
determ inant o f  p r ic e s , and, th e r e fo r e ,  
can n e ith e r  be in crea sin g  nor d ecreasing  
in  im portance.
B. Degree o f importance of knowledge o f marginal c o s ts  
to  rock bottom p r ic in g
£0 Very important 22-41-17
12 Of moderate importance 3 -  7 - 2
£ (Firms, no answer) 5 - 2 - 1
•*
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6 . Firms th a t  f e e l  th a t m arketers in  a fr e e  economy 
charge th e  customer the h ig h e st p r ice  th a t th ey  
can a fford  to  ask
40 Yes 14 -1 9 - 7
55 No 14-29-12
3 (Firms, no answer) 1 -  1 -  1
2 Firms q u a lif ie d  answers 1 -  1 -  0
Comments: Maybe (sm a ll);  Yes, but th e customer
b e n e f it s  in  the lon g  run, because s e r v ic e  
and q u a lity  are b e tte r ;  Yes, i f  you con­
s id e r  i t s  e f f e c t  on volume; Competition  
won*t permit e x c e ss iv e  p r ic e s  in  our
in d u stry ; No, a t l e a s t  a concern which
exp ects to b u ild  and m aintain good w i l l  
would say no; No, in  the long run mar­
k eters  in  a f r e e  economy very  probably  
charge th e  customer the low est p r ice  
th a t  in  th e ir  op in ion  they  can a ffo rd  
to  ask ( la r g e ) .
9 . A. Firms operated under ex c ess  ca p a city
28 G enerally  1 0 -1 5 - 3
53 O ccasion a lly  15-24-14
15 Seldom 5- 8 - 2
3 Never 0 - 3 - 0
1 (Firm, no answer) 0 -  0 -  1
Comments: Our s t e e l  c a s t in g s  department i s  u su a lly
operated a t cap acity ; our r o l l in g  m ill  
( s t e e l  bars) i s  always operated a t l e s s  
than ca p a c ity .
B. With e x is t in g  ca p a city  an in crea se  in  output w i l l  
cause u n it  co s t  to :
5 In crease 2 - 2 -  1
76 D ecrease 22-37-17
18 Remain about the same 6 -1 1 -  1
1 (Firm, no answer) 0 -  0 -  1
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRICING POLICIES OF BUSINESS FIRMS
L is t  o f  P la te s
1 . CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY SIZE IN THE INDUSTRY
2. CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY COMPETITIVE POSITION
3. CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY FEAR OF COMPETITION
4 . BELIEF IN COLLUSION OF PRICING BY A FEW BIG SELLERS
5. FACTORS MORE IMPORTANT THAN PRICE IN MARKETING 
STRATEGY
6. METHODS BY WHICH FIRMS SET PRICES
7 . TRAINING OF PRICE MAKERS
8. PRICE MAKERS ATTENTION FOCUSED ON:
9 . PRICING POLICIES
10. FIRMS ATTEMPTING SOME DEGREE OF MONOPOLY
11. PRICE STABILITY
12. BASES OF PRICE POLICY
13. FIRMS THAT WOULD ALTER POLICY IN TIME OF DEPRESSION
14. IMPORTANCE OF TAXATION IN PRICE POLICY
1$. FIRMS CHARGING DIFFERENT PRICES TO DIFFERENT 
CUSTOMERS
16. FIRMS ABLE TO CALCULATE OUTPUT AND REVENUE
17. FIRMS SELECTING MAXIMUM REVENUE AT ALL TIMES
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CHAPTER IV 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Economic p r ice  theory has been c r i t i c i z e d  by 
in d iv id u a ls  who b e l ie v e  that theory doe3 not character­
iz e  b u siness  p r a c t ic e .  These attacks have continued  
w ith  r e la t iv e  co n sis ten cy  s in ce  the la t e  1 9 2 0 ' s .  Such 
econom ists as P rofessors Piero S ra ffa , Howard H o te ll in g ,  
and R. A .. Gordon have contended th a t  price  theory needs 
an o r ie n ta t io n  toward p rice  p o l i c i e s ,  s a le s  promotion, 
and sp e c ia l  buyer conveniences. Those econom ists have 
poin ted  to a problem wherein marginal economic a n a ly s is  
of the firm i s  weak and does not f i t  the businessman's  
p r a c t ic a l  p r ic e  and output problems.
Economists o f equal s ta tu re  with the c r i t i c s  
have defended the a p p lica t io n  of price  theory to b u sin ess  
p r a c t ic e .  P rofessors F r itz  Machlup and P. W. S. Andrews 
have been instrum ental in  the defense o f  economic theory. 
P rofessor Edward Chamberlin and Mrs. Joan Robinson helped  
to  r e o r ie n t  the n e o - c la s s i c a l  a n a ly s is  of p r ic e .
R ecently , t h e ir  th e o r e t ic a l  approach has been c r i t i c i z e d  
as not ch a ra c ter iz in g  p r a c t ic a l  b usiness  a c t i v i t i e s .
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2he controversy over the a p p lica t io n  of economic 
p rice  theory to business p r ic e  p r a c t ic e s  has been the 
b a s is  for  th is  research . The problem involved  i s  one 
of f in d in g  whether the economist i s  r ig h t  or wrong, or 
whether there i s  only an element of divergence between 
the econom ist’s concepts and those o f  the businessman.
The method of approach to t h is  problem ha3 been 
to  p resen t current p r ice  theory and an an a lys is  o f  b u s i­
ness p r a c t ic e s  as seen by the b usiness  entrepreneur.
The em pirica l data d ea lin g  w ith b usiness  p r a c t ic e  was 
tabulated  from a questionnaire  submitted to manufactur­
ing  firm s in  the southwestern United S ta te s .  This 
sample covered such s e le c te d  f i e l d s  as the price-m aker, 
the fa c to r s  invo lved  in  p r ic e  determ ination, p r ice  
p o l ic y  concepts, and c o s t -p r ic e  r e la t io n s h ip s .  The 
two areas, th e o r e t ic a l  and p r a c t ic a l  b u s in e ss ,  form the 
b a s is  fo r  the observation s and con clusions which fo l lo w .
PRICE-MAKER
The price-maker in  manufacturing concerns, as 
in d ica ted  by em pirica l data, i s  u su a lly  a committee or 
the c h ie f  execu tive  o f  the b u s in e ss .  Committee action  
i s  normally dominated by the c h ie f  execu tive  and as a 
r e s u l t  he probably s e t s  more p r ic e s  than any other in d i ­
v id u a l or group.
246
I t  i s  naive to  b e l ie v e  that the b u sin ess  world 
u ses a l l  of the symbols and terms o f  the econom ist. I t  
i3  almost as a r t le s s  to  b e l ie v e  that a l l  p r ic e s  are 
autom atically  adjusted by the producer to  f i t  every  
change in  c o s t  and demand c h a r a c te r is t ic s  w ith in  the 
market. The .American price-maker f in d s  h im se lf  at a 
lo s s  in  many cases  to g ive  a concrete d e f in i t io n  of such 
terms as marginal c o s t  and marginal revenue; y e t ,  he 
grasps these concepts r e a d i ly  when they are explained  
to him. The m anufacturer's knowledge o f  demand and 
c o s t  co n d it io n s  i s  fundamental; however, h is  f a m i l i ­
a r i ty  w ith e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand i s  weak, and he many 
times l im i t s  h i s  sources of c o s t  data because o f  the 
expense in v o lv ed . P r ices  in  many < ases are dependent 
upon in d iv id u a l background and experience and as such 
bear some necessary  r e la t io n s h ip  to the h is to r y  of the 
firm and the in d u stry .
FACTORS IN PRICING
The primary fa c to r s  in  p r ic in g  are com petitive  
c o n d it io n s ,  co s t  a n a ly s is ,  and a reasonable return . 
Businessmen, through th e ir  r e l ia n c e  on p a st  experience  
as th e ir  b a s is  fo r  s e t t in g  p r ic e s ,  g en er a lly  and perhaps 
unknowingly fo llow  the econom ist's  concepts; t h i s  i s  a 
case wherein c o s t  or supply p r ice  f i x e s  the lower p r ic e
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l im i t  and demand and com petition  fa c to r s  se t  the upper 
p rice  l i m i t .  There i s  a tendency fo r  the businessman 
to use some type of p r ice  which w i l l  g ive  him h is  " fu l l  
c o s t ."  This bears a c lo se  r e la t io n s h ip  to the econom ist's  
c o s t  o f  production concept wherein a "normal p ro f it"  i s  
included in c o s t .  Many businessmen use some ru le  of  
thumb method fo r  p r ic in g  to cover th is  f u l l  c o s t ,  and 
th is  ru le  w i l l  normally be some formula arrangement w ith  
a percentage markup on overhead a fte r  f ig u r in g  d ir e c t  
c o s t s .
The r e s u l t s  o f  the em pirica l a n a ly s is  contained  
in  t h is  work lead  one to b e l ie v e  that most firms are 
in te r e s te d  in  long-run w elfare; however, th is  p o s it io n  
i s  not c o n s is te n t  w ith  answers rece ived  wherein only  
approximately 60$ of the firm s in d ica ted  long-run w elfare  
to be im portant. About 70$ of the firm s in d icated  that 
they did not s e l e c t  maximum revenue at a l l  times; only  
about 40$ of the firm s f e l t  th at  producers charged as 
much as they cou ld . Both of these  f ig u r e s  would in d ic a te  
that long-run w elfare was important. I f  40$ o f  American 
producers in  general are not in te r e s te d  in  long-run w el­
fa r e ,  then apparently many businessmen operate on a very 
sh o r t-s ig h te d  b a s i s .  The em pirical data can be in t e r ­
preted  to  cover th is  lack  of b u sin ess  fo r e s ig h t  i f  we
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assume that ’'adapting to  f i t  the in d iv id u a l com petitive  
s itu a tio n "  i s  about the same thing as promoting the 
long-run w elfare of the f irm . I f  t h i s  holds true ,  
approximately 90^ o f  a l l  business firm s examined are 
in te r e s te d  in  p r ic in g  in  such a manner as to survive in  
the long  run.
Empirical data in d ic a te s  that com petition  i s  not 
too important as a fa c to r  in  p r ic in g .  Oligopoly  
apparently i s  extremely common in  manufactured markets. 
Interview s re v e a l  that the businessman knows l i t t l e  
a c tu a lly  of h i s  com petitors in so fa r  as number i s  con­
cerned. For example, i t  i s  unusual that Q5% o f the 
large firm s examined contend th at they are very compet­
i t i v e  and y e t  85^ of these firm s in d ica te  that they have 
p r a c t ic a l ly  no fea r  o f  com petition . Manufacturing firm s  
In 69f3 o f  a l l  cases  in d ica te  that  they do not fea r  
compo t i t i o n .
No b u sin ess  firm can separate i t s e l f  and I t s  
bu siness  a c t i v i t i e s  from the impact of general economic 
f lu c tu a t io n s .  Probably very few firms w i l l  ever be able 
to  produce and s e l l  in  such a manner that continued  
e x is te n c e  as a profit-m aking concern w i l l  bo assured  
over long periods o f  time. However, because of the con­
tra c tu a l  arrangements for  raw m a te r ia ls ,  wages, s e l l i n g
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p r ic e s ,  and s im ila r  fa c to rs  which are ev id en t from the 
current a n a ly s is ,  a firm can p a r t ia l ly  in su la te  i t s e l f  
as an economic u n it  from many "market" adjustments.
PRICE STABILITY 
Many p r ic e s  for  manufactured goods are very 
s ta b le  over considerable  lengths o f  time. The length  of  
th is  s ta b le  p r ice  period i s  u su a lly  determined by the 
production period  under con sid eration  or the ca ta logu e-  
p rice  p er iod . S ev en ty -f iv e  per cent o f  a l l  firm s  
examined in d ica ted  that s ta b le  p r ic e s  were d e s ir a b le .  
Interviewed firm s in d ica ted  that p r ic e s  are f ix e d  for  a 
production period  and that they u su a lly  based production  
upon a f i s c a l  y ea r . Businessmen have found that by f i x ­
ing a uniform p r ice  over a period  o f  time they are able 
to  create  some s t a b i l i t y  in  the demand fo r  th e ir  product. 
In any ca se , r ig id  p r ic e s  are more or l e s s  forced  upon 
the businessman by the very nature of productive p rocesses  
and the len g th  of the production period  in  modern indus­
try .  Empirical r e s u l t s  show that firm s are committed to  
holding to  th e ir  p r ice  p o l ic y  in  times o f  d ep ress ion .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  b e liev e  th a t  73$ o f  the sm all f irm s,
52$ of the medium firm s, and 65$ of the large firm s would 
not adjust th e ir  p r ic e s  w ith c o s t  changes in  d ep ression .  
This p o in ts  up one o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  a questionnaire
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a p p r o a c h  t o  g a i n i n g  e m p i r i c a l  d a t a  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  a  
d i r e c t  i n t e r v i e w  m e t h o d .  T h e  m a t t e r  o f  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
a  q u e s t i o n  a n d  t h o  i n t e r p r o t a t i o n  o f  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  
p r i c e  p o l i c y  p e r h a p s  l e a d s  t o  a n  u n i n t e n d e d  a n s w e r  i n  
t h i 3  c a s e .
The concept of a kinked demand curve i s  f a i r l y  
w ell borne out from the r e s u l t s  o f  th is  in v e s t ig a t io n .
This concept provides a very reasonable explanation  for  
r ig id  p r ic e s .  I t  a llow s for  a d isc o n t in u ity  in the 
marginal revenue curve and while a businessman might not 
know about marginal revenue he i s  aware that ho can 
carry out on adjustment in c o s t  and s t i l l  maintain an 
o v e r a l l  p r o f i t  at a g iven  p rice  and output l e v e l .  This 
concept, i f  truo, s t r ik e s  at m on op olist ic  com petition  
theory s in ce the theory depends upon a p r e c ise  and r e ­
f in e d  th e o r e t ic a l  s i t u a t io n  wherein marginal cost  always 
equals marginal revenue.
AGREEMENTS, MONOPOLY, AND LEADERSHIP
Agreements o f  a p r ic in g  nature in  American indus­
try are very hard to a sc e r ta in .  Agreements in  p r ic in g  
are assumed to hinge prim arily  on c o l lu s io n .  There i s  
no way to  determine whether or not c o l lu s iv e  p r ic in g  takes  
place in  the market fo r  the m anufacturer's goods. Several  
firms Indicated  th a t  government contract p r ic e s ,  which
251
would be b id  upon, were predetermined and th is  would 
in d ica te  th a t  in  th is  one f i e l d  there was some c o l lu ­
s io n . I t  i s  very unusual, too , that 60% o f  the small 
firm s involved  in  th i3  study thought that i t  was true 
or p o ss ib ly  true that there was c o l lu s io n  in  p r ic in g .  
Large firms and medium firms in general deny that such 
p r ic in g  r e la t io n s h ip s  e x i s t .
Empirical data shows that about 00%, of manufac­
turing firm s ore not in te r e s te d  in  e s ta b l is h in g  monopoly. 
A b asic  in co n s is ten cy  a r is e s  at th is  p o in t  between ques­
t ion n a ire  and in terv iew  answers. A ll firms interview ed  
in d ica ted  that  they would e s ta b l i s h  monopoly i f  at a l l  
p o s s ib le ;  q u estionn aire  r e s u l t s  in d ica ted  that hardly  
any firm attempted monopoly. I t  i s  p o s s ib le  that the 
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  the term monopoly might present a 
problem at t h is  p o in t .  I t  i3  safe to assume that many 
firm s su re ly  attempt some monopoly elem ents, Ihe problem 
breaks down to the f a c t  th a t  I f  they could, they would. 
Interview s showed, however, th a t  p r ivate  monopolies are 
not as r u th le s s  and ex a c tin g  in  s e t t in g  p r ic e s  as many 
people seem to b e l i e v e .  M onopolists freq u en tly  re fr a in  
from short-run p r o f i t s  from fear  of long-run repercus­
s io n s .  Most m onopolists are known, and to  a large  ex ten t  
th e ir  monopoly con d ition  i s  dependent upon th e ir  own
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behavior. The m onopolist knows that h i 3  behavior can 
upset h is  current monopoly s i t u a t io n .  The m onopolist  
must e x e r c ise  enough r e s t r a in t  to keep h o s t i l e  govern­
ment reg u la tio n  away, and he must be ca r e fu l  in  s e t t in g  
p r ic e s  so high a3 to support r i v a l  concerns or to  make 
i t  p r o f i ta b le  to  import from d is ta n t  markets.
Price leadersh ip  apparently i 3 very prevalent  
' in  manufacturing industry; yet', in  many ca ses  i t  i s  d i f ­
f i c u l t  to  f in d  any one p a r t ic u la r  firm that w i l l  admit 
to being the p r ice  le a d e r .  Much o f  the leadersh ip  comes 
about through the in te r a c t io n  o f  the d e c is io n s  of a 
number of firm s w ith in  the competing group. Normally 
one firm w i l l  be dominant to  a l im ite d  ex ten t;  however, 
over a period o f  time the p o s it io n  of p r ice  leader  
probably s h i f t s  to  other firms because of changes in  
the sc a le  of output of the se v e r a l  competing firm s.
One r e s u l t  of the a n a ly s is  presented  in th is  work may 
help  to so lv e  the problem of duopoly and o lig o p o ly  
when p rice  lead ersh ip  i s  consid ered . I t  has always
been d i f f i c u l t  to  determine the ex ten t  to  which a firm
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had knowledge of the r e a c t io n s  of other firms to i t s  
p r ice  p o l ic y  and the impact o f  th e ir  p r ice  p o l ic y  upon 
i t s  own p r ic in g .  A ll  firm s interview ed tended to  
change p r ic es  "in the middle;" the use o f  t h i s  term
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in d ic a te s  that they a l l  fo llow  other firm s in  adjusting  
p r ic e .  I f  th is  i s  trxio, they look to leadersh ip  from 
some source other than th e ir  immediate com petitive area.
TAX ATI Oil
Taxes are an important fa c to r  in  price-making, 
according to 78;  ̂ of the firms analyzed. The term tax 
used here in c lu d es  a l l  ta x e s .  Businessmen are re lu c ta n t  
to  d iscu ss  ex a c tly  how taxes in flu ence th e ir  p r ic e s .  As 
a r e s u l t ,  there i s  no way to gauge the use o f  or tho 
importance of tax impact from a p ric ing  standpoint.
Medium firm s are very impressed by the importance o f  
taxa tion  as i t  a f fe c t s  p r ic e s ;  e ig h ty -e ig h t  per cent of  
these  firms in dicatod  that taxes  in fluenced  price  p o l ic y .  
Medium firm s were l ik e  a l l  others examined, howevor, in  
s ta t in g  g en er a lly  that some taxes are s h if te d  as ad dition  
to co s t  w hile other taxes are the government's share in  
th e ir  p r o f i t .  Because o f  the questionnaire  approach used  
in  th is  survey, i t  i s  e a s i l y  understood why firms would 
not comment f u l l y  on how they U3e taxes in  price  d e te r ­
m ination. This i s  one area in  which there i s  a need for  
a d d it io n a l research .
DISCRIMINATION 
Empirical r e s u l t s  in d ica te  th at  p r ice  d iscr im i­
n a tio n  i s  g en era lly  p ra c t ic ed  by manufacturers. The
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type of d iscr im in ation  v a r ie s  somewhat from large to  
small and medium concerns. Tne average businessman w i l l  
deny that h is  p r a c t ic e s  are n e c e s s a r i ly  those which 
would be termed a3 d iscr im inatory; he con sid ers price  
con cession s  as a rou tine  part of business op era tion s .
Such th ings as p r ice  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  based upon quantity  
and method of sa le  are g en er a lly  p racticed  by large b u s i ­
ness concerns. Small and medium firm s allow many d i f ­
f e r e n t  types of d i f f e r e n t i a l s  based upon tim e, person, 
and p lace  and these d i f f e r e n t i a l s  are very varied  and 
v a r ia b le •
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY 
Businessmen normally e s ta b l i s h  a l e v e l  of output 
which i s  somewhat below that l e v e l  which they would con­
s id er  to  be cap acity  output for th e ir  b u s in e ss .  They 
knowingly operate at lo s s  than ca p a c ity ,  and they r e a l i z e  
that added output would reduce c o s t s .  In one sense th is  
i s  i l l o g i c a l  s in ce  most firm s think that c o s t s  are o f  
very great Importance; y e t  even though they might reduce 
c o s t s  with an in crease  in  output, they do not do so .
Two con sid era tion s  en ter  at t h is  p o in t .  Perhaps the 
m atter of su rv iv a l and the a b i l i t y  to m aintain the lo n g -  
run w e ll  being of the firm  are considered in  e s ta b l is h in g  
p la n t  s c a le .  Long-run w elfare w i l l  include the s a fe ty
2 5 5
fa c to r  necessary to care fo r  breakdowns and increased  
orders. Secondarily , th is  s i tu a t io n  g iv es  other evidence 
that most markets are o l i g o p o l i s t i c  by nature. I t  i s  
unusual from an economic standpoint that firms would 
d e l ib e r a te ly  e s ta b l i s h  something l e s s  than capacity  
output when over 60;l of a l l  firms in d ica ted  they had a 
r a t io n a l  plan to determine the most e f f e c t iv e  sca le  of  
op era tion s . B a s ic a l ly ,  th is  p o in ts  up the f a c t  that  
many manufacturing concerns operate in  the realm of 
m onopolistic  com petition  wherein output w i l l  be somewhat 
short of that which would be achieved under pure compe­
t i t i o n .
COST ANALYSIS
Cost of production i s  of continuing and growing 
importance to  tho businessmen who contributed  to the 
em pirical data h ere in . The timing of the questionnaire  
had something to  do w ith  th is  answer. P r ic es  havo boon 
g en o ra lly  s ta b le  over the p ast  three years and y e t  c o s ts  
have tended to  increase s l i g h t l y  fo r  the businessman. 
N atu ra lly , he would be impressed with the growing impor­
tance o f  c o s t  in so fa r  as i t  a f f e c t s  h is  p r ice  and p r ice  
p o l ic y .
G enerally, i t  can be assumed that over h a l f  o f  
the firm s covered in  t h i s  survey are able to f igu re
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output and revenue that maximize p r o f i t s ;  however, the 
firm s examined make l i t t l e  or no attempt to  equate mar­
g in a l  revenue and marginal co s t  knowingly. They r e a l i s e  
that marginal c o s t  i s  important to  rock-bottom p r ic in g  
near the margin, and they emphasise that c o s t  accounting  
i 3 growing in  importance in so fa r  as p lant sc a le  is  con­
cerned; these f a c t s  are borne out by em pirica l r e s u l t s .  
These con sid era tion s  are in terp reted  to mean that monop­
o l i s t i c  com petition theory i s  gain ing  added relevance  
over a period o f  time. Large firm s normally are able to 
e s t a b l i s h  output and revenue to maximize p r o f i t s  much 
b e t te r  than medium and small f irm s. I t  i s  unusual that  
sm aller f irm s, wherein c o s t s  should be e a s i l y  computed, 
accurate ly  measured th is  p r o f i t  maximization point in  
only 27% o f  the cases  stu d ied .
The manufacturing firms examined apparently do 
not know the purpose o f  the accountant as he i s  p ic tu red  
by the econom ist. In gen era l, businessmen sa id  th a t  
there was no p a r t ic u la r  balance sh eet  p o s i t io n  that  
needed a t te n t io n  in th e ir  f irm s. 'Jhis i s  unusual when 
i t  i s  considered th a t  the action  of accountants should  
be to place the b u sin ess  in  a b e t te r  p o s i t io n .  A ll b u s i ­
nessmen co n sta n tly  attempt to b e t te r  the balance sheet  
of th e ir  b u s in e ss  i f  they consider  the long-run w elfare
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of th e ir  firm a3 the b a s is  fo r  p r ic in g .  This p a r t ic u la r  
condition  can bo found only in  the statem ents prepared 
by the accountants as of some p a r t ic u la r  time.
GEKErtAL CONCLUSIONS 
C o n v e n t i o n a l  m a r g i n a l  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  some n e c e s s a r y  
amendments can be  assumed to  be  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  p r o d u c ­
t i v e  and p r i c i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  th o se  f i r m s  w h ic h  f i x  t h e  
p r i c e  f o r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s .  However, t h e  m a r g i n a l  a n a l y s i s  
m ust  be r e g a r d o d  o n ly  os a g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  a b r o a d  
and n o t  i n  a p r e c i s e  s e n s e .  The n e c e s s a r y  amendments a re  
b a s e d  p r i m a r i l y  upon the  f a c t  t h a t  b u s in e s s m e n  im plem en t  
t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  upon f o r e c a s t s  b a s e d  upon p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  
and t h i 3  i n  r e a l i t y  i3  i n  m os t  ca3e3  o n ly  an i n f o r m e d  
g u e s s .
The average manufacturer examined in  th is  work 
does not have the con tro l over output and p r ice  which Is  
assumed by the conventional a n a ly s is  o f  m onopolistic  
com petition . A d i f f e r e n t ia te d  product w i l l  not allow  
a l l  firm s to f i x  the price  of th e ir  product in  the sense  
that they have m onop olistic  powers. Instead , even with  
d if f e r e n t ia te d  products, manufacturers find that they 
must hold th e ir  p r ices  and products in  alignment with  
those in  tho market. P r ices  w i l l  not n e c e s s a r i ly  be
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u n i f o r m  and n e i t h e r  w i l l  the  p r o d u c t s  be a b s o l u t e l y  
hom ogeneous .  Ihe d i f f e r e n c e s  w i l l  n o t  be g r e a t  e n ou g h ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t o  a l lo w  th e  c o n t r o l  which  C h am b er l in  and 
R ob in so n  f o r e s e e .  Thi3 i s  e v i d e n t  f rom t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
many f i r m s  f o l l o w  p r i c e  movements i n i t i a t e d  by  known o r  
unknown p r i c e  l e a d e r s ;  t h e s e  p r i c e - f o l l o w i n g  f i r m s  have  
no  s p e c i f i c  p r i c e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e i r  own n e c e s s a r i l y .
These observations and conclusions are those  
which are seemingly s e l f - e v id e n t  from the m ater ia ls  con­
ta ined  in  Chapters 2 and 3 .  No attempt has been made to  
e s ta b l i s h  models which require ab stract and u n r e a l i s t i c  
assumptions for  th e ir  general acceptance. The fa c t  that  
marginal a n a ly s is  has had 3 o m e  doubts ca s t  upon i t  does 
not destroy i t s  o v e r a l l  v a l id i t y ;  i t  i s  hoped that th is  
work has shown how marginal a n a ly s is  can be in terp reted  
to  apply to business p ra c t ice  in  a general i f  not in a 
s p e c i f i c  and p rec ise  manner.
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